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Introduction
In modern macroeconomics, business cycles are often analyzed with so-called “dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium” (DSGE) models. DSGE models originated from the Nobel
Prize winning work of Kydland and Prescott (1982), who initially used them to study
business cycles in economies where monetary policy is irrelevant. Nowadays, DSGE models
are widely used by theoretical researchers and applied policy analysts alike, for example to
study the consequences of fiscal and monetary policy or to analyze issues in international
finance. Most recently, they have seen a particularly rapid adoption by many central banks
as a state-of-the-art technique in monetary policy analysis.
DSGE models explicitly account for the interaction of optimizing people and firms in
markets for labor, goods, capital and more – hence the “general equilibrium”attribute. Via
savings and investments, these interactions are interrelated across time, which makes the
models “dynamic”. An important role is played by the expectations of forward looking
decision makers. Finally, business cycles are initiated by random shocks, say an exogenous
increase in productivity, so they are “stochastic”. Models differ in the nature of shocks
hitting the economy and, most importantly, how people, firms and policymakers interact.
Key questions for DSGE analysis are then:
1. What kinds of shocks drive our economy?
2. How does the economy react to them, for how long and why?
These questions can be asked with respect to model economies and vis-a-vis real world
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data. Answering them serves to understand the determinants of key macroeconomic vari-
ables, such as output, inflation and interest rates. Borrowing language initially used in
engineering this representation of data and models is also called “impulse response analy-
sis”.
A theoretical researcher builds a model around a set of exogenous impulses, say shocks
to productivity or government spending, and a set of transmission channels, which result
from the nature of markets, technologies, preferences and policies. An empirical analyst
then tries to identify these shocks in the data and seeks to measure the data’s responses
to them. Comparing their results is the basis for model evaluation. In this vein, my first
chapter studies the comovements of output and interest rates in post-war data for the U.S.
economy. Previous work by King and Watson (1996) found this data hard to match with a
wide array of DSGE models, but without a deeper analysis of the underlying shocks. Their
results generated a literature trying to match the data with new transmission mechanisms.
The contribution of my study is to refocus attention to the nature of shocks driving the
data. The models used by King and Watson and others are driven only by a limited set
of shocks (technology, monetary policy errors). As it turns out, estimated responses to
these shocks conform to the predictions from commonly used DSGE models. The puzzle
in the data is rather caused by an additional set of shocks – shocks which are responsible
for inflation persistence.
The second chapter of this thesis takes a deeper look at the methods commonly used to
estimate responses to structural shocks. The vector autoregressions (VARs) pioneered by
Sims (1980) have become an almost ubiquitous tool to represent and estimate time series
data in macroeconomics. At least approximately, DSGE models often lend themselves
to a VAR representation, which makes VAR analysis the empirical counterpart to DSGE
models. In order to carve out a particular kind of shock from the data, VARs need to make
identifying assumption. Most of the shocks important to DSGE models are identified by
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their long-run properties. A growing literature has however started to criticize the validity
and accuracy of VARs when used for long-run identification. Recently, a new method
has been proposed in the Macro Annual of the National Bureau of Economic Research
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson 2006b), with the promise of delivering better
results. My study asks whether these estimators are useful. Alas, the answer is no. The
key problem for empirical analysis with long-run restrictions is not so much the specification
of the VAR, but the well-known difficulties in disentangling permanent trends from long-
lasting cycles in the data.
The first two chapters assume that model agents and econometricians can either observe
the structural shocks, or at least that they can be perfectly inferred based on historical
data. This is commonly assumed in DSGE models, too.1 In reality it is however often the
case that we keep asking “What is going on?”, since the nature of a shock is typically not
obvious. The final and third chapter of this thesis embeds this kind of uncertainty in an
otherwise standard New Keynesian model of monetary policy. The model is constructed
such that the kind of structural inference used in the previous two chapters of this thesis
is not available to the private sector agents in the model: There are simply more shocks
than there is publicly observable data.
The contribution of the chapter is to show how policy changes when the public cannot
observe the true “impulses” driving policy. Modeling monetary policy becomes tricky in
this context, since the policymaker does not only influence economic fundamentals – like
borrowing conditions – but also people’s beliefs, which will be based on the history of policy
decisions. In fact, people’s beliefs become an economic “fundamental” and optimal policy
changes in dramatic ways even within the well-studied New Keynesian model. Most impor-
tantly, the policymaker seeks to strategically manage the beliefs of the public. The chapter
studies the optimal policy under discretion, where the policymaker retains the freedom to
1A detailed discussion can for example be found in Ferna`ndez-Villaverde et al. (2007).
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change his policies at each point in time. Usually this leads to myopic policies, since cur-
rent period decision makers cannot credibly influence people’s beliefs about future policies.
Under asymmetric information, public beliefs about current policy motives become a state
variable which is under the control of the policymaker. These beliefs are also relevant for
public beliefs about future policies with strong disciplinary effects on discretionary policies.
In the stylized model presented here, this is ultimately welfare enhancing.
Apart from studying these consequences of asymmetric information in a simple, but
widely known model, the chapter contributes a general methodology, which allows to extend
the analysis to the kind of large-scale models used by researchers in central banks for
realistic policy analysis.
Chapter 1
Puzzling Comovements between
Output and Interest Rates?
Multiple Shocks are the Answer
The relationship between output and interest rates has long been important to macroe-
conomists and policymakers alike. But basic stylized facts on their comovements in U.S.
data have proved difficult to match within a variety of modern business cycle models. For
instance, King and Watson (1996) study three models: a real business cycle model, a sticky
price model, and a portfolio adjustment cost model. They report that this battery of mod-
ern dynamic models fails to match the business cycle comovements of real and nominal
interest rates with output:
While the models have diverse successes and failures, none can account for the
fact that real and nominal interest rates are “inverted leading indicators” of
real economic activity.1
Calling interest rates inverted leading indicators refers to their negative correlation
with future output. These correlations are typically measured once the series have been
1King and Watson (1996, p.35). The inverted leading indicator property has been the subject of various
empirical studies, for example Sims (1992) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992). The expression “negative
leading indicator” is synonymous.
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passed through a business cycle filter.2 Amongst the diverse failures mentioned by King
and Watson, RBC models generate mostly a pro-cyclical real rate.
But in the data, the real rate is clearly anti-cyclical, it is negatively correlated with
current output. As mentioned already, it is also a negative leading indicator. This com-
monly found pattern of correlation between bc-filtered output and short-term interest rates
is depicted in Figure 1.1.3
What is the correct conclusion from a mismatch between implications from a dynamic
model and stylized facts? Modern dynamic models always involve a joint specification
of fundamental economic structure and driving processes. Model outcomes, such as the
output-interest rate correlation, involve the compound effect of these two features. Yet,
when “puzzling” findings are taken as evidence against a particular structural feature –
such as sticky prices or portfolio adjustment costs – it is typically not acknowledged that
the economy might alternatively be driven by different types of shocks that yield different
effects within the given structure. Yet, more carefully, it is simply unclear whether dynamic
models fail (or succeed) because of their transmission mechanisms or because of the nature
of their driving forces.
To shed more light on this important issue, I provide empirical evidence about output-
interest rate comovement conditional on three types of shocks: Technology shocks, mon-
etary shocks and sources of inflation persistence. The first two of these also drive the
models of King and Watson (1996). There are striking results of my decomposition, which
are reported in section 1.2 using plots analogous to Figure 1.1:
2When it can be applied without confusion, I use the phrase “business cycle filter”, or short “bc-filter”,
to describe the bandpass filters developed and applied in Baxter and King (1999) and Stock and Watson
(1999) or the filter of Hodrick and Prescott (1997, “HP”) since each eliminates nonstationary and other
low frequency components from a time series. These filters differ mainly in that the typical bandpass filters
eliminates not only cycles longer than 32 quarters but also those shorter than 6 quarters, while this latter
high-frequency component is retained in the HP filter.
3This evidence is broadly in line with previous studies, see for instance the stylized facts collected by
Stock and Watson (1999, Table 2) for bandpass-filtered U.S. data. The facts are also significant as can be
seen from the confidence intervals plotted in Figure A.3 of Appendix A.1.
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Note: cor(y˜t, x˜t−k) where y˜t is bandpass-filtered per-capita output and x˜t is bandpass-filtered nominal,
respectively real rate. This ex-ante real rate is constructed from the VAR described in Section 1.1 as
rt = it − Etπt+1. Monthly lags on the x-axis. U.S. data 1966–1996.
• After conditioning on technology, the real rate is pro-cyclical and a positive leading
indicator – just the opposite of its unconditional behavior. In response to such
permanent growth shocks, this is a common outcome for variants of the neoclassical
growth model, be they of the RBC or the New Keynesian variety (King and Watson
1996; Gali 2003; Walsh 2003; Woodford 2003).
• Conditional on monetary shocks the real rate is counter-cyclical and a negative lead-
ing indicator, which squares with simple New-Keynesian models, too.4
• Like monetary shocks, but even stronger, persistent shocks to inflation induce anti-
4Money is neutral in RBC models, so they have not much to say here. Conditional on monetary shocks,
output remains in steady state and correlations are zero.
8 CHAPTER 1. COMOVEMENTS OF OUTPUT AND INTEREST RATES
cyclical behavior of the real rate and cause it to be a negative leading indicator. These
shocks also account for the bulk of comovements between output and the nominal
rate.
Thus, the “output-interest rate puzzle” is already defused by conditioning on two widely-
studied shocks: Technology and monetary shocks, which counteract each other. Such
opposing effects of shocks to “supply” and “demand” are a general theme in Keynesian
models (Be´nassy 1995). To explain the overall behavior, in particular for nominal move-
ments, it is important to focus attention on sources of inflation persistence.
Rotemberg (1996), Gali (1999) and den Haan (2000) stress the importance of looking
at conditional comovements in the context of the comovement of output with either prices
or hours. In applying this general idea to output and interest rates, my specific approach
is motivated by the fact that the “puzzle” in this area is typically expressed in terms of
bc-filtered data.
The backbone of my calculations is a VAR for the joint process of (unfiltered) output,
nominal and real interest rate. The VAR serves both as a platform for identifying the
structural shocks and to model the bc-filtered covariances and correlations. The identified
shocks are shocks to the unfiltered data. For instance, the technology shock has a perma-
nent effect on output but it might also have important effects on economic fluctuations.
The point of bc-filtered statistics is to judge models solely on those cyclical properties, not
on their implications for growth (Prescott 1986). In this vein, the VAR is used to trace
out the effects of shocks to the bc-filtered components of output and interest rates. This is
done analytically using a frequency domain representation for the VAR and the bc-filters.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 1.1 lays out my VAR framework for iden-
tification of the shocks as well as for decomposing the filtered covariances. Results are
presented in Section 1.2. Related literature is briefly discussed in Section 1.3. Concluding
comments are given in Section 1.4.
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1.1 Empirical Methodology
The variables of interest to my study are the logs of per-capita output5, the nominal as
well as the real interest rate:
Yt =

yt
it
rt
 (1.1)
Let us call their bc-filtered component Y˜t. The goal is to model and estimate how structural
shocks induce comovements between the elements of Y˜t.
The backbone of all my calculations is a VAR. Owing to the real interest rate, Yt is
not fully observable. So the VAR is not run directly over Yt but rather over a vector of
observables Xt. As a benchmark, I specify a simple four-variable system using output
growth, inflation, the nominal rate and a monetary policy measure constructed by Romer
and Romer (2004):
Xt =

∆yt
πt
it
mt

(1.2)
The dynamics of Xt are captured by a p-th order VAR:
6
A(L)Xt = et = Qεt (1.3)
5All quantity variables shall be per-capita without further mention.
6For convenience, I dropped the constants such that Xt is mean zero. This is without loss of generality
since estimating a VAR from demeaned data is equivalent to running a VAR with constants.
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where
A(L) =
p∑
k=0
AkL
k , A0 = I
and Et−1εt = 0 , Et−1εtε
′
t = I
The coefficients Ak and forecast errors et can be estimated using OLS. Identification of
the structural shocks εt will be concerned with pinning down Q. Since fewer shocks are
identified than the VAR has equations, there remains an unidentified component without
structural interpretation.
The real rate is computed from the Fisher equation rt = ii − Etπt+1 where inflation
expectations are given by the VAR. So Yt can be constructed from Xt by applying a linear
filter:
Yt = H(L)Xt
where
H(L) =

(1− L)−1h∆y
hi
hi − hπ
(∑p
k=1AkL
k−1)

and h∆y, hi and hπ are selection vectors such that ∆yt = h∆yXt and so on.
The remainder of this section describes the following: First, how the structural shocks
are identified (Sections 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3). This gives usQ and the conditional dynamics
of the unfiltered variables can be computed from Yt = H(L)A(L)
−1Qεt. Second, how to
apply a bc-filter to the structural components of Yt to obtain the decomposition of their
auto-covariances (Section 1.1.4).
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1.1.1 Technology Shocks
Following Gali (1999), technology shocks are typically identified as the only innovation to
the permanent component of labor-productivity (output per hour).7 While both the mea-
surement of hours and the treatment of their stationarity have been found to be contentious
issues8, hours are of no direct interest to my study.
Instead of looking at labor productivity, I label innovations to permanent output (per
capita) as “technology shocks” for the following reason: The predictions of standard models
– RBC or New Keynesian – for output and interest rates remain identical, even when non-
technology shocks have permanent effects on output. Appendix A.4 argues in more detail
how non-technology candidates such as government spending or changes in the workforce
composition (Francis and Ramey 2005b) pose the same output interest rate puzzle as
technology shocks do. If hours are stationary, there are no non-technology influences
on permanent output and my identification is actually equivalent to Gali’s definition.9
Unit root tests for quarterly hours data, even favor the view of stationary hours over
my sample.10 Not using hours data makes it also possible to use a monthly instead of a
quarterly VAR.
The identifying restriction is that the first row of A(1)−1Q is full of zeros, except for a
7However, Fisher (2006) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) employ an alternative definition
of technology as specifically improving investments.
8See Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005) and Francis and Ramey (2005b) on measurement issues and
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003) and Gali and Rabanal (2004) on implications of the the
stationarity assumption.
9This is easy to see from yt = (yt − lt) + lt where lt are log hours (per capita). A stochastic trend in
output will be identical to the one of labor productivity if lt ∼ I(0).
10The results are not reported here, but can be found at http://www.elmarmertens.ch/thesis.
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positive entry in its first column11:
A(1)−1Q =

a11 0 0 0
· · · ·
· · · ·
· · · ·

where a11 > 0
Together with the orthogonality of the structural shocks, this identifies the first column of
Q, which is then computed as in Blanchard and Quah (1989)12.
1.1.2 Monetary Shocks
Again following standard conventions, monetary shocks are defined as unexpected devi-
ations from endogenous policy. With the Fed Funds rate as policy instrument, they are
unexpected Taylor-rule residuals, just as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) or
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Strictly speaking, I do not identify such shocks myself.
Rather, the measure of Romer and Romer (2004) is hooked up as a fourth variable mt to
my VAR.13 This allows to keep the VAR small, whilst the measure of the Romers takes
care of the Fed’s information about future activity and inflation – variables which typi-
cally influence endogenous policy. Without that information, my small VAR would likely
produce the “price puzzle” by confounding an anticipatory increase in interest rates with
an exogenous policy move14.
11This number corresponds to the square root of the zero-frequency spectral density of output growth.
Dots represent otherwise unrestricted numbers.
12An alternative method, yielding the same results, would be the instrumental variables regressions of
Shapiro and Watson (1988). This framework is more amenable to include overidentifying restrictions, such
as the orthogonality of technology and monetary shocks. See the Appendix A.3 for a description.
13mt in corresponds to ε
m
t in equation (14) of Romer and Romer (2004). The data is available from
their website.
14The VAR would spuriously document inflation to rise in response to a monetary tightening. That is
the price puzzle. A partial but classic response would be to include inflation-forecasting variables, like
commodity prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999). See Hanson (2004) and Giordani (2004) for
a critical discussion.
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Romer and Romer have recently constructed a measure from minutes of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) and the Greenbook of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors15 (Fed) which explicitly accounts for the Fed’s policy intentions and for the
Fed’s anticipation of future inflation and activity. The series has been constructed for
each FOMC meeting from 1964 to 1997. It is based on a series of “Intended Fed Funds
rates”16 for each FOMC meeting. Their policy measure is the residual from a regression
of these policy intentions on Greenbook forecasts of activity and inflation. The details are
described by Romer and Romer (2004) and the insightful discussion by Cochrane (2004).
Comparing the Romer series against technology shocks estimated from a three-variable
VAR using only output growth, inflation and nominal rate shows that the two series are
virtually uncorrelated. This squares nicely with the survey of McCandless and Weber
(1995) who find no long-term effects of monetary policy on the real economy. Likewise the
estimated technology shocks are very similar whether they are estimated from a VAR with
or without the Romer series. Appendix A.3 lays out a test strategy following Shapiro and
Watson (1988) and cannot reject that the Romer measure is orthogonal to the technology
shocks. The two identification strategies barely interfere with each other. My technology
shocks would be estimated to be practically the same when disregarding the Romer measure
and vice versa. For convenience only, I impose orthogonality in sample by projecting the
Romer measure off the technology shocks as explained below. The Romer measure series is
not iid and contains some persistence which is pruned by including it in the VAR similarly
as it is done by Romer and Romer (2004) themselves.17
Formally, the normalized monetary shock is the standardized residual εmt obtained from
15The Greenbook publishes forecasts by the Fed’s staff for future real activity and inflation.
16In constructing the series from FOMC minutes (prior to official targets) Romer and Romer (2004)
found that even when the Funds rate was not the official policy instrument, policy makers’ thinking was
fairly well shaped around informal fund rate targets. This supports the identification of policy shocks from
interest rates over a period which featured different schemes of official monetary policy making (Bernanke
and Blinder 1992; Bernanke and Mihov 1998).
17Romer and Romer (2004) use the cumulated series of mt instead which is by construction a unit root
process. This would however interfere with the long-run identification scheme of the technology shocks.
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projecting the forecast error of the VAR’s Romer equation, emt the fourth element of et in
(1.3), off the technology shocks (denoted εzt ):
emt = βzε
z
t + ε˜
m
t
εmt ≡ ε˜mt /
√
Var(ε˜mt )
The second column of Q is then filled up with the slopes of regressing the forecast errors
et onto the time series of monetary shocks ε
m
t .
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1.1.3 Inflation Persistence Shocks
Inflation persistence is a pertinent feature of the data (Fuhrer and Moore 1995a) but the
nature of shocks and transmission channels behind this phenomenom are subject of an
ongoing debate. For example, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) and King and Dotsey
(2006) try to link inflation persistence to particular forms of nominal stickiness in the
economy. A different approach is taken by the flexible price model of Dittmar, Gavin, and
Kydland (2005), where inflation persistence is a function of the central bank’s interest rate
policy.19
Inflation persistence is also an important characteristic of fluctuations in my VAR
which are not captured by technology and monetary shocks. Looking at the forecast error
variance of inflation between the 2 and 20 years, half of these persistent fluctuations are
unexplained. I am concerned with the associated comovements in output and interest
rates and given the uncertain sources of inflation persistence an agnostic scheme has been
chosen for the identification. Building on Uhlig (2004a, 2004b), the shock to “inflation
persistence” is constructed to explain the most of inflation’s forecast error variance over a
18This regression follows from et = Qεt and the orthogonality of the structural shocks. Even though the
regression of et on εt is multivariate, it follows from the Frisch-Waugh-Lowell Theorem, that the regression
slopes can be computed from separate, univariate regressions as well.
19Related ideas have been expounded also by Dotsey (1999) and King and Lin (2005).
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horizon of 2 to 20 years and to be orthogonal to technology and monetary policy errors.
The sign of the shock is determined by making it raise inflation on impact. Details of the
computations behind this procedure are described in Appendix A.2. In implementing the
aforementioned orthogonality constraint, I extend the eigenvector computations used by
Uhlig (2004b).
The scheme is agnostic is that it allows for the various sources of inflation persistence
listed above. In a modest interpretation, it merely groups together a large part of fluc-
tuations unexplained by technology and Romer shocks based on their effect on inflation
persistence. This “shock” captures very well the persistent fluctuations not driven by tech-
nology and monetary policy. What is more, it turns out to be an important source for
output interest rate comovements, too.
1.1.4 Decomposition of BC-Filtered Covariances
Summarizing the previous discussion, the impulse responses of the unfiltered variables in
Yt are given by H(L)A(L)
−1Q. These do not only trace out the business cycle responses
of Yt to the structural shocks εt, but also how the shocks induce growth as well as high-
frequency variations. The motivation for bc-filtering is now to focus only on the business
cycle effects.20 Formally, it remains to apply a bc-filter and to decompose the filtered
lead-lag covariances into the contributions of the structural shocks. The computations are
straightforward to perform in the frequency domain. A classic reference for the necessary
20Business cycle filters have also been criticized for creating spurious cycles, originally by Harvey and
Jaeger (1993) and followed by Cogley and Nason (1995) as well as in the discussion between Canova
(1998a, 1998b) and Burnside (1998). Whilst most of these papers focused on the HP filter, their analysis
also applies to the bandpass filter. But the bc-filtered statistics employed here can be perfectly justified
from the perspective of model evaluation in the frequency domain: The goal is not to match data and
model over all spectral frequencies, but only over a subset which is associated with “business cycles”. For
the U.S. this is typically taken to be 6 to 32 quarters following the NBER definitions of Burns and Mitchell
(Baxter and King 1999; Stock and Watson 1999). Formal concepts of model evaluation in this vein have
been advanced by Watson (1993), Diebold, Ohanian, and Berkowitz (1998), as well as Christiano and
Vigfusson (2003). Using the concept of the pseudo-spectrum this extends also to nonstationary variables,
notwithstanding the analysis of Harvey and Jaeger.
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tools is Priestley (1981). Similar techniques are employed by Altig et al. (2004) and Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2006).
The analysis is applicable to a wide class of bc-filters, including the HP-Filter, the
approximate bandpass filter of Baxter and King (1999) as well as the exact bandpass filter.
For the computations it is key that the bc-filter can be written as a linear, two-sided,
infinite horizon moving average whose coefficients sum to zero:21
Y˜t ≡ B(L)Yt
where B(L) =
∞∑
k=−∞
BkL
k
and B(1) = 0
The bandpass-filter is a such a symmetric moving average. It is explicitly defined in the
frequency domain and most of my calculations are carried out in the frequency domain.
For frequencies ω ∈ [−π, π], evaluate the filter at the complex number e−iω instead of the
lag operator L. This is also known as the Fourier transform of the filter which represents
it as a series of complex numbers (one for each frequency ω). Requiring B(1) = 0 sets the
zero-frequency component of the filtered time series to zero. For instance, the bandpass
filter22 passes only cycles between two and a half and eight years. For monthly data, it is
21Of course, some coefficients Bk can be zero. So B(L) could also be the first-difference filter. But mean-
ingful bc-filters should also be symmetric, such that they have a zero phase shift. Otherwise, comovements
over one frequency band, say business cycles, could be attributed by the filter to other frequencies, like
growth.
22Alternatively, the HP filter approximates a high-pass filter (King and Rebelo 1993) and its Fourier
transform is
B(e−iω) =
4λ (1− cos(ω))2
1 + 4λ (1− cos(ω))2
where λ is a smoothing parameter, conventionally set to 1600 for quarterly data. Likewise, the approximate
Bandpass-Filter can be implemented by computing the Fourier transform of the (truncated) lag polynomial
B(L) described by Baxter and King (1999).
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specified as follows:
B(e−iω) =

1 ∀ |ω| ∈ [ 2π
8·12 ,
2π
2.5·12
]
0 otherwise
Since the bc-filtered variables in Y˜t are covariance-stationary, their lead-lag covariances
exist and so does their spectrum. They can be computed from the VAR parameters and
the filters H(L) and B(L). To ease notation, the impulse responses of Y after applying
the bc-filter are written as
C˜(L) ≡ B(L)H(L)A(L)−1Q
so that the bc-filtered spectrum can be expressed as
SY˜ (ω) = C˜(e
−iω) C˜(e−iω)′ (1.4)
For each frequency ω, this is simply a product of complex-numbered matrices23. The lead-
lag covariance matrices of Y˜t can be recovered from the spectrum in what is known as an
inverse Fourier transformation
Γk
Y˜
≡ EY˜tY˜t−k
=
1
2π
∫ π
−π
SY˜ (ω) e
iωkdω (1.5)
which can be accurately and efficiently computed using well-established algorithms24.
23The transposes are conjugate transpose, i.e. they flip also the sign of the imaginary components.
24In Matlab for instance, fast Fourier algorithms are encoded in fft and ifft. For ω I use an evenly
spaced grid over the unit circle with 1024 respectively 512 elements depending on the persistence of the
VAR (the discrete fast Fourier algorithms behind fft and ifft work best for powers of 2). Here is a rule
of thumb for the accuracy of the discretized Fourier transformation: Call n the number of grid points and
λ the largest eigenvalue (in absolute terms) of the VAR’s companion matrix. λn should be numerically
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Since the structural shocks are orthogonal to each other, the decomposition of the
covariances Γk
Y˜
is straightforward. First, the spectrum is computed conditional on each
shock. Then, the conditional lead-lag covariances follow from an inverse Fourier transfor-
mation, analogously to equation (1.5). To fix notation, the shocks are indexed by s and Js
is a square matrix, full of zeros except for a unit entry in its s’th diagonal element. The
spectrum conditioned on shock s is
SY˜ |s(ω) = C˜(e
−iω) Js C˜(e
−iω)′ (1.6)
Since
∑
s Js = I the conditional spectra add up to SY˜ (ω). This carries over to the coeffi-
cients Γk
Y˜ |s ≡ E(Y˜tY˜t−k|s) from the inverse Fourier transformation of SY˜ |s(ω).
∑
s
Γk
Y˜ |s = Γ
k
Y˜
This VAR framework is also capable of handling unit roots in Yt. By construction,
H(L) and thus Yt has a unit root such that H(1) is infinite. For computing the bc-
filtered spectrum SY˜ (ω) in (1.4), B(1) = 0 takes precedence over this unit root. It is
straightforward to check that H(eiω) is well defined everywhere, except at frequency zero.
So we can think of the nonstationary vector Yt as having a pseudo-spectrum SY (ω) =
C(e−iω) C(e−iω)′ where C(L) = H(L)A(L)−1Q and which exists for every frequency on
the unit circle except zero. Similar remarks apply to potential unit roots in the VAR such
that some element(s) of A(1) would be zero. As long as the solutions to the characteristic
equation A(z) = 0 are on or outside, but not inside the unit circle, the computations above
close to zero to ensure accuracy over the entire range of frequencies. The reason is that discretizing
the frequencies over [−π;π] is analogous to approximating the complete dynamics by a finite number
of impulse responses. For stationary variables, the impulse responses ultimately converge to zero. The
rule of thumb picks n large enough to capture this. Computations can be sped up dramatically using
SY˜ (ω) = SY˜ (ω)
′ = SY˜ (−ω)T (where T is the simple, non-conjugate transpose) and by computing the
spectrum only for frequencies where B(e−iω) 6= 0.
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run through. Higher orders of integration, i.e. powers of unit roots (1− L)d where d is an
integer, thus fit in this framework as well.25
1.2 Results
This section presents the results for the VAR described in the previous section. Monthly
data is taken from FRED26 on per-capita output (real Industrial Production), CPI inflation
and the average nominal yield on three-month T-Bills for the U.S. from 1966 to 1996.27 This
sample is determined by the availability of the Romer shocks. Industrial production data is
used in order to have a monthly data set, similar results are obtained from quarterly data
using GDP data, albeit with reduced statistical significance.28 Except for the interest rates
all data is seasonally adjusted in this study. The VAR is estimated with 12 lags to ensure
uncorrelated residuals. (See Appendix A.1 for lag-length selection.) After accounting for
initial values, the sample covers the period from 1967 to 1996.
To assess the statistical significance of the results, bootstrapped confidence intervals are
computed for each shock. As discussed by (Sims and Zha 1999) these are best interpreted
as the posterior distributions from a Bayesian estimation with flat prior. The small sample
adjustment of Kilian (1998) is used to handle the strong persistence of the VAR29. In a
first round, the small sample bias of the VAR coefficients is estimated from 1, 000 Monte
25Even for a nonstationary VAR, the OLS estimates of its coefficients in A(L) are consistent, they would
even be super-consistent. The roots of A(z) are the inverse of the eigenvalues to the VAR’s companion
form matrix. The only computational issue is that this cannot handle VARs whose point estimates imply
companion eigenvalues outside the unit circle.
26Federal Reserve Economic Data, maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/).
27Output growth, inflation and interest are all expressed in annualized log-percentage rates. it = log(1+
It/100), ∆yt = 12 · (logYt − logYt−1) and πt = 12 · (logPt − logPt−1) where It is the annualized nominal
yield in percent, Yt and Pt are the levels of real per-capita Industrial Production, respectively the PCE
price deflator, as reported by FRED.
28Again, these additional results are available from the author upon request respectively at
http://www.elmarmertens.ch/thesis.
29The largest root equals 0.979, see Table A.1 in Appendix A.1. Furthermore, a rejectance sampling is
applied considering only stable VARs such that the long run restrictions can be applied.
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Carlo draws. In the second round, the posterior distribution is constructed from 2, 000
draws using the VAR adjusted for the small sample bias. The procedure follows exactly
Kilian (1998) where further details are given.
For the long-run identification it is important that all elements of Xt are stationary.
The critical elements of Xt are here inflation and the nominal rate. Given their low power
it is no wonder that standard Dickey-Fuller tests cannot reject the presence of a unit root
in these variables. In the VAR context it is however more appropriate to use the covariate-
augmented Dickey Fuller test of Hansen (1995), which has more power. It tests for the
presence of unit roots directly in the context of the VAR equations and resoundingly rejects
the unit root hypothesis.3031
1.2.1 Real Interest Rate and Output
A key result of this paper is that technology shocks induce a strongly pro-cyclical real rate
which is also a positive leading indicator for up to one year. This is depicted in Figure 1.2
which decomposes the filtered covariances between output and the real rate. Covariances
add linearly, so they are a natural measure for the decomposition. The total covariances
in Figure 1.2 are just a rescaling of the correlations reported in Figure 1.1 above.
Figure 1.2 shows further that monetary shocks induce negative covariances at leads
between zero and a year and a half. Overall, monetary shocks appear to play a much
smaller role in terms of explaining the overall covariation. Since they are essentially defined
as the Fed rolling dice, it is no wonder that their impact is comparably small. Qualitatively
similar, but quantitatively stronger are the comovements due to the inflation persistence
30The t-statistics are −11.87 for inflation, respectively −2.89 for the nominal rate and the associated
“ρ2” statistics are 0.43 and 0.54 which makes both t-statistics significant at the 1%, respectively 5% level.
31As a robustness check, an alternative VAR has been specified allowing for a common trend in inflation
and nominal rate. This specification yields qualitatively similar results to those obtained here. (The
inflation persistence shock has been replaced there with a permanent shock to inflation.). The results are
available on http://www.elmarmertens.ch/thesis.
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Figure 1.2: Covariance Decomposition for Real Rate and Output
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Note: Bandpass-filtered moments, Cov (y˜t, r˜t−k), computed from VAR described in Section 1.1. Monthly lags on the x-axis.
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shock. It causes the real rate to be strongly anti-cyclical and to be a negative leading
indicator.
It is ambiguous to put a number like “percentage explained” on the decompositions,
since covariances can be negative as well as positive. For a large part, the technology
effects are offset by the covariances conditional on monetary shocks so that the shock to
inflation persistence tracks the overall autocovariance function pretty well. But clearly,
substantial comovements are induced by technology and monetary shocks, too. (Variance
decompositions are discussed further in Section 1.2.3 below.)
Both the monetary autocovariances as well as those caused by the inflation persistence
shock are highly significant, see Figure 1.3 respectively 1.4. But there is much larger
uncertainty associated with the technology shocks (see Figure 1.5). This is a general
feature of inference on long run effects in VARs (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson
2006b). The 90% confidence interval covers zero practically at all leads and lags. Since the
early days of VARs, Sims (1987) has already advocated studying the shape and location of
the posterior distribution instead of critical values alone. Indeed, the posterior distribution
of Cov (y˜t, r˜t−k) is highly skewed and clearly concentrated in the region of positive values
for k between zero and one year.
1.2.2 Nominal Interest Rate and Output
Turning to the nominal rate, it is striking that only monetary and inflation persistence
shocks give rise to sizeable comovements with output, see Figure 1.6. The autocovariance
functions associated with the two shocks are qualitatively similar to the overall behavior of
a pro-cyclical nominal rate which is an inverted leading indicator for output after half a year
and more. As for the real rate, these conditional autocovariances are clearly significant, see
Figure 1.3 and 1.4. Qualitatively, technology shocks lead to a positively leading nominal
rate, but these comovements are very small.
1
.2
.
R
E
S
U
L
T
S
23
Figure 1.3: BC-Moments conditional on Monetary Shock
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Note: Covariances EY˜tY˜
′
t−k conditional on monetary shocks for VAR described in Section 1.1. Correlations on the upper diagonal. Bandpass-
filtered moments. Bootstrapped standard-errors bands with Kilian (1998)’s small sample adjustment (1000 draws in first round, 2000 draws in
second). Percentiles are shaded: 95% (light), 90% (middle), 68% (dark) and 38% (very dark). White line is median of bootstraps. Black line
is point estimate of VAR. Monthly lags on the x-axis.
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Figure 1.4: BC-Moments conditional on Inflation Persistence Shock
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Note: Covariances EY˜tY˜
′
t−k conditional on inflation persistence shock for VAR described in Section 1.1. Correlations on the upper diagonal.
Bandpass-filtered moments. Bootstrapped standard-errors bands with Kilian (1998)’s small sample adjustment (1000 draws in first round, 2000
draws in second). Percentiles are shaded: 95% (light), 90% (middle), 68% (dark) and 38% (very dark). White line is median of bootstraps.
Black line is point estimate of VAR. Monthly lags on the x-axis.
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Figure 1.5: BC-Moments conditional on Technology Shock
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Note: Covariances EY˜tY˜
′
t−k conditional on technology shocks for VAR described in Section 1.1. Correlations on the upper diagonal. Bandpass-
filtered moments. Bootstrapped standard-errors bands with Kilian (1998)’s small sample adjustment (1000 draws in first round, 2000 draws in
second). Percentiles are shaded: 95% (light), 90% (middle), 68% (dark) and 38% (very dark). White line is median of bootstraps. Black line
is point estimate of VAR. Monthly lags on the x-axis.
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Figure 1.6: Covariance Decomposition for Nominal Rate and Output
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Note: Bandpass-filtered moments, Cov (y˜t, i˜t−k), computed from VAR described in Section 1.1. Monthly lags on the x-axis.
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1.2.3 Impulse Responses and Forecast Error Variances
So far the cyclical behavior of output and interest rates has been described in terms of
bandpass-filtered covariances. This subsection reports results on impulse response and
variance decompositions for the unfiltered variables which corroborate the preceding anal-
ysis.
The first column of Figure 1.7 plots the response of Yt to a monetary policy shock. The
shock leads to a contractionary increase in nominal and real interest rates for about a year
which is followed by contractionary effects on output and inflation, which is similar to the
results of Romer and Romer (2004). (Cochrane (2004) discusses the initial price puzzle
evident in his and mine calculations.) This is consistent with counter-cyclical, negatively
leading interest rates as found above for the bandpass filtered data.
By construction, the technology shock raises output permanently. The second column
of Figure 1.7 shows that this growth is accompanied by a significantly increased real rate
for one to two years, which again matches the evidence discussed earlier. Because of the
non-trivial effects of bc-filtering32 it is not a foregone conclusion, that the picture emerging
from the impulse responses should mirror the results for the bc-filtered comovements as it
does here.
In order to better understand the shocks and transmission channels behind the infla-
tion persistence shock, it is useful to study the associated impulse responses in the third
column of Figure 1.7. Due to the sign restriction inflation increases on impact and – not
necessarily but neither surprisingly – stays consistently positive for more than two years.
This persistent rise in inflation is met by a very persistent increase in nominal rates, which
is however not sufficiently commensurate to keep real rates from falling below steady state
for up to a year33. Real activity is accordingly stimulated for slightly more than two years.
32For a critical discussion see for instance Canova (1998a) or King and Rebelo (1993).
33Except for a brief positive spike in the seventh month.
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Figure 1.7: Impulse Response Functions
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Note: Estimates from VAR, equation (1.2) described in Section 1.1. Responses of unfiltered variables to a one-standard deviation shock
(H(L)A(L)−1Q). Bootstrapped standard-errors bands with Kilian (1998)’s small sample adjustment (1000 draws in first round, 2000 draws in
second). Percentiles are shaded: 95% (light), 90% (middle), 68% (dark) and 38% (very dark). White line is median of bootstraps. Black line
is point estimate of VAR. Monthly lags on the x-axis.
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In my interpretation, these are instances of the Fed responding (at least initially) with an
insufficient interest rate policy to expansionary shocks, like government spending. Adverse
supply shocks are hardly compatible with this situation since both activity and inflation
are increased.
As argued earlier, it is hard to measure “shares explained” for the covariance decompo-
sitions. Looking at the variance decompositions reported in Table 1.1, it is however clear
that all three shocks are important for explaining movements in the VAR and that the
unexplained remainder is very small. Looking at the bc-filtered variances in the bottom
panel, technology is the key driver behind real rate fluctuations. It explains almost half of
their bc-filtered variance. Monetary policy shocks and the inflation persistence shock ex-
plain each about half the fluctuations in the nominal interest rate, whereas the explanatory
power of technology shocks is close to zero. Interestingly, at the bc-frequencies, technol-
ogy explains only about 17% of output fluctuations, the bulk being accounted for by the
inflation persistence shock with 57%. The unfiltered variations in the VAR’s forecast er-
rors yield qualitatively similar decompositions, except that technology shocks account for
an ever increasing share in output variations. Please recall that the technology shock is
constructed to completely account for output movements in the long run.
1.3 Related Literature
To overcome the output-interest rate puzzle, Beaudry and Guay (1996) and Boldrin, Chris-
tiano, and Fisher (2001) propose models with habit preferences and frictions to capital ac-
cumulation respectively sectoral factor immobility. This matches the real rate evidence by
tweaking the transmission mechanism for a single kind of shock, namely technology. But
the evidence presented in this study, suggests that the standard RBC mechanism for tech-
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Table 1.1: Variance Decompositions
Shocks
MP Tech InfP Rest
From 1 to 12 lags
y 3.80% 39.49% 48.85% 7.86%
i 41.10% 0.99% 48.92% 8.99%
r 27.98% 50.02% 14.70% 7.31%
π 5.66% 51.41% 32.08% 10.85%
From 1 to 60 lags
y 7.62% 75.73% 13.59% 3.06%
i 17.67% 3.66% 73.98% 4.69%
r 25.83% 32.18% 32.50% 9.49%
π 9.94% 43.19% 37.88% 8.99%
From 1 to 120 lags
y 3.13% 88.17% 7.44% 1.26%
i 18.17% 4.55% 72.44% 4.85%
r 23.19% 29.35% 39.06% 8.41%
π 9.77% 41.13% 40.39% 8.70%
From 24 to 240 lags
y 0.82% 96.96% 1.92% 0.30%
i 6.04% 10.37% 82.13% 1.46%
r 15.03% 9.23% 69.54% 6.19%
π 26.05% 23.42% 43.15% 7.38%
Total Variance
y 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
i 18.09% 4.58% 72.49% 4.83%
r 23.12% 29.18% 39.31% 8.39%
π 9.82% 41.08% 40.40% 8.70%
Total BC-Variance
y 22.25% 16.69% 57.45% 3.61%
i 45.57% 2.76% 45.37% 6.30%
r 21.92% 45.75% 26.21% 6.12%
π 17.81% 25.69% 54.57% 1.93%
Note: Variance decompositions computed from the VAR described in Section 1.1. “MP” is the monetary
policy shock and “InfP” the inflation persistence shock. The latter is computed as discussed in Section 1.1.3
based on the forecast error window from 24 to 240 lags. “BC-Variance” is bandpass filtered variance.
Monthly lags.
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nology works fine.34 It is rather the interaction of several shocks leading to the “puzzling”
evidence.
In this spirit, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) report success with decision lags in a
sticky price model35. The only structural shock they identify are disturbances to monetary
policy. But their solution to the output-interest rate puzzle is based on the interaction
with other shocks, which are left unidentified. This is revealed by their impulse response
functions (Rotemberg and Woodford 1997, Figure 1). Following a monetary shock, their
model’s output responses are negative (respectively zero) at all lags whilst they are positive
for the nominal rate. Since conditional lead-lag covariances are just convoluted impulse
responses, they are negative (respectively zero) at all leads and lags. This contrasts with
the changing signs in the unconditional covariances depicted in my Figure 1.1 respectively
their Figure 2.
Likewise, Fuhrer and Moore (1995b) model the inverted leading indicator property of
interest rates with multiple, non-structural shocks and couch their analysis just in terms of
unconditional statistics. My paper is an empirical attempt to disentangle the underlying
interaction of the various structural shocks.
34Beaudry and Guay (1996) recognize the importance of conditioning on technology, too. They use
cointegrating properties between output, consumption and investment derived by King et al. (1991), which
are similar in spirit to my specification described in Section 1.1.1. When conditioning on these permanent
shocks, they report negative correlations between output growth and the unfiltered real rate. Since growth
rates amplify high-frequency fluctuations instead of focusing on business cycle characteristics, these results
are hardly comparable to my approach and the puzzle framed by King and Watson (1996).
35Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) look only at output and the nominal rate. They use linear detrending
instead of the stochastic procedures considered here. Still they find similar patterns of covariation and
juxtapose their results to the puzzle posed by King and Watson (1996).
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1.4 Conclusions
An economic model specifies restrictions on how the economy responds to exogenous forces.
Data may not conform to these predictions, either because the specified responses are
wrong, or because the set of forces considered in the model does not sufficiently capture
those impinging on the real world (or both).36 King and Watson (1996) report an output-
interest rate puzzle, because of discrepancies in the unconditional correlations of output
and interest rates in U.S. data and a variety of calibrated models. But it appears in a
different light, once the bc-statistics are conditioned on structural shocks. At the root of
the “puzzle” are not so much the transmission mechanisms of their models, but rather the
interaction of several shocks37. Three points stand out:
Conditional on technology shocks, the comovements between output and real rate lines
up fairly well with standard models, be it the standard RBC model or the technology
channel of textbook New-Keynesian models as studied by Gali (2003), Walsh (2003) or
Woodford (2003). For all specifications considered, the contemporaneous correlation be-
tween (bc-filtered) real rate and output is positive. Likewise, the real rate is a positive
leading indicator of output for almost two years. Unconditionally, the real rate is widely
reported to be just the opposite – namely counter- or a-cyclical and a negative leading
indicator. Attempts to match this only with technology shocks appear to be going in the
wrong direction.38 The overall behavior must be the outcome of an interaction of several
36A case in point is how Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) add government spending shocks to RBC
theory to resolve the Dunlop/Tarshis/Keynes debate on the overall cyclicality of real wages. See between
Dunlop (1938), Tarshis (1939) and Keynes (1939), the issue is also summarized by Sargent (1987, p. 487).
Another example for solving the same puzzle with multiple shocks is how Baxter and King (1991) enrich
the RBC model with demand shocks.
37Another line of attack in this area has been opened by Dotsey, Lantz, and Scholl (2003) by pointing out
that the real rate evidence is sensitive to the choice of price deflator used for constructing the real rate. The
widely reported anti-cyclicality of the real rate is particularly strong when deflating with the CPI which has
been used in this paper, too. It is a-cyclical or weakly pro-cyclical using the deflator for personal consump-
tion expenditures (PCE). I can replicate this with my VAR, too. However, the basic results for conditional
comovements between output and real rate remain valid. These alternative results for the PCE deflation
are available from the author upon request or can be found at http://www.elmarmertens.ch/thesis.
38See for instance the RBC modifications of Beaudry and Guay (1996) and Boldrin, Christiano, and
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shocks. Indeed:
When conditioning on monetary shocks, the real rate is counter-cyclical and a nega-
tive leading indicator as predicted by the simple New-Keynesian models. Such opposing
responses to “supply” and “demand” shocks are a general theme in Keynesian models
(Be´nassy 1995).
Sources of inflation persistence make up for the bulk of comovements not explained
by technology and monetary shocks. In particular, they explain most of the comovements
between output and the nominal rate. They are also responsible for the overall anti-cyclical
real rate. Models need to include other shocks than technology and monetary policy errors
to explain these effects.
Fisher (2001) with habit preferences and frictions like capital accumulation and sectoral factor immobility.
Beaudry and Guay (1996) recognize the importance of conditioning on technology. But since they use a
quite different detrending method their results of a counter-cyclical real rate even after conditioning on
technology are hard to compare with the results in this study. See also Footnote 34.
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Chapter 2
Are Spectral Estimators Useful for
Implementing Long-Run Restrictions
in SVARs?
VARs have been criticized for failures in estimating the responses to long-run shocks. A
crucial element for long run identification is the spectral density at zero-frequency, also
known as “long-run variance”. OLS estimates of VAR coefficients are concerned with
minimizing forecast error variance, not estimating the long run variance. This has recently
motivated Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2006a, 2006b), henceforth “CEV”, to
propose a new way of estimating structural VARs using a combination of OLS and a
nonparametric estimator. They argue that their estimator virtually eliminates the bias
associated with the standard OLS estimator. This paper investigates their procedure in
more detail.
CEV’s mixing-and-matching of OLS and non-parametric estimates is not internally
consistent. For example, it misrepresents the total variance of the data. The spectral
estimates (correctly) allow for non-iid residuals in the finite-order VAR when the under-
lying model is of infinite order. And CEV use this to compute the long-run responses of
variables to shocks. But when mapping these back into impact responses, the information
is neglected. This inconsistency is shown to be quantitatively relevant. Moreover, the
35
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inconsistency makes it impossible to obtain meaningful estimates of the shocks themselves.
When the relationship between forecast errors and structural shocks is inverted with the
CEV coefficients, one obtains a time series which is identical to the OLS estimates up to
a scale factor. This is of interest to any researcher wanting to adopt their strategy.
The CEV framework is corrected here by recognizing that the non-parametric esti-
mate contains information about omitted lags in the VAR. This misspecification has been
stressed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005, henceforth “CKM”), Erceg, Guerrieri,
and Gust (2005) and Cooley and Dywer (1998). My correction retains the OLS esti-
mates and fills up the omitted lags with a spectral factorization of the spectral density’s
non-parametric estimate. By construction, this adjusted S-VARMA matches the sample
variance of the data just as OLS does.
The various procedures are applied to data simulated from the same model economy
as in CKM and CEV – but over a wider set of calibrations as in CEV. Four key results
emerge:
1. Non-parametric estimates of long-run variance are not much better than OLS. Using
the CEV specification for the spectral estimators bandwidth1, they are even consid-
erably worse.
2. The variance misrepresentation of CEV is substantial – particularly when using their
(2006b) estimator.
3. Taking their procedure at face value, it is no panacea at all. Depending on the true
process, OLS can have both smaller bias and smaller sampling uncertainty. The
spectral factorization proposed here performs almost uniformly better than OLS in
terms of bias, however the gains are fairly small and sampling uncertainty is large.
1Comparable to lag length in a time series model, bandwitdth is a key parameter in spectral estimation.
See Section 2.1.2 for details.
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4. For lab economy simulated here, the corrected procedure does somewhat better in
terms of bias than the other methods. But overall the bias is still large and sampling
uncertainty is considerable. This is no surprise since it inherits the considerable small
sample issues of the spectral density estimates. A major issue for all procedures are
the effects of small sample bias, not only misspecification bias.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.1 compares the standard
OLS procedure for long-run identification against the spectral method by CEV. To remedy
their conceptual shortcomings, a spectral factorization procedure is proposed. Section 2.2
describes the model economy used to simulate the performance of the various estimation
routines. Section 2.3 presents the Monte Carlo results and Section 2.4 concludes the paper
with a brief summary and a discussion.
2.1 Long-Run Identification in VARs
An economic model is supposed to specify a VAR representation for a stationary vector of
observable variables2 Xt:
Xt = B(L)Xt−1 + et (2.1)
where B(L) is a polynomial in the lag-operator L
B(L) =
∞∑
k=1
BkL
k−1 (2.2)
2For notational convenience, but without loss of generality, Xt represents the demeaned variables. As
an application of the Frisch-Waugh-Lowell Theorem, this is both theoretically and numerically equivalent
to including a constant in a VAR using the original data.
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whose roots lie all outside the unit circle and the innovations are iid
et ∼ iid(0,Ωe) (2.3)
Note that the model prescribes an infinite order VAR. When Bk = 0 for k > p this is
a finite order VAR. But as noted by Cooley and Dywer (1998), many interesting models
have only infinite order VAR representations. In the remainder I will always assume that
the true VAR representation is of infinite order.
For the identification of structural shocks, there has to be an invertible one-to-one
mapping from innovations et to the structural shocks εt driving the underlying model –
such as technology, monetary policy errors, exogenous government spending etc.:
et =A0 εt (2.4)
where A0 is square and |A0| 6= 0. Ferna`ndez-Villaverde et al. (2007) derive conditions
when a (linear) dynamic model economy will have a VAR representation satisfying this
invertibility (see also Appendix B.2). My paper considers only cases where these con-
ditions are satisfied, though possibly only in an infinite order VAR representation. The
same applies to the situations studied by CKM, CEV as well as Erceg, Guerrieri, and
Gust (2005). Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Sargent (2005) give examples of
interesting models where the condition is satisfied and where not. By excluding the com-
plications arising from non-invertibilities we want to focus on problems stemming solely
from finite order approximations of the VAR.3
3See for example Giannone and Reichlin (2006) on the non-invertibility problem.
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It will be handy to introduce the notation
C(L) ≡ (I − B(L)L)−1 =
∞∑
k=0
CkL
k where C0 = I (2.5)
for the non-structural moving average (VMA) coefficients of Xt = C(L)et. The structural
moving average representation for Xt is then
Xt = A(L)εt with A(L) = C(L)A0 (2.6)
Long-Run Restriction
In the spirit of CEV and CKM, we will only be concerned with identifying one of the
structural shocks. For concreteness, let it be the first one, denoted εzt , and call it “technol-
ogy shock”. Think of the first element of Xt as being a growth rate (a difference in logs),
like the change in labor-productivity (Gali 1999) or output growth (Blanchard and Quah
1989). The identifying assumption is then that only the technology shock has a permanent
effect on the level of the first element of Xt. This restricts the following matrix of long-run
coefficients, A(1) =
∑∞
i=0Ai:
A(1) = C(1)A0
=
a¯11 0 . . . 0
# # . . . #
 and a¯11 > 0 (2.7)
A key object for implementing this constraint is the spectral density of Xt. The spectral
density at frequency ω is defined as
SX(ω) ≡
∞∑
k=−∞
E(XtX
T
t−k)e
−iωk = C(e−iω) ΩC(e−iω)T (2.8)
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where i is the imaginary unit and the transpose is complex conjugate. A(1) factors the
spectral density of Xt at frequency zero:
A(1)A(1)T = C(1) ΩC(1)T = SX(0) (2.9)
One way to compute the first column of A0 is by recovering A(1) from the Cholesky
decomposition of SX(0). (This is the unique lower triangular factorization of a positive
definite matrix.4):
A(1) = chol {SX(0)}
CEV show that the restriction in (2.7) uniquely pins down the first column of A0 and
the Cholesky factorization is one possible implementation. Its orthogonalization of the
remaining columns of A(1) is arbitrary.5
The long-run coefficients can then be mapped into the matrix of impact responses using
the VAR dynamics encoded in the polynomial of lag coefficients B(L):
A0 = (I − B(1))A(1) (2.10)
4The spectral density SX(0) = C(1)ΩC(1)
T is strictly positive definite when the forecast errors et are
linearly independent, which implies that their variance covariance matrix Ω is nonsingular. SX(0) inherits
positive definiteness from Ω since C(1) is nonsingular. I − B(1) = C(1)−1 exists because of the assumed
stationarity of the VAR process.
5In general, A(1) is described by
A(1) = chol {SX(0)}
[
1 0
0 W
]
whereWWT = I
In the lab economy described later, the VAR will be bivariate and the forecast errors et are a linear
combination of only two shocks. Knowing the technology shock will then also identify the second shock
up to its sign, |W | = 1.
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2.1.1 OLS: Implementation with Finite-Order VAR
Since the VAR innovations in (2.1) are assumed to be white noise, they satisfy the OLS nor-
mal equations EXt−keTt = 0 (∀ k). And in principle, the coefficients Bk could be estimated
from least squares projections of Xt on its infinite past. An empirical implementation
however can only work with a finite lag length. Henceforth I will denote by B(L)OLS a lag
polynomial of finite order p <∞:
B(L)OLS ≡
p∑
k=1
BOLSk L
k
and vOLSt ≡ Xt − B(L)OLSXt−1 (2.11)
ΩOLSv ≡ E [vOLSt (vOLSt )T ]
where the normal equations are imposed for all lags k ≤ p
EXt−k(vOLSt )
T = 0 (2.12)
The associated VMA is C(L)OLS ≡ (I−B(L)OLS L)−1. Only stable VAR’s are considered,
formally this requires all roots of C(L)OLS to be outside the unit-circle.
The key assumption of standard VAR implementation is to assume that the residuals,
vOLSt , are white noise. Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), the long run restriction
(2.7) is then implemented based on an estimate of the spectral density at frequency zero
constructed from the OLS estimates. Impact coefficients are then computed by plugging
these estimates into (2.10):
SX(0)
OLS = C(1)OLS ΩOLSv C(1)
OLS T
AOLS0 =
(
I − B(1)OLS ) chol{SX(0)OLS }
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This implementation has been criticized for instance by Cooley and Dywer (1998) and
CKM on the grounds of interesting models having only infinite order VAR representations
and finite order approximations being insufficient. The assumption that the vOLSt are
serially uncorrelated is a good example of what Cooley and Dywer called an “auxiliary”
(but not innocuous) assumption.
2.1.2 CEV: Combination with Spectral Estimate
CEV propose an alternative estimator for the matrix of impact coefficients. Their new
estimator uses a mixture of the OLS estimates of B(1) and a nonparametric estimator for
SX(0). Their procedure is motivated by the following observation: The OLS projections
construct B(L)OLS such as to minimize forecast error variance ΩOLSv . As shown by Sims
(1972), this can be expressed in the frequency domain as6
min
BOLS1 ,...,B
OLS
p
ΩOLSv = Ωv+∫ π
−π
(
B(e−iω)− B(e−iω)OLS )SX(ω) (B(e−iω)− B(e−iω)OLS )′ dω (2.13)
Written this way, it is evident that OLS coefficients are constructed in order to minimize
the average distance between themselves and the true B(e−iω), weighted by the spectral
density of Xt, which may or may not be large at zero frequency: Based on this objective,
SX(0)
OLS need not be the best possible estimate for the spectral density at frequency zero.
OLS will try to set B(1)OLS close to B(1) only if the data’s spectrum is high at the zero
frequency.
Instead, CEV construct A(1) from a spectral estimator of SX(0). In Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Vigfusson (2006a), they consider two estimators, one based on Newey and West
6To derive this apply the definition of spectral density (2.8) to vOLSt and recall that the variance
equals the integral under the associated spectral density. Finally note that we can write B(L)OLS =
B(L) + (B(L)OLS −B(L)).
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(1987) and the other on Andrews and Monahan (1992). Both are based on truncated sums
of autocovariance matrices. To ensure positive definiteness, these are weighted by a Bartlett
kernel. Where Newey-West uses the (sample) autocovariances of Xt, Andrews-Monahan
uses first the VAR to prewhiten the data and then takes the residual autocovariances.
SX(0)
AM = C(1)OLS SNWv (0)
(
C(1)OLS
)T
(2.14)
where Sv(0)
NW =
b∑
k=−b
(
1− |k|
b+ 1
)
E
[
vOLSt (v
OLS
t−k )
T
]
(2.15)
where b is a truncation parameter, also known as “bandwidth” to be chosen by the re-
searcher. The Newey-West estimator applies (2.15) to Xt directly. As elsewhere in
this section, I have expressed the estimators above in terms of population moments,
E
[
vOLSt (v
OLS
t−k )
T
]
. For an empirical application, the population moments are replaced
by sample moments7.
In general, other weighting schemes than the Bartlett weights can be used, but as shown
by Newey and West (1994), this is of secondary importance compared to the bandwidth
choice. For a consistent estimator, b can grow with the sample size but at a smaller rate.
Andrews (1991) and Newey and West (1994) propose data dependent schemes of optimal
bandwidth selection whereas CEV use a fixed and fairly large value of b = 150 in a sample
of 180 observations.8 I will return to this issue in the lab simulations of Section 2.3, where
both automatic selection and fixed bandwidth schemes are evaluated.
The prewhitening of Andrews-Monahan is theoretically appealing since it removes
spikes from the spectral density of Xt which make spectral estimation difficult (Priestley
1981, Chapter 7). It is not meant to necessarily eliminate all of the data’s serial dependence.
Both Andrews and Monahan (1992) and Newey and West (1994) find the pre-whitening
7For some variable Zt, the sample moment is ET Zt ≡ 1/T
∑
t Zt.
8Whilst they suggest this to be compatible with consistency, Watson (2006) regards it as a practically
untruncated and inconsistent estimator.
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to fair better in Monte Carlo studies than the original Newey-West estimator. Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2006a) find no clearly superior choice between the two and
proceed to use only the Newey-West estimator in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson
(2006b). For ease of exposition, I will focus my presentation on the Andrews-Monahan
estimator. Amongst others, this is appealing since it nests the OLS estimator by setting
b = 0. (Section 2.3 presents results for both.)
The new CEV estimator computes the long-run coefficients from the non-parametric
density estimate
A(1)AM = chol
{
SX(0)
AM
}
(2.16)
and combines this with the OLS lag coefficients to obtain the impact coefficients
ACEV0 =
(
I − B(1)OLS )A(1)AM (2.17)
The impulse responses of CEV are then
A(L)CEV = C(L)OLSACEV0 (2.18)
Analogous formulas hold when using the Newey-West estimator.
2.1.3 Problems with the CEV Procedure
The CEV procedure is motivated by dissatisfaction with B(1)OLS , which is needed to
construct the long run responses A(1). But when transforming long-run responses into
impact coefficients, they use B(1)OLS again. This leads to some serious problems which
are stated here in the form of three remarks. A fourth remark motivates my corrected
2.1. LONG-RUN IDENTIFICATION IN VARS 45
procedure, presented at the end of this section.
Remark 1 (CEV Shocks are just a rescaling of OLS). Given vOLSt and A
CEV
0 a researcher
might want to re-construct the structural shocks based on (2.4)
εCEVt =
(
ACEV0
)−1
vOLSt
and compare them against
εOLSt =
(
AOLS0
)−1
vOLSt
He will be troubled noticing that the estimated technology shocks are perfectly correlated:
(εzt )
CEV =
a¯OLS11
a¯CEV11
· (εzt )OLS
(Recall from (2.7) that a¯11 is the top element of A(1).) This holds both for population and
sample moments. Actually, it holds for any pair of matrices A10 and A
2
0 constructed from
(2.10) using B(1)OLS and a A(1) satisfying the zero restrictions (2.7).
Proof. Both CEV and OLS use B(1)OLS in computing
A−10 = A(1)
−1 (I −B(1))−1
and except for the top left element, the first row of A(1)−1 is full of zeros. This follows
from the long run restriction (2.7) which places the same zero restrictions on A(1)−1 as it
does on A(1) and applies both to A(1)CEV and A(1)OLS . Finally, the top left element of
A(1)−1 equals 1/a¯11.9
9This is a standard result for inverting partitioned matrices, see for example Magnus and Neudecker
(1988, p. 11).
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The point of the previous remark is that the top rows of
(
A(1)OLS
)−1
and
(
A(1)CEV
)−1
are identical up to a scaling. Since CEV were only concerned with impulses-responses and
A0, the problem does not show up in their analysis. The construction of estimated shocks
is however often used by researchers, for instance in order to plot historical decompositions
or when identifying several shocks (see for example Altig et al. (2004)). Of course, if
something is wrong about A−10 , this applies also to A0. Looking at A0 the problem shows
up more subtly.
Remark 2 (Mismatch with OLS Forecast Error Variance). The CEV procedure is mo-
tivated by a dissatisfaction with SX(0)
OLS . A researcher adopting their strategy wants
SX(0)
AM 6= SX(0)OLS and thus Sv(0)NW 6= ΩOLS .10 This immediately implies
ACEV0 (A
CEV
0 )
T 6= ΩOLSv (2.19)
Implicitly, CEV attribute any difference between spectra estimated from OLS and the
non-parametric methods to the VAR’s forecast error variance, and not to a misspecification
of the dynamics. However, the accuracy of estimating ΩOLSv has never been doubted. In
fact, getting a good estimate for forecast error variance is precisely the objective of OLS
projections. This objective is doubted by CEV only when it comes to the zero-frequency
spectral density.11 It is also noteworthy that with (2.19), their procedure also deviates from
the previous literature where identification is defined as a search over the space of matrices
A0 satisfying A0A
T
0 = Ω
OLS
v (Faust 1998; Canova and de Nicolo 2003; Uhlig 2005).
Remark 3 (Total Variance not matched either). Given (2.19), the CEV SVAR cannot
match the variance of Xt. Their impulse-responses (2.18) imply the following variance
10Likewise she wants SX(0)
NW 6= SX(0)OLS and thus (I−B(1)OLS )SX(0)NW (I −B(1)OLS )T 6= ΩOLS .
11Larry Christiano confirmed this reading of their work to me in a private conversation, too.
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measure
VarXt
CEV =
∞∑
k=0
COLSk A
CEV
0 (A
CEV
0 )
T (COLSk )
T (2.20)
6=
∞∑
k=0
COLSk Ω
OLS
v (C
OLS
k )
T (2.21)
= VarXt
Proof. CEV model the data as XCEVt = C(L)
OLSACEV0 εt. The second step follows di-
rectly from Remark 2 and the third step holds because of the normal equations (2.12)
and the definition of the VAR(p) in (2.11), regardless of whether vOLSt is iid or not. (See
Appendix B.2.)
These remarks hold both for population moments as well as for sample moments12.
They are unsettling and raise issues about the applicability of the CEV procedure for
variance decompositions. To understand what is amiss in their procedure, it is useful to
recognize that the OLS residuals vOLSt are not iid and that this is embedded in the long-run
coefficients of CEV.
Remark 4 (CEV are concerned about serially-correlated VAR residuals). The Andrews-
Monahan estimator is constructed from autocovariances of the VAR residuals vOLSt . Re-
writing (2.15) and considering also non-zero-frequencies we have
Sv(ω)
NW = ΣOLSv +
b∑
k=1
κ(k)
(
Γke
−iωk + ΓTk e
iωk
)
(2.22)
where Γk ≡ E
[
vOLSt (v
OLS
t−k )
T
]
(2.23)
and κ(k) = 1− |k|
b+ 1
12See Proposition 2 below for details.
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Obviously, b > 0 expresses a concern about serially correlated residuals. Implicitly, the
Newey-West estimator of SX(ω) also embodies concerns about serially correlated VAR
residuals since it implies the following spectrum for vOLSt , which is generally not constant
across frequencies
(I −B(e−iω)OLS )SX(ω)NW (I − B(e−iω)OLS )T
(As before SX(ω)
NW is (2.22) applied to the autocovariances of Xt.)
The CEV procedure is clearly concerned about misspecified dynamics of the VAR(p)
when constructing A(1) but not when mapping this back to the short run responses A0.
As argued in the next section, this is the source of the problems listed in Remarks 1, 2 and
3 above.
2.1.4 Correct Identification via Spectral Factorization
We need to reconsider the consequences of approximating the infinite order model (2.1)
with a VAR(p). In particular, once we start modeling the serial correlation in vOLSt , it
needs to be done consistently.
OLS projections are still well defined in the sense of satisfying the projection equations
(2.12) for k ≤ p, but the residuals vOLSt are not iid. In general, they follow a moving
average representation:
vOLSt = D(L)A0εt
D(L) = (I −B(L)OLS )C(L) (2.24)
= I +
∞∑
k=1
DkL
k
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with spectral density
Sv(ω) = D(e
−ω)ΩeD(e−ω)T (2.25)
The results of CKM and CEV on a truncation bias which is hard to detect based on VAR
lag-length selection procedures can be read as finding
Di ≈ 0 but D(1) 6= I
(This will be confirmed also in the lab economy of Section 2.2, see Figure 2.1 there.) For
our purposes, an important property of D(L) is its invertibility:
Proposition 1 (Invertibility of D(L)). When the underlying model has a fundamental VAR
representation as in (2.1), and the OLS-VAR is stable, the moving average polynomialD(L)
defined in (2.24) has all its roots outside the unit-circle.
Proof. The proof is straightforward since (I−B(L))−1 = C(L) = (I−BOLS )−1D(L) has all
roots outside the unit circle and the same has been assumed for the VMA of the VAR(p),
C(L)OLS = (I − B(L)OLS L)−1.
Via (2.25), the spectral estimates of Sv(ω) contain information on the Di coefficients.
For the time being, I want to abstract from estimation issues such as bandwidth selec-
tion and weighting schemes and consider the case where an econometrician is given the
population values of B(L)OLS and Sv(ω). It is then straightforward to recover D(L) by
performing a spectral factorization of Sv(ω). The “canonical spectral factorization” is a
classic theorem in linear quadratic control and assures us of existence and uniqueness of
an invertible13 D(L) and a positive definite Ωe consistent with (2.25). Below I adapt its
13The theorem assures us of a D(L) which has no roots inside the unit circle. Excluding zero spectra,
all roots have to be outside the unit circle.
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statement from Hannan (1970), see also Whittle (1996, Chapter 13) and Li (2005). For a
reference in the context of economics see Hansen and Sargent (2007, 2005). (A lengthier
version of the theorem is restated in Appendix B.1.)
Theorem 1 (Spectral Factorization, (Hannan 1970)). Given a spectral density
Sv(ω) ≡
q∑
k=−q
Γke
−ikω ∀ ω ∈ [−π, π]
which is non-singular at each frequency (|Sv(ω)| 6= 0 ∀ω) and where Γk = (Γ−k)T are
autocovariance matrices as in (2.23), there is a factorization of Sv(ω) into
Sv(ω) = D(e
−ikω) ΩeD(e−ikω)T
(The transpose is complex conjugate). This factorization is unique and Ωe is positive
definite. D(z) is a q’th order polynomial
D(z) = I +
q∑
k=1
Dkz
k
which has all its roots on or outside the unit circle.
The theorem factors a spectrum constructed from a finite number of autocovariances
into a finite-order MA. As will be seen below, a finite q has of course to be chosen for
an empirical application. But when applying the spectral factorization to the population
objects of the true model (2.1), we need to consider that in general the true D(L) is an
MA(∞). However, since the processes forXt and vOLSt are stationary, their autocovariances
and MA-coefficients vanish for large lags14. A spectral factorization with an arbitrarily
large but finite q can arbitrarily well approximate the true spectrum and true D(L). (This
14See for example Hamilton (1994, Chapter 3.A) or Hayashi (2000, Chapter 6).
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is analogous to Sims (1972).) Alternatively we can think of the true D(L) being the limit
of applying Theorem 1 to an ever increasing sequence of q’s.
Correct Identification
Of course, knowing B(L)OLS and D(L) is equivalent to knowing the fundamental VMA
C(L). Expressed in terms of the former the correct impact coefficients from (2.10) can be
rewritten as
A(1) = chol {(I − B(1)OLS )−1Sv(0)(I −B(1)OLS )−T} (2.26)
A0 = D(1)
−1 (I −B(1)OLS )A(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ACEV0
(2.27)
CEV construct A(1)AM by plugging into (2.26) a spectral estimator for Sv(0) (see (2.15)).
But they ignore the residual dynamics when mapping A(1)AM back into the impact coef-
ficients. They err by treating D(1) = I for a given A(1). The point of Remarks 2 and 4 is
however, that A(1)AM includes an estimate of D(1) which is not identical to the identity
matrix. This is the source of the variance misrepresentation noted in Remark 3.
Many moving averages are observationally equivalent with a given spectrum, but only
one of them is invertible. Proposition 1 tells us to look exactly for this fundamental
representation of the data. Theorem 1 tells us that the spectral factorization gives us
exactly the right D(L) for that purpose.
Implementation
Theorem 1 can also be implemented empirically based on a spectral estimate like Sv(ω)
NW
in (2.22), which is constructed as the truncated sum of b autocovariances. The factoriza-
tion will then yield a unique and invertible MA(b), denoted D(L)LSF , and an innovations
variance matrix ΩLSFe . The superscript “LSF” indicates that these are calculated from
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a spectral factorization of sample moments from the least-squares residuals. Sayed and
Kailath (2001) survey a number of different algorithms. I use a reliable and efficient algo-
rithm from Li (2005), which is based on a state space representation of the moving average
process of vOLSt . Details are given in Appendix B.1. Based on the spectral factorization, I
propose the following procedure:
1. Estimate a VAR(p) to capture the main dynamics of the data. (Lag-length selection
is chosen as usual, for example based on information criteria.)
2. Construct a spectral estimate Sv(ω)
NW from the sample autocovariances of the VAR
residuals (Bandwidth q can either be fixed or data dependent.)
3. Construct long run coefficients as in (2.16):
A(1)AM = chol {C(1)OLS Sv(0)NWC(1)OLS T}
4. Factorize this spectral estimate into a MA(b) denoted D(L)LSF with innovation vari-
ance ΩLSFv .
5. Short run coefficients are then
ALSF0 =
(
D(1)LSF
)−1
(I − B(1)OLS )A(1)AM
=
(
D(1)LSF
)−1
ACEV0
The first three steps are identical to the CEV procedure, which is correct in its construction
of A(1)AM . The spectral factorization is needed to obtain an estimate of D(1) which
corrects their impact coefficients and impulse responses.
In addition to the VAR’s lag length, the bandwidth b is a free parameter here. The lab
simulations reported in Section 2.3 use both fixed bandwidth schemes, as CEV do, and the
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optimal, data-dependent selection scheme of Newey and West (1994).
Using population values of B(L)OLS and Sv(ω), the spectral factorization correctly
represents the true VMA and thus also the variance of Xt. The latter holds also when using
sample estimates of the VAR and a spectrum like Sv(ω)
NW constructed as a weighted and
truncated sum of sample autocovariances:
Proposition 2 (OLS and Spectral Factorization correctly represent Variance of Data).
Estimates of ALSF0 and D(L)
LSF are consistent with the sample variance of the VAR resid-
uals
ΩˆOLSv ≡
1
T
T∑
t=1
vOLSt (v
OLS
t )
T
=
∫ π
−π
Sˆv(ω)
NW dω (2.28)
and thus consistent with the VAR’s sample variance
V̂arXt
OLS
=
∞∑
k=0
CˆOLSk Ωˆ
OLS
v (Cˆ
OLS
l )
T (2.29)
Despite the serial correlation of vOLSt , this is the correct variance measure because of the
normal equations which are enforced by OLS in sample.15
Proof. (2.28) follows from the construction of the Newey-West estimate which is (2.22)
15Up to the treatment of initial observations this is also identical to the sample variance V̂arXt
OLS ≈
1
T
∑T
t=1 XtX
T
t . Take a first order VAR and index the data from −(p− 1), . . . , 0, . . . T . The approximation
holds to the extent that (
1
T
T∑
t=1
X2t
)
≈
(
1
T
T−p∑
t=−p+1
X2t
)
The exact relationship enforced by the OLS normal equations is
VarT Xt ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
X2t = B
OLS
1
(
1
T
T−p∑
t=−p+1
X2t
)
(BOLS1 )
T +
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
vOLSt
)2
(Please recall that the data is demeaned.)
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evaluated at sample autocovariances Γˆk =
1
T
∑T
t=k v
OLS
t (v
OLS
t−k )
T and since
∫ π
−π e
−iωkdω = 0.
(2.29) is the sample analogue to (2.21).
2.2 Lab Economy
The previous section described various procedures for implementing long-run identifications
in a VAR. The next section will assess their effectiveness with data simulated from a model
economy, where the true coefficients are known. This model economy is described here. It
is identical to the two-shock model used by CKM and CEV.
The model is a common one-sector RBC model driven by two shocks: First, a unit root
shock to technology. This is the permanent shock to be estimated by the VAR. Second,
a transitory shock which drives a wedge between private household’s labor-consumption
decision.
The representative household maximizes his lifetime utility over (per-capita) consump-
tion, ct, and labor services, lt:
max
{c,l}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(β(1 + γ))tu(ct, lt)
and faces the budget constraint
ct + (1 + γ)kt+1 − (1− δ)kt = (1− τlt)wtlt + rtkt + Tt
where kt is the per-capita stock of capital, wt the wage rate, rt the rental rate of capital, Tt
are lump sum taxes, γ is the growth rate of population, δ the depreciation rate of capital
(γ > 0, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and β < 1).
τlt is an exogenous labor tax. As discussed by CKM, it need not be literally interpreted
as a tax levy, but stands in for the effects of a variety of non-technology shocks introduced
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into second-generation RBC models. Mechanically, it distorts the first-order condition for
consumption and labor. It works similar to a stochastic preference shock to the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2006) show how this labor
“wedge” can be understood more generally as the reduced form process for more elaborate
distortions, such as sticky wages.
The production function F (kt, Ztlt) is constant returns to scale, where Zt is labor-
augmenting technological progress. Firms are static and maximize profits
F (kt, Ztlt)− wtlt − rtkt
Per-capita output equals production, yt = F (kt, Ztlt), and the economy’s resource con-
straint is
yt = ct + (1 + γ)kt+1 − (1− δ)kt
The exogenous drivers follow linear stochastic processes:
logZt = µz + logZt−1 + σzε
Z
t (2.30)
log τl,t+1 = (1− ρl)τ¯l + ρl log τl,t−1 + σlεlt (2.31)
where εZt and ε
l
t are iid standard-normal random variables. They are the technology shock,
respectively labor shock. ρl measures the persistence of the transitory labor tax. The scale
factors σz and σl determine their relative importance in the model. (µz is the drift in
log-technology and τ¯t is the average tax rate.)
The calibration is identical to the baseline model of CKM and CEV, which uses pa-
rameter values familiar from the business cycle literature. Utility is specified as u(c, l) =
log c+ψ log (1− l) (consistent with balanced growth) and the production function is Cobb-
Douglas F (k, l) = kθl1−θ with a capital share of θ = 0.33. The labor preference parameter
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is set to ψ = 2.5. On an annualized basis, the calibration sets the depreciation rate to 6%,
the rate of time preferences to 2% and population growth to 1%.16
The model economy is calibrated over different ratios in the variance of transitory to
permanent shocks, σ2l /σ
2
z .
17 As a benchmark, note that the maximum-likelihood estimates
of CEV imply a variance ratio of 0.345.18 Following CEV, the transitory shock is calibrated
as an AR(1) with persistence ρl = 0.986. For σ
2
l /σ
2
z = 0, this is a one-shock RBC model
and CKM show how our bivariate VAR will recover the correct impact coefficients in this
case19
Appendix B.2 shows how the linearized solution of the model can generally be repre-
sented by an infinite order VAR20 In this VAR representation of the model, the technology
shock satisfies the identifying assumptions made in (2.7) above.
Following CEV and CKM, the analysis looks at bivariate VARs in the growth rate of
labor productivity and hours worked.21
Xt =
∆yt −∆lt
lt

16The drift in technology is set to 0.4% and the average “labor tax” is set to 24.2% per quarter.
17CKM extensively document how different ratios in the variance of transitory to permanent shocks,
σ2l /σ
2
z , affect the performance of standard VAR’s both in population and in small sample. McGrattan
(2005) shows that (only) in the limit, σl/σz → 0, a finite order VAR (even a p = 1) recovers the true
responses – though the true system is not a finite-order VAR. The OLS error thus shrinks to zero with the
variance ratio. This can also be seen in the results below.
18CEV estimate σl = 0.0056
2, σz = 0.00953.
19An important aspect of this result is that there are more observables than shocks in this case.
20For all calibrations, the model satisfies the condition of Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and
Sargent (2005) for an invertible mapping from structural shocks to forecast errors.
21In addition to this “LSVAR” specification, CKM run also VARs with quasi-differenced hours. This
replaces the second VAR element lt with (1 − αL) lt (α ∈ {0; 0.999}). Depending on α, this captures
popular (but also contested) specifications: On the one hand the “LSVAR” with hours in levels and α = 0
and on the other hand the “QDSVAR” with α = 0.999, which approximates a VAR with differenced hours
without introducing a unit MA root. Sensitivity and sensibility of results to these choices are discussed
amongst others by Gali and Rabanal (2004) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003). The
quasi-differencing is discussed in more detail by CKM.
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and the matrix of impact coefficients is now 2× 2
A0 =
a11 a12
a21 a22
 (2.32)
The impact responses of hours are thus
elt = a21ε
Z
t + a22ε
l
t (2.33)
where a21 is the immediate response of hours in response to a current shock in technology.
Mimicking the empirical literature, a small lag length is specified. Lag length, sample
size and Newey-West truncation are as follows (identical to CEV and CKM)22:
p = 4 T = 180 b = 150
For each calibration, 10,000 samples are simulated.
As discussed in Section 2.1.4 above, it is a salient feature of the VAR(p) approximation
that Di ≈ 0 (∀i > 0) whereas D(1) 6= I. This holds also for our VAR(4) in this economy
as can be seen in Figure 2.1. For the “CEV calibration” with σ2l /σ
2
z = 0.345, it plots the
population values of the cumulated sums
∑K
k=0Dk. At each lag, the increments are small
and close to zero23, but summing over many lags we clearly have D(1) 6= I.
2.3 Performance in Simulated Economies
This section presents results from applying the various estimation procedures discussed in
Section 2.1 to data simulated from the lab economy described in Section 2.2. The following
22Instead of a fixing the lag length, it could also be chosen for each simulation based an information
criteria. But for the simulations considered here, this does not affect results substantially.
23They would only be barely visible on the graph.
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Figure 2.1: D(1) 6= I
Note: Each panel shows an element of the cumulated sum
∑K
k=0 Dk, which is a two-by-two matrix, for the
bivariate VAR in the lab economy of Section 2.2. “CEV calibration” with ρl = 0.986 and σ
2
l /σ
2
z = 0.345.
Lags K on the x-axis.
questions are addressed:
1. Are the non-parametric estimates of the zero-frequency spectrum really better than
OLS? What are the effects of bandwidth selection?
2. Is the misrepresentation of sample variance by CEV stated in Remark 3 quantitatively
important?
3. How do OLS, CEV and LSF compare in terms of bias and sampling uncertainty of
impact coefficients A0?
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4. Finally, the accuracy of variance decompositions is compared.
Goodness of Spectral Estimates
CEV’s initial motivation is that the non-parametric estimates of Newey and West (1987)
and Andrews and Monahan (1992) should yield better estimates of the spectral density
at zero frequency than OLS. Two things are known from this literature, when it comes
to the spectra of persistent data: First, estimation is improved by prewhitening with a
VAR as with the Andrews-Monahan formula. Second, there are substantial small sample
biases when persistence is high (Newey and West 1994; Andrews 1991). These results are
confirmed by my simulations.
Figure 2.3 shows the median percentage errors for each element of the two-by-two
matrix SX(0). Percentage errors are defined as
SˆX(0)− SX(0)
SX(0)
· 100%
where the division is elementwise. SˆX(0) is the median of simulated estimates for a given
estimator and SX(0) is the true spectrum from the model’s population values, see Ap-
pendix B.2 for details on computing population values. Since the spectrum is symmetric,
the top right panel reports trace(SˆX(0) (SX(0))
−1)/2 as a joint measure of closeness. If the
estimates were equal to the true vales, this would be equal to one.
First, biases are large in an absolute sense with estimates being off by about 100%.
Comparing their relative performance, the Andrews-Monahan is generally doing better
than Newey-West. This confirms the results of Newey and West (1994). What is strik-
ing, is that with an optimal bandwidth selection, the Andrews-Monahan spectrum is not
substantially different from OLS. The bandwidths chosen for Sv(ω)
NW vary between b = 1
and b = 3 and are not picking up any substantial serial dependence amongst estimated
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vOLSt .
24 Actually, this is no wonder, since the VAR’s lag length has been chosen to whiten
vOLSt as good as possible already. Using CEV’s fixed and large bandwidth of b = 150, both
Andrews-Monahan and Newey-West are doing substantially worse than OLS. Overall, OLS
appears to yield amongst the best estimates of the zero-frequency spectrum. A similar pic-
ture emerges when looking at the corresponding percentage errors of A(1) = chol {SX(0)}.
These results are not encouraging for including spectral estimates in SVAR analysis.
The optimal bandwidth procedures are very close to OLS also in terms of A(1) and A0.
Henceforth, results will only be reported for CEV’s fixed bandwidth selection of b = 150.
24Bandwidths selected for SX(ω)
NW vary between b = 6 and b = 10.
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Figure 2.2: Median Errors in Spectral Estimates
(a) b automatically selected (b) b = 150
Note: Median percentage errors of spectral estimates over 10,000 simulations with ρl = 0.986. Automatic bandwidth selection in Panel a) uses
scheme of Newey and West (1994).
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Variance Measures
Figure 2.3 reports measures for the variance of hours, Var (lt) derived from the various
procedures both in population and in sample. CEV variances are computed from (2.20)
and OLS variance from (2.21), respectively from their sample analogues.25 The popula-
tion values are calculated from applying the estimation formulas to population moments.
(Please recall that in population, OLS variance equals the true value by construction.)
In particular, the spectral estimates are still calculated from the truncated and weighted
summation of equation (2.22) with b = 150. The thought experiment is to isolate specifi-
cation bias from small sample bias, not to consider what a researcher would see if he had
an infinite amount of data. For the sample measures, medians are reported over 10,000
Monte Carlo draws.
In sample, the deviation of CEV from sample variance (OLS) is substantial. Both
the ACEV0 constructed from Andrews-Monahan and Newey-West understate total variance
by at least half of the OLS variance, which again is approximately equal to the sample
moments, (see Proposition 2). In population, Andrews-Monahan is quite close to the true
value since the residual autocovariances are close to zero26
Another striking effect is visible in Figure 2.3: There is a large bias in the sample
estimates when compared against the population. This is due to small sample bias (Hurwicz
1950) which is very active in these calibrations with ρl = 0.986. It is well known that
autoregressive parameters are downward biased when the true process is close to unit root.
Forecast error variance is however estimated quite well. As a corollary, the sample variance
is understated as well.27
25The variance of hours is the bottom left element of those matrices.
26This is a corollary of Di ≈ 0 as documented in Figure 2.1.
27A demonstration for a simple AR(1), xt = ρxt−1 + σeεt, can be found at
http://www.elmarmertens.ch/thesis. Please recall the variance formula for an AR(1):
Varxt = σ
2
e/(1− ρ2) which is decreasing in ρ.
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Figure 2.3: Measures for Hours Variance
Note: Population values and medians of simulated variances of hours, Var (lt). 10,000 simulations with ρl = 0.986. Population values are
computed from the true autocovariances and denoted OLS0, CEV
NW
0 and CEV
AM
0 . The latter two use the truncated and weighted summation
of equation (2.22) with b = 150. (Please recall that in population, OLS variance equals the true value by construction.)
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Bias and Uncertainty in Hours Impact
CEV claim that ACEV0 “virtually eliminates bias” in estimated impact coefficients. Follow-
ing CEV and CKM, I focus on the impact of technology on hours28. Median percentage
errors are computed as
aˆ21 − a21
a21
· 100%
where aˆ21 is the median over 10,000 simulated estimations for a given estimator. The
median errors are shown in Figure 2.4.
Ignoring the preceding discussions and taking ACEV0 at face value, it is not even a
panacea for estimating impact coefficients. The Newey-West version reported in Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2006b) has actually larger biases than OLS for low to
intermediate ratios between the variances of transitory and permanent shocks, σ2l /σ
2
z . This
includes the preferred calibration of CEV.29
As can be anticipated from the preceding discussions, the Andrews-Monahan estimator
for ACEV0 is much closer to OLS. It has an almost uniformly lower bias than OLS, though.
The LSF estimator behaves similarly, and has a somewhat smaller absolute bias for most
calibrations. Again, a key difference between the LSF estimator and ACEV0 is also that it
is fully consistent with the OLS sample variance, whereas ACEV0 is not.
The simulated distributions of these impact errors are shown in Figure 2.5. The spread
in simulated estimates is huge – swamping even the considerable size of the biases. Even
the 68% confidence intervals regularly span errors exceeding minus 100%, which means that
they include estimates of a21 having the wrong sign. This is the case for OLS as well as the
various spectral methods. The Newey-West ACEV0 has a considerably tighter distribution
of errors. Based on the preceding discussion, this estimator however appears to be the least
28Cursory inspections suggest that results are qualitatively similar for the impact of output.
29Curiously, previous versions of CKM were calibrated to higher values of this ratio where ACEV0 fairs
better.
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useful. What is more, even this finding is not robust to changes in the model’s calibration.
Figure B.1 in Appendix B.3 shows how the OLS errors are more tightly distributed than
CEV for a less persistent model where ρl = 0.5.
As discussed before in the context of Figure 2.3, OLS spectra have almost uniformly
better bias properties than the spectral estimators. So how is it possible that for some
of these calibrations, ACEV0 has a lower bias than OLS? Figure 2.6 decomposes the biases
in AOLS0 and A
CEV
0 into effects from small sample and misspecification issues. Across
calibrations of σ2l /σ
2
z , the small sample bias in A
CEV
0 is almost constant at around −10%
and variations in the performance of ACEV0 are caused by variations in its truncation bias
which is steadily rising. Appendix B.3 shows that constancy of the small sample bias is the
effect of canceling biases in B(1)OLS and A(1)AM (respectively A(1)NW ), see Figure B.5
there. The performance of ACEV0 is not (solely) determined by the quality of the A(1)
estimates, but by the interaction of various biases arising from truncation and small effects,
as well as canceling effects from B(1)OLS and the spectral estimate.
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Figure 2.4: Bias in Hours Impact
Note: Median percentage errors of the impact response of hours to a technology shock, a21, over 10,000 simulations with ρl = 0.986. Spectral
estimates using b = 150. Dashed vertical line denotes CEV’s preferred calibration with σ2l /σ
2
z = 0.345.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Estimated Impact Coefficients
Note: Distribution of percentage errors in the impact response of hours to a technology shock, a21, over 10,000 simulations with ρl = 0.986.
Spectral estimates using b = 150. Percentiles are shaded: 95% (light), 68% (middle) and 38% (very dark). Black line is median of bootstraps.
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Figure 2.6: Decomposed Bias in Hours Impact
Note: Small sample and truncation bias in the median percentage errors of the hours impact to technology, a21. Small sample bias computed
from (ÂOLS0 −AOLS0 )/A0 and truncation bias is (AOLS0 −A0)/A0, where ÂOLS0 is the median of the OLS estimates over 10,000 simulation with
ρl = 0.986. CEV computed from Andrews-Monahan spectral estimate with bandwidth b = 150. (For Newey-West, please see Figure B.4.)
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Variance Decompositions
Apart from impulse response analysis, an important application of SVAR’s are variance de-
compositions. They ask “What share of total variance is explained by technology shocks?”
For the innovation in hours (2.33), the share of variance explained by technology equals
a221
(a221 + a
2
22)
The distributions of OLS, CEV and LSF for this measure are shown in Figure 2.7.
The figure also displays the population estimates as well as the true variance share. A
pertinent feature of the underlying model is that hours do not respond much to permanent
shocks30 So apart from calibrations where technology is almost the only driving force, the
true variance rapidly drops to values below 10%.
The results are sobering again: All procedures overstate the variance share by 10 to 20
percentage points (medians) and the 68% confidence intervals easily span values between
10% and 60% (or wider). If anything, OLS is doing a better job than the spectral estimates
– both in terms of a somewhat lower bias and tighter confidence bands. Again, the CEV
procedure is not a panacea. And neither is LSF when looking at variance decompositions.
The high persistence of the underlying model makes estimation generally harder. For the
case with ρl = 0.5 OLS performs much better than CEV (and also much better compared
to itself in the high-persistence calibration.). These results are shown in Figure B.2 of
Appendix B.3.
30This is a direct consequence of the log-log preferences with canceling substitution and income effects.
See also Kehoe (2006)’s discussion in this context.
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2.4 Conclusions
Using non-parametric estimators to learn about dynamics missed by a VAR sounds ap-
pealing. But when combining these two estimations, we need a consistent account of the
fluctuations in the data. When a VAR(p) is used to approximate what is truly a VAR(∞),
then its residuals will be serially correlated vOLSt = D(L)et. However, OLS computes
spectra and and short run responses as if they were iid. But even a misspecified VAR
will correctly represent the total variance of the data. Mixing-and-matching with spectral
estimates requires an adjustment in order to retain this property and – moreover – to
compute the correct impact coefficients. This can be achieved in sample with a spectral
factorization of the non-parametric estimates.
The long-run responses of CEV allow for non-zero moving average terms in vOLSt which
have permanent effects, D(1) 6= I. Once long run responses are constructed from the
non-parametric estimates, CEV ignore these permanent effects in computing the short-run
responses ACEV0 . The correct responses are however
A0 = D(1)
−1ACEV0 (2.34)
Using simulations from the lab economy used by CEV and CKM, I demonstrate that the
total variance is seriously misrepresented by treating D(1) = I above. This is particularly
so when using the Newey-West spectrum as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson
(2006b). The Andrews-Monahan estimates used in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson
(2006a) inherit a lot more structure from the VAR and thus the problem is less prevalent.
Related to this inconsistency is that the estimated time series of shocks will be a mere
rescaling of the OLS estimates (see Remark 1), even though impulse responses are not.
This is of practical importance to researchers interested in adopting their strategy. These
issues are resolved with the spectral factorization presented in this paper.
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A deeper question is whether and how spectral estimates can actually help to over-
come the biases associated with OLS. After all they are calculated from sample moments
of the data, just as the VAR and its lag-length selection criteria. Erceg, Guerrieri, and
Gust (2005) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005) have already highlighted that there
are two kinds of biases: The truncation bias arising from a misspecified VAR and the
Hurwicz-type bias in coefficients estimated from small samples of data with high persis-
tence (Hurwicz 1950). Whilst the spectral estimates may offer a way around the VAR’s
misspecification, they are subject to similar small sample biases. Indeed my simulation
results paint a sobering picture:
• Based on optimal bandwidth selection procedures, the spectral estimates do not
deviate much from OLS. This is simply because the VAR’s lag-length has already
been chosen to whiten the residuals as good as possible. OLS estimates of the spectra
are generally much better than the high-bandwidth spectral estimates used by CEV
which have almost uniformly larger biases.
• Looking at the impact coefficients A0, the large and fixed bandwidth advocated by
CEV (b = 150 in a sample of T = 180) can improve on OLS, but it is no panacea
either. Depending on the true process it can have larger biases and larger sampling
uncertainty. The spectral factorization almost uniformly improves upon OLS while
providing a correct account of total variation – the gains appear to be small however.
• The reason why CEV sometimes outperforms OLS is not because of better spectral es-
timates, but because of canceling biases in coefficients from OLS and non-parametric
estimates and the “freedom” to deviate from correctly modeling the data’s variance
in the sample.
The corrected procedure yields a VARMA representation of the data where the MA-
process is orthogonal to the lagged variables in the VAR. My results complement other
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studies looking at the performance of conventional VARMA specifications, notably Mc-
Grattan (2006) and Kascha and Mertens (2006) (not related to me). Their specifications
enjoy the benefit of being chosen to match exactly the underlying model, whereas my pro-
cedure is fairly agnostic in its specification of lags in the VAR and MA component. All
in all, their results as well as mine point to small sample biases and not just specification
issues being a key factor in the estimation of permanent shocks and their effects on the
business cycle.
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Chapter 3
Information Strategies for Monetary
Policy under Discretion
Asymmetric information is an inherent feature of delegated management. The conduct
of monetary policy by a specialized central bank is no exception. If there were no asym-
metric information, central banker’s would not need to worry about their credibility. But
they do. Credibility and public expectations take a central role in the conduct of policy
(Blinder 2000).1 In the past, secrecy has been considered an integral and beneficial ele-
ment of monetary policy design. But nowadays it is transparency, which is recognized as
a virtue rather than a vice (Goodfriend 1986; Geraats 2002). Either view acknowledges
the existence of hidden information and even the most transparent regime has its limits
in the verifiability and confidentiality of a central bank’s proprietary information (Blinder
2006) – not to mention the preferences of the policymakers. Whatever its sources, there
is evidence that proprietary information of the U.S. Federal System allows it to improve
upon public forecasts (Romer and Romer 2000; Sims 2002)2.
1In the words of the then Governor of the Federal Reserve System, Ben S. Bernanke: “Central bank
communication and transparency are important precisely because of the role of private-sector expectations
in determining the effectiveness of monetary policy.” (Bernanke 2004) or the ECB board member Jose
Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo: “More generally, if we think about the main channels of monetary policy
transmission, it is clear that expectations are central.” (Gonzalez-Paramo 2007) Or as remarked by ECB
president Jean-Claude Trichet: “In all difficult episodes and crises the credibility of the Fed has been
decisive in the effectiveness of its handling of the situation.” (Trichet 2005).
2See Section 3.5 for more detailed references.
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When the public does not observe all the information used by the cental bank, it will try
to infer it from policy actions and announcements. This complicates the policy problem,
since for example, a change in interest rate does not only affect economic fundamentals via
the conditions for borrowing and lending, it also influences the people’s signal extraction
about the underlying motives of the policymaker. As a strategic player, the central bank
must account for this informational channel in choosing optimal policy. This is different
from situations where it is the central bank who is learning about an economy populated by
atomistic agents, for example as in Sargent (1999): Nobody is changing his cash behavior
to influence central bank estimates of money velocity. But the central bank must consider
how current policy influences the public’s beliefs about future policy.
So far, problems of this kind have mostly been analyzed in highly stylized and often
static settings.3 But the models used for policy analysis are typically dynamic and of
larger scale. This paper presents a flexible, yet tractable way to analyze optimal policy
under hidden information which is applicable to the kind of DSGE models used in policy
analysis. The procedure remains tractable and transparent by relying a linear-quadratic
representation of the policy driven by Gaussian shocks.
Public beliefs are shaped by policies. By responding to these beliefs, the Markov-perfect
strategies of the policymaker become history dependent – not unlike commitment policies.
This allows to counteract erroneous beliefs and inflationary expectations created by past
actions. A key complication is then to track the distribution of public beliefs. In this
setting, the problem collapses to tracking the evolution of means via the Kalman filter.
In the real world, policymakers understand that – at least on average – their actions
must match the signals given to the public, otherwise their ability to influence public expec-
3See for example the classic contributions by Backus and Driffill (1985a), Canzoneri (1985) and Cukier-
man and Liviatan (1991). More recent work includes the papers by Ball (1995) and Walsh (2000). My
definition of static includes also repeated play of one-period games. More comparable are the papers by
Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) which will be discussed shortly.
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tations will be lost.4 In my model, this boils down to finding a fixed point between policy
actions and rational beliefs of the private sector. Computationally, that is a fixed point
between two Riccati equations: One associated with the policymaker’s linear regulator
problem, the other with the public’s Kalman filter.
The effects of hidden information on optimal policy are illustrated with a simple New
Keynesian model – a model not chosen for its realism, but in order to document the
differences with the symmetric information benchmark most clearly within a widely studied
setting. A key result is that policy responds negatively to inflationary beliefs which is
welfare enhancing. Moreover it does so more vigorously, the larger the credibility problems
from hidden information. This confirms conjectures by Sargent (1993) and Bordo et al.
(2007) about the necessity to disinflate more quickly, when credibility is at stake. To the
best of my knowledge, this is the first such analysis with an explicitly optimizing monetary
policymaker.
Papers most closely related to this work are Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002) and
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) who cast their models within similar linear settings, but
without providing a general framework capable of handling various models with endoge-
nous state variables. A substantive difference with Cukierman and Meltzer is that their
policies do not react to prior beliefs. Faust and Svensson focus on the welfare effects of
credibility with a Lucas-supply curve. Using a forward-looking Phillips Curve, their results
are confirmed here: Welfare is is improved when output targets are unobservable, since
there is an explicit role for public beliefs, even in a time-consistent policy. This disciplines
the pursuit of persistent output targets. Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006) endow the pub-
lic with a time-varying, adaptive learning rule. They derive a Markov-perfect policy with
history dependence induced similarly as here via the reaction to people’s beliefs. Their
4From the perspective of Philipp Hildebrand, member of Swiss National Bank’s governing board:
“Transparency and credibility render monetary policy more effective. However, they are no substitute
for action. If a central bank uses words with the explicit aim of substituting them for action, it will risk
losing credibility.” (Hildebrand 2006)
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policies generate data with low inflation persistence to influence people’s constant gain
learning. Thanks to the lower complexity of the inference problem adopted here, their
results can be corroborated here in a very transparent way.
In addition, my paper emphasizes the time-series implications for estimation and in-
ference. For private agents and econometricians, there is an observational equivalence
between hidden policy components and a policy process with a longer lag structure. With
the benefit of hindsight, econometricians can use techniques from the Kalman smoother
(Hamilton 1994, Chapter 13), to infer past policy components better than it is possible for
contemporaneous decision makers.
The framework adopted here exclusively assigns the policymaker with superior infor-
mation. This is an extreme assumptions. Reality is best described by different kinds of
hidden information facing private sector and policymakers in different ways. But because
of his strategic position, the policy constraints of a better informed policymaker change in
dramatic ways when agents are learning about him. The point of this paper is to focus on
those strategic effects.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.1 introduces hidden
information in a textbook version of the New Keynesian model. For a given policy, it
derives public beliefs and outcomes. Section 3.2 solves for optimal policy in a general
setting. Results for the simple model are presented in Section 3.3 and extensions are
shown in Section 3.4. Further aspects and related literature are discussed in Section 3.5.
Section 3.6 concludes the paper with an outlook for further research. Detailed derivations
and additional results can be found in the appendix.
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3.1 A Simple Model of Hidden Information
This section illustrate the issues arising from hidden information in monetary policy with a
simple New Keynesian model. For most of the time, it adopts the perspective of the private
sector, who takes monetary policy as given. This serves to analyze how different policies
steer outcomes and beliefs under hidden information. The determination of optimal policy
will be the topic of the following sections.
3.1.1 New Keynesian Economy
The model is almost identical to the textbook model of optimal policy in a New Keynesian
as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Gali (2003), Walsh (2003) or Woodford (2003).
The only difference is a stochastic preference shock to the policymaker’s objective function
which is unobservable to the public. Otherwise my model and its notation follow closely
Gali (2003) where further details can be found. A key feature of the model is that inflation
is determined purely by public expectations of current and future policies. This puts
centerstage the concerns of the public about the policymaker’s intentions.
Private Sector
As in the textbook model, aggregate decisions of the private sector are represented by the
New Keynesian Phillips and IS curves. Long-term interest rates are priced according to
the expectations hypothesis. Readers familiar with this setting can skip this part and move
over to the discussion of hidden information in policy objectives.
The private sector is populated by a continuum of identical firms and households which
trade goods and labor services. There is no capital accumulation and output equals con-
sumption. Firms are monopolistically competitive and use staggered price-setting as in
Calvo (1983) and their optimal pricing decisions lead to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
80 CHAPTER 3. INFORMATION STRATEGIES FOR MONETARY POLICY
as in Yun (1996) and King and Wolman (1996). The log-linearized Phillips Curve is
πt = βπt+1|t + κ xt (3.1)
where πt is inflation and xt is the output gap
5 For any variable zt+1, zt+1|t denotes its private
sector forecast. The underlying information set will be explained shortly. The parameter β
is the representative agent’s discount factor and κ is a reduced form parameter influenced
amongst others by the frequency of price-setting.6
The output gap measures the difference between actual output and its natural rate.
The latter would be the output of the economy if there were no nominal frictions.7 My
discussion will exclusively focus on monetary shocks which leave the natural rate unaffected.
Conditional on those shocks, variations in the output gap are thus identical to variations
in output and consumption.
Households trade contingent consumption claims in complete markets. Optimality of
their consumption and savings decisions leads to the familiar Euler equation. For nominal
bond holdings, the log-linearized Euler equation is also called the New Keynesian “IS
Curve” and reads
it = πt+1|t + σ(xt+1|t − xt) (3.2)
where it is the nominal interest rate for one period and the parameter σ is the inverse of
the representative consumer’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution.8
5Throughout the paper, all variables are in log-deviations from steady state which implicitly assumes
the existence and uniqueness of a steady state under discretionary policy. See Section 3.2 for further
discussion.
6Details are given by Gali (2003, p. 159) from whom notation is adopted.
7Gali (2003), Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003) explain in detail how the New Keynesian model can be
separated into a core real business-cycle model (RBC), which evolves as if there were no nominal frictions,
and a set of “gap” variables which track the difference between the RBC core and the actual economy.
8Since only monetary shocks are considered, there is no term in the IS curve to represent variations in
real interest rates due to expected growth in the natural rate of output, a.k.a. the natural rate of interest.
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Up to a log-linear approximation, the consumer’s Euler equation for long-term bond
holdings gives rise to the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. Long-term inter-
est rates are priced as the average of expected future short-term rates and the K-period
nominal interest rate is
iKt =
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
it+j|t (3.3)
Policy Objectives
As in the linearized textbook model, the policymaker seeks to minimize a present value of
expected losses
Et
∞∑
k=0
βk
{
π2t+k + αx(xt+k − x¯t+k)2
}
(3.4)
with αx ≥ 0. The expectations operator Et reflects the policymaker’s information set, to
be described shortly. The non-standard feature of the loss function is the time-varying
target for the output gap, x¯t, which will be specified as an exogenous stochastic process.
In principle, one could think of various ways to motivate the presence of x¯t in the
loss function. However, with regards to the information structure introduced later, one
contender stands out. On the one hand, time-variation in the output target could arise from
variations in wedges between the frictionless and the efficient level of output. Time-varying
markups would for example shrink distortions from monopolistic competition. Then there
are also non-monetary tools to fight such distortions, for example the kind of fiscal tools
discussed by Gali (2003). x¯t could then capture changes in the government’s policy of
handling these distortions. A key restriction of the information structure introduced later
will be however, that x¯t cannot be observed by the representative private agent. To keep the
model close the NK benchmark, I maintain the assumption of a homogeneously informed
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private sector, which excludes all of the reasons above. At least somebody in the private-
sector would have to notice when markups change or when new government regulations
come into effect.
The only interpretation to survive this test, is to associate the output target with
varying preferences of the policymaker. This perspective was also adopted in earlier work
going back to Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). Under this view, x¯t represents the outcome
of political influences on monetary policy to stimulate the economy or not. Because of the
distributional effects of economic growth, these preferences will vary with political repre-
sentation in the government and the makeup of central banker’s preferences.9 Even when
the independence of the central bank is formally enshrined in law, actual independence is a
more fragile concept. Abrams (2006) gives a striking account of hidden but forceful policy
influences. His study documents how Richard Nixon pressured the then Chairman of the
Federal Reserve, Arthur Burns to ease policy in the run-up to the Great Inflation.10
Under either interpretation, the output target is capturing a form of heterogeneity
otherwise not present in the model. In particular (3.4) does not necessarily represent a
social welfare function. Using a similar setup Faust and Svensson (2001) interpret their
version of (3.4) as representative welfare when evaluated at the average output target
(here: zero).11 However without specifying the underlying welfare weighting this is just an
aggregation with unknown distributional consequences. What is clearly defined is however
the objective function of the policymaker as in (3.4).
In reality, short-term interest rates are the typical instruments of monetary policy. In
9There is clearly time-variation in pressures mounted on central bankers to ease economic conditions.
For example, in the short history of the ECB there were the early attempts by German Finance Minister
“Red” Oskar Lafontaine and the current pressures from French President Nicolas Sarkozy.
10Another example, even though outside what would be sensibly captured by an output target, is how
the German government could force the Bundesbank to undertake the most massive monetary injection in
the postwar history of Germany by stipulating the terms of German monetary reunion. Formally an act
of currency policy, the government could do so without violating the Bundesbank’s independence.
11As a convention, I will be referring to “welfare” using their interpretation. In the results discussed
below there will not be a conflict in ranking outcomes under this measure or the policymaker’s objective.
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this simple model, we can equivalently use the output gap as policy control. The IS curve is
then redundant for determining equilibrium, but still useful for analyzing the consequences
of policy for interest rates.
Before turning to the informational structure of the model, it is useful to study optimal
policy when there is symmetric information.
Discretionary Policy under Symmetric Information
For the time being, the output target is assumed to follow a univariate AR(1) process
x¯t+1 = ρ x¯t + et+1 et ∼ N(0, σ2e) and |ρ| < 1 (3.5)
which is observed both by the policymaker and the public.12 Their expectations coincide
such that for any variable zt we have zt = zt|t and zt+1|t = Etzt+1. Lacking a commitment
technology, the policymaker can always reoptimize his policies and for each optimization he
takes his future choices as given. Likewise, he must take the public’s inflation expectations
as given.13 Policies are required to be Markov-perfect, which excludes reputational mech-
anisms via history dependent strategies.14 Under these constraints, the policy problem is
to minimize (3.4) subject to (3.1). The first order condition balances the inflation cost
against the desire to attain the output target:
κπt = αx(xt − x¯t) (3.6)
12The process is mean zero and allows also for negative targets. But all variables are in deviation from
steady state, which allows for a (known) average target which leads to the classic inflation bias in steady
state (In the context of the present model, details can be found in Woodford (2003).) To be consistent
with non-zero inflation in steady state, the Phillips Curve is then viewed as allowing for indexation to the
steady state rate of inflation as in Yun (1996).
13The solution is simplified by the fact that there is only an exogenous state variable. In general, the
policymaker could not take inflation expectations as given but only their mapping to expected future state
values, which may be partly under his control. This aspect appears less well appreciated than it could, see
Svenssson (2007, p. 24) for a nice discussion.
14A more detailed discussion can be found in the next section.
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After substitution into the Phillips Curve, this yields the following Markov-perfect poli-
cies:15
xt =
αx(1− βρ)
κ2 + αx(1− βρ) x¯t ≡ F x¯t (3.7)
πt =
κ
1− βρ F x¯t ≡ G x¯t (3.8)
A well known properties of optimal policies in a linear quadratic framework is their certainty
equivalence (Bertsekas 2005; Sargent and Ljungqvist 2004), which holds here, too, since F
and G do not depend on the volatility σe of the target shocks. Under hidden information,
this will be different.
Inflation and output gap inherit the dynamic properties of the target process. This can
be seen in Figure 3.1 which shows impulse responses of the model both when the target
process is persistent, ρ = 0.9, and when it is iid, ρ = 0. The calibration is identical to Gali
(2003) with equally weighted policy preferences (αx = 1), see Table 3.1 for details.
In principle, the policymaker could always attain the output target by choosing F = 1,
but for αx < ∞ this has to be weight against the inflation resulting from this policy. At
the other extreme, there would be no inflation if F were seto to zero, but only at the cost
of missing the target, which matters if αx > 0. Policies with F close to unity will be called
“bold” and it is instructive to see how policy depends on the preference weight αx and the
persistence of the target process. Inspection of (3.7) reveals the intuitive property that
policies get bolder the higher the preference weight on output, in fact F varies between
zero and one when αx is varied between zero and infinity.
For a given preference weight, higher persistence of the target causes higher persistence
in policy and thus higher inflation, in what is a temporary version of the inflation bias
15The derivation is isomorphic to the discretion problems studied by Gali (2003) and Woodford (2003)
when treating the target as a cost-push shock and the deviation of output gap from target, xt − x¯t, as
corresponding to the output gap in their models.
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Table 3.1: Model Calibration
Private Sector Parameters
β 0.99 Time preference
φ 1.00 Inverse Frisch Labor Elasticity
σ 1.00 Risk Aversion / Inverse EIS
θ 0.75 Calvo Probability of not repricing
κ 0.1717 PC Slope κ = (1− θ) · (1− β · θ)/θ · (σ + φ)
Policy Preferences
αx 1.00 Policy weight on output stabilization is αx/(1 + αx)
Driving Processes
σε 1.00 Target x¯t = τt + εt with εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε)
ρ 0.90 Persistence of target component τt+1 = ρτt + ηt+1
ση 1.00 ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η)
σb 1.00 Belief shocks used in Section 3.4 with bt ∼ N(0, σ2b )
Notes: Private-sector parameters taken from Gali (2002)’s calibration to quarterly U.S. data. Innovation
variances are each normalized to unity and not intended to match the scale of any second moments. The
sensitivity of results to ρ and αx is discussed in Section 3.3. As shown there, variations in αx are isomorphic
to varying κ. As a measure of credibility, σb is varied in Section 3.4.
known from Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a). Policies are less
bold, when the target is persistent. Looking at the impulse responses shown in Figure 3.1,
F is close to one in the iid case but it shrinks to about 0.8 under persistence.16
Under hidden information, to be introduced next, there will be both persistent and
transitory shocks to the output target which will be unobservable to the public. What
matters for inflation is then the perceived persistence of a shock to output. The policymaker
must then seek policies which are as bold as possible, while trying to keep perceived
persistence as low as possible. The remainder of this section describes the public’s signal
extraction and outcomes for a given output process.
16The exact numbers are a 0.97 response of output to a unit shock with zero persistence, and a 0.79
response to a shock with persistence ρ = 0.9.
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Figure 3.1: Symmetric Information Model
Note: Impulse response of output gap (xt), inflation (πt), one period nominal rate (it) and spread between
eight and one-period nominal rate (i8t − it) in symmetric information model. (A period corresponds to one
quarter.) Column labeled τ shows responses to persistent target shock, ρ = 0.9, responses to iid target
are labeled ε.
Hidden Information
Hidden information is introduced by assuming that the public can observe only policy, xt,
but not the policy target(s) driving policy. To keep the public’s signal extraction interest-
ing, the target is henceforth driven by two components, one persistent, one transitory:
x¯t = τt + εt εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε ) (3.9)
τt+1 = ρ τt + ηt+1 ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η) and 0 < |ρ| < 1 (3.10)
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It is important to stress that the private sector has no structural uncertainty about the
economy. All parameters are known, including the specification of the target process. The
public must however infer the realizations of τt and εt based on the observed history of
policies, denoted xt.
The policymaker observes the complete history of the target components and his expec-
tations are typically different from those of the public. As before, for any variable zt, the
policymaker’s expectations are denoted Etzt+1 = E(zt+1|τ t, εt) with the obvious property
zt = Etzt. Public expectations are zt+1|t = E(zt+1|xt). By construction, xt|t = xt and
πt|t = πt (since inflation is a choice variable of the private sector) but typically τt|t 6= τt
and εt|t 6= εt. When analyzing the public’s signal extraction problem it will be convenient
to define “innovations” as surprises relative to the public’s past information:
z˜t = zt − zt|t−1
Innovations provide an orthogonal decomposition of the public information set since z˜t|t−1 =
0. Still, they may well be predictable based on the complete information set, and typically
Et−1z˜t will not be identical to zero.17
3.1.2 Signal Extraction and Outcomes for Given Policy
Since the model is linear with Gaussian disturbances, rational expectations of the public
can be computed recursively from the Kalman filter. Given prior beliefs zt|t−1 and xt|t−1,
the public observes a policy xt and updates its beliefs according to
zt|t = zt|t−1 +Kzx˜t with Kalman gain Kz ≡ Cov (zt, x˜t)
Var x˜t
(3.11)
17This is formalized in (3.16) below.
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A convenient property of the Kalman update is that it preserves the linearity of the model.
The difference with adaptive expectations is that the gain coefficient is an endogenous
parameter, identical to the least squares slope of projecting zt on x˜t. The present model
is particularly simple since there is only one observable, xt, such that Kz is a scalar.
Appendix C.3 extend this to a more general setting which will be used in Section 3.4 to
discuss the effects of differing degrees of transparency on optimal policy.
Kalman Filter and Policy Function
There are two unobserved states, τt and εt. Since εt is white noise, it is sufficient to
consider (3.10) as the only state equation of the Kalman filter.18 The measurement equation
is then the policy function adopted in equilibrium. For the remainder of this section, we
take as given a policy process of the form
xt = fττt + fεεt + Fττt|t−1 (3.12)
For some fτ , fε and Fτ . This is a natural guess, since discretionary policies are Markov-
perfect and depend only on current state variables as in (3.7). Under hidden information,
public beliefs matter and so it comes that their prior beliefs enter the state vector, too.
Since εt|t−1 = 0, it is only prior beliefs about the persistent component of the target which
matter.
A word of caution is at order about regarding (3.12) as a policy “rule”, since it is
not intended to convey any notion of commitment19: We will rather solve for a discretion
equilibrium where optimal policy is determined as a time-invariant function (as above) but
18In contrast, the presentation in Appendix C.3 applies to a generic multivariate framework where
both (3.9) and (3.10) would form a bivariate system of state equations. The univariate Riccati equation
derived in the present section is then part of the matrix Riccati equation shown in the appendix.
19Since the seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott (1977) this is hardly avoidable. However Persson and
Tabellini (2000, Chapter 11) frequently refer to discretionary policies as rules which are ex-post optimal.
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where the policymaker is free to deviate from this “rule” at any time. He will just not
find it optimal to do so.20 Section 3.2 extends this discussion in a more general context
and verifies that optimal policy belongs indeed to this class of processes. All what matters
for the remainder of this section is that policy is given by the linear function (3.12). This
allows us to focus now on consequences of this policy function for public’s signal extraction.
The public belief system is a straightforward application of the Kalman filter with (3.10)
as state equation and (3.12) as measurement equation. A key statistic of the policy function
will be fε/fτ , the ratio of policy loadings on realizations of the output target. Only these
loadings, and not Fτ , are relevant for the Kalman filter which is essentially driven by the
policy innovations21:
x˜t = fτ τ˜t + fεε˜t (3.13)
The ratio fε/fτ reflects the share of innovations due transitory versus persistent target
shocks. This “mixing ratio” determines how much a policy innovation reveals about τt
instead of εt. It can be interpreted as a measure of relative boldness of the policymaker
in attaining the two components of his output target.22 Recall that under symmetric
information, policy was bolder in response to transitory target shocks since they caused
less inflation.
As will be seen below, the mixing ratio is directly related to the R2 coefficients in
regressions of x˜t on τ˜t respectively ε˜t.
23 Moreover, from the perspective of the private
20The discussion focuses on equilibrium behavior. Off equilibrium, the private sector need not even
assume that policy has the form in (3.12) but that he still forms beliefs according to (3.11) for some gain
Kz.
21This can be seen from (3.11).
22Relative boldness could also be measured by (fε− 1)/(fτ − 1) which has however no direct bearing on
the Kalman filtering problem. Moreover, sensible policies will anyhow satisfy 0 ≤ fε ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ fτ ≤ 1
such that the measures will yield similar answers.
23Since εt is iid it is identical to its innovation ε˜t. To be clear when referring to innovations and also
for symmetry with τ˜t, the notation ε˜t will still be used in the context of innovations.
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sector, it governs the persistence of policy in response to a policy innovation, which is
crucial for inflation.
To get a first intuition for the role of the mixing ratio, notice that the Kalman gains
are invariant to rescaling the policy innovations. So instead of using x˜t one can consider
x˜t
fτ
= τ˜t +
fε
fτ
ε˜t (3.14)
which is a noisy signal of τ˜t and the noise variance
σ¯2 ≡ f
2
ε
f 2τ
σ2ε (3.15)
scales with the mixing ratio.
Moreover, there is a neat geometric representation for the role of fε/fτ : The standard-
ized innovations in the two target components form an orthonormal basis for the space of
innovations.24 x˜t spans the subspace of projections z˜t|t. As shown in Figure 3.2, this is
just a line with slope (fε/fτ · σε/
√
Σt). Whilst projections zt|t lie in this space, projection
errors zt − zt|t are perpendicular to it.
Regression R2 between target and policy innovations are measured by the distance
between the x˜t-space and the two respective axes. For a fixed Στ , it is easy to see how
projections τ˜t|t converge to the actual innovations τ˜t if the mixing ratio approaches zero.25
The opposite is the case when |fε/fτ | gets very large: Nothing gets revealed about the
persistent component of the target.
These results also hold up when considering the effects of the mixing ratio on the
24Formally, this is a two-dimensional Hilbert space with inner product defined by the (full information)
expectations operator E(·). Hilbert space analysis is for example used by Hansen and Richard (1987) to
study the role of information sets for asset pricing restrictions.
25Moreover, the innovations τt converge to the actual shocks ηt as can be seen below.
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Figure 3.2: Innovation Space
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Note: Projections εt|t are constrained in the subspace spanned by x˜t (dotted line) and
projection errors ε˜t− ε˜t|t are perpendicular to this line. The same holds for projections τ˜t|t.
innovation variance Στ . For any set of Kalman gains (Kτ , Kε) the innovation dynamics are
τ˜t+1 = ρ (1−Kτfτ )τ˜t − (ρKτfε)εt + ηt+1 (3.16)
and for the optimal projection coefficients
Kτ =
1
fτ
Στ
Στ + σ¯2
and Kε =
1
fε
σ¯2
Στ + σ¯2
(3.17)
Στ solves the Riccati equation
Στ = σ
2
η + ρ
2 σ¯2
Στ
Στ + σ¯2
=
σ2η
1− ρ2 σ¯2
Στ+σ¯2
(3.18)
As can be seen, Στ is bounded between σ
2
η and the AR(1) variance of τt. The limit points
are themselves not so interesting, since they would sensibly be attained only by setting
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either one of the policy coefficients fε and fτ to zero. But their analysis is instructive since
Στ and thus also Kτ and
R2τ ≡
Var τ˜t|t
Var τ˜t
=
Στ
Στ + σ¯2
are monotonically increasing in the mixing ratio fε/fτ .
26 The opposite holds for Kε and
R2ε = 1 − R2τ as can be seen from Figure 3.2: An absolute increase in the mixing ratio
rotates the x˜t-line towards the ε˜t axis and shrinks the distance between realizations and
projections of ε˜t. At the same time, it increases the projection residuals associated with
τ˜t.
27
The innovation dynamics (3.16) also reveal how the policymaker can forecast future
innovations using Etτ˜t+1 = ρ(1−Kτfτ )τ˜t − ρKεfεεt.
Inflation and Perceived Policy Dynamics
From the perspective of the public, policy is driven by the iid innovations x˜t. Policy has
an innovations representation in the form of an ARMA(1,1) process:
xt = ρxt−1 + x˜t + ψx˜t−1 (3.19)
with ψ = ρ [(fτ + Fτ )Kτ − 1]
The policy function governs the persistence of this ARMA via the MA coefficient ψ.28
Together with the Phillips curve (3.1), this innovations representation is sufficient to de-
26Formally, this can be checked by applying the implicit function theorem to (3.18) which yields
∂Στ
∂σ¯2
=
ρ2σ2η
1 + ρ2σ2η σ¯
2
Στ > 0
The rest follows straightforwardly from the definition of σ¯2 = f2ε /f
2
τ · σ2ε .
27This holds also after accounting for the dependence of Στ on fε/fτ .
28The derivation can be found in Appendix C.2.
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termine inflation as
πt = κ
∞∑
j=0
βjxt+j|t =
κ
1− βρ (xt + βψx˜t) (3.20)
which crucially depends on the MA root ψ.
The policy function has two levers to affect the persistence of xt: First, there is the
mixing ratio which has been discussed above. If policy largely ignores the persistent target,
i.e. if fε/fτ is large such that Kτ is close to zero, the MA root gets close to cancel the
AR root and policy is (correctly) perceived to be almost iid. In this case, inflation also
approaches the solution (3.8) under symmetric information with ρ = 0.29
But due to the second lever, Fτ , things need not collapse to the AR(1) case, when the
mixing ratio tends to zero. In this case, ψ converges to ρ·Fτ , which is not necessarily zero.30
Fτ represents the marginal reaction to people’s prior beliefs and affects the persistence of
policy, too. The marginal reaction to beliefs is sensibly negative since beliefs τt|t−1 will
be inflationary. This will be verified to be the case under the optimal policy studied in
Section 3.3. In effect, this counteracts policy persistence induced by τt.
The previous discussion was mostly geared at the effects of policy on perceived persis-
tence and thus on inflation. And there is a simple answer to keeping perceived persistence
low: Ignore the persistent output target.31 Or more subtly, to choose a high mixing ratio,
with a higher responsiveness to transitory than persistent shocks. But two things need to
be borne mind: First, in a rational expectations equilibrium, the policy function used in
people’s Kalman filter, must be identical to the actually implemented policy function. And
second, output has not only an informational role but attaining the output targets matters,
too, calling for fτ = fε = 1 and Fτ = 0. Whilst ignoring the persistent target alleviates
29Notice that in this case xt|t−1 goes to zero since xt becomes iid.
30Notice from (3.17) that in general fτKτ + fεKε = 1 which collapses here to fτKτ = 1.
31fτ = 0 such that xt ∼ iid.
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inflationary cost, it also leads to persistent shortfalls from the τ -target. And neither is it
sensible to conduct a policy of fτ = 1 and fε = 100, despite its attractive mixing ratio.
These are the trade-offs faced by a policymaker under hidden information: Attain
both targets as good as possible whilst keeping the public public’s perceptions of policy
persistence in check. The optimal trade-off is the subject of the next sections. For now, an
important restriction stands out already. On average, actual policies must match public
perceptions. Taking the perspective of the public, this yields an observationally equivalent
model based on the innovation representation of policy.
Observational Equivalence and Innovation Responses
This model with hidden policy components is observationally equivalent to a symmet-
ric information model where policy follows an ARMA(1,1). Both yield the same second
moments and have identical likelihoods. But there are important differences: First, once
policy is endogenized, the hidden components model endogenizes the MA root. This would
be an exogenous persistence parameter in the ARMA model. Secondly, the hidden com-
ponents model distinguishes different sets of impulses responses which can be associated
with different episodes in monetary policy.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.3 with different sets of impulse responses for output,
inflation and interest rates. They are computed for a not necessarily policy, namely when
setting fτ and fε the optimal coefficients under full information and Fτ = 0. First, there
are the expected responses computed by the public, after observing a unit innovation in
policy, x˜t, at time zero. They represent public expectations formed after the impact about
the future evolution of the various variables: After the initial upwards jump, output is
still expanded at about half of the impact value and then decays in a very persistent
fashion which is mirrored by an equally elevated and persistent inflation pattern. Then,
there are the true responses to the structural shocks τt and εt, computed under the full
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information measure spanned by wt. They are scaled such to yield the same unit innovation
in output as before. After a shock to the persistent target, τt, is persistently higher than
originally expected by the public. Please notice that the difference between these impulse
response does not represents the errors of public forecasts made in the initial period. As the
structural responses unfold, the public learns about the true nature of the shock.32 Since
the innovations responses are rational, they are correct on average, and the true response
to εt is persistently lower than expected.
If particular periods are supposed to be dominated by one set of shocks rather than
another, this predicts patterns of persistent forecast errors in public beliefs which should
be reflected in survey data. A striking example is how Erceg and Levin (2003) describe
the Volcker disinflation as a period of persistently excessive inflation forecasts, not unlike
the (stylized) responses to εt here. Their model matches aspects of U.S. data in the early
1980’s with a fixed policy rule steering inflation beliefs downward until they have reached
a lower inflation target. The point of the next section, is to show how the parameters of
such a rule can be derived within an explicitly optimizing framework of monetary policy
under hidden information.
32For the optimal policy, Figure 3.4 below shows how the one-period ahead forecast errors evolve and
persist for about four periods.
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zero, after a unit innovation in policy (x˜t) at time zero. Dashed lines are true impulses under the full information measure to structural shocks
τt (starred) respectively εt. Structural responses are scaled to yield a unit innovation in output. The policy uses the coefficients for optimal
policy under symmetric information for fτ , fε and Fτ = 0. The variables are: output gap (xt), inflation (πt), nominal rate (it) and spread
between eight and one-period nominal rate (i8t − it).
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3.2 Optimal Policy: Concepts and Methods
When the policymaker has information which is hidden from the public, the optimal policy
solution is complicated by the strategic behavior of the policymaker. As a monopolist,
he is conscious of the private sector’s signal extraction efforts. When contemplating a
policy step, for example a change in interest rates, he recognizes that this will not only
change economic fundamentals, but that it will also influence public beliefs about his
hidden information. This section solves for the policy, which optimally accounts for such
considerations in the discretion case.
Lacking a commitment technology, the policymaker acts in a time-consistent fashion
and retains the freedom to reoptimize his plans in each period. I restrict attention to
policies which are Markov-perfect. This excludes reputational mechanisms via the kind
of history-dependent strategies considered by Barro and Gordon (1983b) and Chari and
Kehoe (1990). In the spirit of “bygones are bygones”, state variables in a Markov-perfect
equilibrium must be relevant for current payoffs.33 The public’s prior beliefs will be part
of these Markov states since they matter for public payoffs. This even allows for a sense
of reputation and history dependence – but only indirectly – in that public prior beliefs
depend also on past policies.
In general, the entire distribution of public beliefs needs to be tracked by the policy
problem. The framework presented here affords a considerable simplification, which makes
the problem well tractable: We work in a Gaussian framework with constant variances.
Tracking entire distributions then collapses to tracking only their means and can be handled
with the Kalman filter.
It is the public’s prior, not posterior, beliefs which enter the state vector, since the
latter will be formed after observing current data which is influenced by current policy.
33Similar to my work, Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 11) formalize dynamic policy problems
with Markov-perfect equilibria. The concept originated in the game theoretic work of Maskin and Tirole
(1988b, 1988a, 2001).
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This section defines a rational expectations equilibrium where the public forms its posterior
beliefs consistently with the optimal policy function. The policymaker is free to choose
policies which are inconsistent with the public’s belief system, but equilibrium requires
that he finds it ex-post optimal not to deviate from the policy function assumed in people’s
Kalman filter. Because of this circularity, the within-period timing of the game between
policymaker and public is viewed as a simultaneous moves game34 and not a Stackelberg
game where the policymaker moves first.
Eggertsson and Swanson (2007) show how this simultaneity assumption also leads to a
unique Markov-perfect equilibrium for the kind of New Keynesian model used in Section 3.1
under symmetric information. This stands in contrast to the multiple equilibria found
under Stackelberg timing by King and Wolman (2004), Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano
(2003) and others.
A Class of Linear Quadratic Models
The mechanisms of this policy problem extend beyond the simple model of the previous
sections and are applicable to a general class of linear quadratic environments. It is thus
beneficial to cast the exposition around this more general class of models. This allows also
to easily enrich the simple model of the previous section with additional features to be
presented in Section 3.4.
As usual, the LQ model is meant as approximating a more general, non-linear setting.35
A precondition for such an approximation is the existence of a unique steady state, which
has been questioned for example by King and Wolman (2004). However, under the assumed
timing of simultaneous moves, I rely on the uniqueness results of Eggertsson and Swanson
(2007). For the steady state, their results carry over to the class of models studied below:
34The simultaneity stems from the circularity of assumed and implemented policy functions.
35Gali (2003) derives for example the private sector equations of Section 3.1 as a log-linearized approxi-
mation to the non-linear first-order conditions of consumers and firms. A more detailed discussion can be
found in Woodford (2003).
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There is no hidden information about constants, and thus no hidden information in steady
state. The steady state of the model is known by all agents and coincides with the steady
state of the full information model.
There are four types of variables:
1. Backward-looking variables, Xt, corresponding for example to the policy targets τt
and εt in the model of the previous sections.
2. Policy controls, Ut, corresponding to the output gap above.
3. Publicly observable variables, Zt, coinciding with the output gap in the simple model.
4. Forward-looking decision variables of the private sector, Yt, like inflation and the
interest rate in the above model.36
They will be treated as vectors of dimension Nx, Nu, NZ , and Ny respectively.
The backward looking variables need not only capture exogenous forcing variables like
gt and εt but also endogenous states like capital, habits, or lagged variables, for example
inflation in a model with price indexation. They evolve as
Xt+1 = AxxXt + AxyYt +BxUt +Gwt+1 (3.21)
where wt+1 is an exogenous Nw-dimensional white noise process with variance Ewtw
′
t = I.
37
The policymaker observes the entire history of wt, denoted w
t and will thus have com-
plete information about the realization of all variables until time t. In contrast, the private
36Except for such simple models, the interest rate is typically modeled as the policy control and the
output gap is a forward-looking variable of the private sector.
37Without loss of generality, Xt is constructed such that Nx ≥ Nw.
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sector observes only a linear combination of policy controls and backward looking variables:
Zt = CxXt + CuUt (3.22)
The history Zt spans the public information set.38 A sufficient condition to ensure superior
information of the policymaker is that NZ < Nw. For any variable zt,
zt|t ≡ E(zt|Zt)
denotes the expectation of zt on the private sector’s information set. Synonymously these
expectations will be called public beliefs. In particular, Xt|t−1 are the prior beliefs about
Xt before observing Zt. By construction,
Yt = Yt|t
always holds since public decisions are based on public information. In principle, Yt could
also be added to the measurement vector, but without adding new information.
The optimality conditions of private sector behavior are represented by an expectational
linear difference equation involving only publicly observable variables and public sector
expectations:39
A1yyYt+1|t = AyyYt|t + AyxXt|t +ByUt|t (3.23)
38In addition, there is no uncertainty about the structure of the economy and the public will know all
parameters of the model, for example the matrices Axx, Axy, Bx and G of equation (3.21).
39Notice that the policy control or parts of Xt are not precluded from entering directly in this forward
looking constraint. This will be the case when, for example, the policy control is publicly observable such
that Ut|t = Ut. A more general way to set up (3.23) would be to write
A1yyYt+1|t = AyyYt|t +A
2
yxXt|t +B
2
yUt|t +A
3
yxXt +B
3
yUt
with the understanding that the measurement equation (3.22) implies A3yxXt +B
3
yUt = A
3
yxXt|t +B
3
yUt|t.
This reduces then to (3.23) with Ayx = A
2
yx +A
3
yx and By = B
2
y +B
3
y .
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As in Section 3.1, the policymaker seeks to minimize the expected present value of
current and future losses
Wt = Et
∞∑
k=0
βkLt+k (3.24)
where the per period loss function Lt is quadratic in Xt, Yt and Ut,
Lt =

Xt
Yt
Ut

′
Q

Xt
Yt
Ut
 (3.25)
and the expectation operator is conditional on the history of wt.40
In principle, one could also allow for public beliefsXt|t and Ut|t to enter the loss function.
Except for adding algebraic complexity, this would not raise any further methodological
issues.41 In the current form, the loss function (3.25) depends on public beliefs via Yt = Yt|t.
Equations (3.21), (3.22), (3.23) and (3.25) describe the class of LQ models for which
this section seeks a solution to the optimal policy problem under hidden information.
The model of the previous sections can be mapped into this framework using Ut = gt,
Yt = πt and Xt = [τt εt]
′. The details are described in Appendix C.1. In this model, the
backward looking variables are purely exogenous, Axy = 0 and Bx = 0, which considerably
simplifies the solution under symmetric information (Svenssson 2007, p. 24). However, in
the hidden information problem the state vector will be augmented by public beliefs and
the state vector will be endogenous. So no additional complication arises from allowing
the backward looking variables in (3.21) to be partly endogenous, too.
40As usual, Q is assumed to be a positive definite matrix.
41Likewise, linear terms in Xt|t and Ut|t could be added to the transition equation for the backward
looking variables.
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Private Sector Equilibrium
The policymaker is constraint by the beliefs and the behavior of the private sector. The
private sector is atomistic and takes policies as given. So before turning to optimal policy, it
is useful to consider notions of private sector equilibrium for a given policy. This generalizes
the discussion of Section 3.1 in important ways.
We seek a time-invariant, Markov-perfect equilibrium. So policies will depend only on
current levels of backward-looking variables and prior beliefs about those. In equilibrium,
policy is a function of the Markov states:
Ut = F
0
1Xt + F
0
2Xt|t−1 (3.26)
for some F 01 , F
0
2 . Notice that this does not presuppose a commitment of the policymaker
to such a rule. Discretion will rather require that this policy is ex-post optimal, such
that the policymaker has no incentive to deviate once the private sector has formed beliefs
consistent with the policy.
For the time being, we take the perspective of the private sector who forms beliefs and
makes choices given the policy (3.26). This gives rise to a fairly strong notion of private
sector equilibrium used in Section 3.1. As will be seen shortly, such an equilibrium need
not always exist, but a weaker temporary equilibrium will be sufficient to constrain the
discretionary policy problem.
Definition (Private Sector Equilibrium). Given the policy in (3.26), the private sector
equilibrium is a sequence of observations {Zt}, perceived states {Xt|t}, perceived policies
{Ut|t} and private sector choices {Yt} such that
• Expectations and beliefs are rational. In this linear framework, they are formed using
the Kalman filter with measurements Zt.
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• Choices are optimal, that is they satisfy the forward looking constraint (3.23).
Using the Kalman filter, beliefs then evolve as
Xt|t = Xt|t−1 +K
0(Zt − Zt|t−1) (3.27)
Ut|t = F 01Xt|t + F
0
2Xt|t−1 (3.28)
Amongst others, the Kalman gain K0 depends on the policy coefficients F 0 = [F 01 F
0
2 ]
in (3.26). Details are given in Appendix C.3.
From the perspective of the private sector, the economy is driven by innovations to its
measurement variables. For any variable zt, innovations are defined relative to the public’s
prior belief z˜t ≡ zt − zt|t−1. By construction they are orthogonal to prior information of
the private sector and are iid under the public’s probability measure. Optimal choices in
the private sector equilibrium are the solution to an expectational linear difference system
driven by Z˜t and its solution can be analyzed using the counting rules of King and Watson
(1998) for stable and unstable roots:
Proposition 3 (Existence of Private Sector Equilibrium). Existence and uniqueness of
a private sector equilibrium depend on the roots λ of |A¯ − λB¯| = 0 for matrices A¯ and
B¯ defined in Appendix C.4. Due to certainty equivalence, the condition for existence and
uniqueness depends on the policy rule (3.26) but not on the Kalman gain K0.
Proof. The proof uses the innovations representation of the Kalman filter to set up a
system of expectational difference equations under the public’s probability measure. A¯
and B¯ collect the coefficients on the endogenous variables in that system. The result then
follows from applying the solution methods of King and Watson (1998) and Klein (2000).
Details are given in Appendix C.4.
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In the example of Section 3.1 the condition is trivially met42 but in general this needs
not be the case. A pertinent example is the nominal indeterminacy of Sargent and Wallace
(1975), which holds for any exogenous policy like (3.26) when the interest rate is the control
variable. This applies also to the New Keynesian model, as discussed for example by Gali
(2003). But even in models without nominal indeterminacy, the equilibrium need not exist
for any policy coefficients F 01 and F
0
2 .
If a unique solution exists, the construction of the private sector equilibrium is useful to
analyze outcomes under different candidate policies as in Section 3.1. But for the purpose
of constraining the discretionary policy problem, the above equilibrium notion is actually
too strong. In this equilibrium, private sector expectations treat (3.26) as a time-invariant
policy rule, carried out forever.43 And even though this will resemble the equilibrium
outcome, it misrepresents the nature of the discretion problem where the policymaker
can reoptimize his plans at each period. Therefore, non-uniqueness of a private sector
equilibrium does not foreclose uniqueness of a discretionary equilibrium. To constrain
the discretion problem, a weaker form of private sector equilibrium is sufficient. It is a
temporary equilibrium in the spirit of Grandmont (1977):
Definition (Temporary Private Sector Equilibrium). At a given point in time, the private
sector has given beliefs about current policy according to (3.26). They are embodied in
a Kalman gain K0 used to update beliefs about Xt as in (3.27). Furthermore, he holds
possibly different beliefs about future policies. They are embodied in a mapping G0 which
42It is straightforward to check that there are two stable roots (ρ and 0) associated with the exogenous
target variables and one unstable root (1/β) associated with inflation, which is the only forward looking
variable.
43This perspective is for example missed by the textbook chapter of Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter
11) on the subject (however in a not necessarily monetary context). Soderlind (1999) derives optimal
monetary policies for LQ economies and informally uses the notion of temporary equilibrium which is
developed here next.
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leads to expectations about future private decisions:
Yt+1|t = G
0Xt+1|t (3.29)
The temporary equilibrium then reduces to optimal choices which satisfy the forward
looking constraint (3.23) given these beliefs.
In a temporary equilibrium it is straightforward to substitute the forward-looking vari-
ables by a linear combination of publicly perceived policies and states, since private sector
expectations of future choices are given:
Yt|t = GxXt|t +GuUt|t (3.30)
where G0x = (A
1
yy G
0Axy − Ayy)−1(Ayx − A1yy G0Axx)
and G0u = (A
1
yy G
0Axy − Ayy)−1(By − A1yy G0Bx)
Discretion Policy and Equilibrium
Discretionary policy is time-consistent. At each point in time the policymaker can reopti-
mize while taking his future optimizations as given. This leads to a recursive representation
of the optimization problem. The state variables of the policy problem are the backward
looking variables and prior beliefs, there is no further history dependence. Furthermore,
the policymaker must account for the rational expectations and optimal choices of the
private sector. This is summarized in the following definition:
Definition (Discretionary Policy). At each point in time, for given private beliefs embodied
in F 0 and G0, the policy maker chooses Ut to minimize Lt + βEtV
0
t+1. The continuation
value of this dynamic optimization problem, V 0t+1, is a given function of future state vari-
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ables
X t+1 ≡
Xt+1
Xt+1|t

The problem is constraint by the transition equation for Xt (3.21), and the private sector’s
temporary equilibrium.
Appendix C.5 shows in detail how this gives rise to a linear regulator problem:
X ′tV
∗X t + v
∗ = min
Ut
{
X ′tQ
0X t + 2X
′
tN
0Ut + U
′
tR
0Ut + βEtX
′
t+1V
0X t+1 + v
0
}
(3.31)
s.t. X t+1 = A
0X t +B
0Ut +Dwt+1 (3.32)
for given matrices F 0, G0, V 0 and a scalar v0.44 The optimal policy is
Ut = −(R0 + βB0′V 0B0)−1(N0 + βB0′V 0A0)X t (3.33)
≡ F ∗X t
This is the form anticipated in (3.26). The policy appears certainty equivalent since it is
independent of the shock loadings D.45 But in fact, the setup of the regulator itself is not
certainty equivalent since it depends on the private sector’s Kalman filter as described in
Appendix C.5. So policies are actually not certainty equivalent.
The solution (3.33) to the regulator takes public beliefs and future policies as given.
Equilibrium imposes that plans and actions of policymaker and public are mutually con-
sistent:
Definition (Equilibrium under Discretion). Equilibrium under discretionary policymaking
44Except for V 0 and v0 matrices with superscript “0” depend on F 0 and G0.
45Certainty equivalence is a well-known result of linear regulator problems (Bertsekas 2005).
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consists of sequences {Ut}, {Xt}, {Yt} and {Zt} such that each
• Ut solves the policymaker’s problem
• Yt is the solution to a temporary equilibrium whose underlying beliefs are consistent
with the optimally chosen policies Ut
• Xt and Zt evolve according to (3.21) and (3.22)
where policies are a time-invariant function of the states.
Formally, this requires that F 0 = F ∗,46 and G0 = G∗ = Gx + Gu(F ∗1 + F
∗
2 ), where
F ∗1 and F
∗
2 partition F
∗ conformably with Xt and Xt|t−1. Furthermore, the value function
satisfies
V 0 = V ∗ = Q0 +N0F ∗ + F ∗′R0F ∗+ β(A0 +B0F ∗)′V 0(A0 +B0F ∗) (3.34)
This equilibrium concept is similar to the self-confirming equilibria of Fudenberg and
Levine (1993) and Sargent (1999) in that both are a fixed point of mutual beliefs and
actions in multi-player games. However, in a self-confirming equilibrium, players hold
erroneous beliefs about the structure of the economy, which are justified by observable
outcomes. This is different here, where the public completely knows and understands the
structure of the economy. A similar fixed point of beliefs and outcomes is used in the
limited-information rational expectations equilibria of Marcet and Sargent (1989a, 1989b)
and Sargent (1991).
Policy Improvement Algorithm
The equilibrium is a fixed point of public beliefs and policy actions and maps (F∗, G∗,V ∗)
into itself. An intuitive and efficient way to compute this fixed point is the following policy
46K0 is then consistent with F 01 = F
∗
1
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improvement algorithm. It is efficient, since policy improvement methods converge faster
than value function iterations (Whittle 1996; Bertsekas 2005).47 It is intuitive, since the
algorithm uses the regulator (3.31) to seek for a one-period deviation from a candidate
equilibrium. Non-existence of such a deviation is the defining property of equilibrium.
Formally, the algorithm starts with a candidate policy F 0 and beliefs G0 and computes
the Kalman gain K0 and continuation value V 0 associated with continuing this policy
forever. (Details are given in Appendix C.5.) If the conditions for a private sector equi-
librium are met (Proposition 3), one can even compute the G0 consistent with F 0. The
solution (3.33) to the above regulator problem then yields the optimal one-period devi-
ation. As long as F 0 6= F ∗ and G∗ 6= G0 there is no equilibrium. In this case, a new
iteration starts using (F ∗, G∗) as new candidate policies.48
The difference with a value function iteration is that at each step, the regulator uses
a continuation value consistent with carrying out the candidate policy forever whereas a
value function iteration would update V 0j+1 = V
∗
j at the j-th step. In contrast, the policy
improvement algorithm solves at each step an infinite horizon problem, where Kalman gain
K0 and continuation value V 0, and if possible also G0, are consistent with the candidate
policy.
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Above I argued for uniqueness of the equilibrium in steady state, since the model then
collapses to a full information setting with a unique steady state under simultaneous move
timing. But off-steady state, the above equilibrium is an intricate fixed point between
optimal one-period policies (F ∗), and public beliefs (F 0, G0). Formally, it is a fixed point
47Soderlind (1999) solves for optimal discretionary policies under symmetric information with value
function iterations and comments on the slow performance of the algorithm.
48Notice that there is a distinction between the sequential computations of this algorithm, which proceeds
in a Stackelberg-like fashion by starting with a policy “move”, and the equilibrium concept which rests on
the simultaneity of moves between policymaker and public as discussed above.
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between two Riccati equations, one from the policymaker’s regulator problem, combining
(3.33) and (3.34), the other associated with the public’s Kalman Filter, equation (C.8)
in Appendix C.3. Under suitable regularity conditions (Bertsekas 2005), both solve well-
defined problems with unique solutions given the other’s solution. However, to the best
of my knowledge there exist no results on the existence and uniqueness of such nested
systems. This is also the conclusion of Hansen and Sargent (2007, Chapter 15) who solve
multi-player equilibria with similarly stacked Riccati equations.
However, in my practical experience, the algorithm typically converges, and if so always
to the same equilibrium from arbitrary starting values for (F 0, G0). In particular, over
a wide range of calibrations49, each equilibrium has been checked by drawing 50 times
initial values from a mean zero Normal distribution with variance 10. Given equilibrium
coefficients of about one, this is basically a flat prior. Each time, the algorithm converges
to the same equilibrium.50
3.3 Optimal Policy in the Simple Model
Using the concepts and methods of the previous section, we can now solve for the optimal
policy in the simple New Keynesian model analyzed in Section 3.1. The optimal policy
has the form anticipated in (3.12):
xt = fττt + fεεt + Fττt|t−1 (3.12)
As discussed above, key statistics of this function are the mixing ratio fε/fτ which governs
the Kalman gains and Fτ via which policy responds to prior beliefs.
As expected, optimal policy seeks to quell inflationary expectations built up in the past
49See the sensitivity analysis in Figure 3.6 below.
50Occasionally an equilibrium might not be found for a particular initial guess. In this case, another
draw is made until the algorithm has converged 50 times.
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and Fτ is negative. This can be seen from impulse response shown in Figure 3.4. The first
two columns show responses to shocks in τt and εt.
51 The third column documents responses
to initial conditions τt = 0, εt = 0, τt|t−1 = 1. This corresponds to a situation where the
policymaker is faced with erroneous beliefs about his inflationary output preferences. The
optimal response is a prolonged contraction until beliefs and outcomes have settled back
in steady state after about four periods.52 Given that the New Keynesian model generally
lacks endogenous persistence, the length of this learning process is a remarkable outcome
echoing the results of Erceg and Levin (2003). Moreover, the effect of fighting past beliefs
is also present in the other impulse responses. When the true target shock is iid, this leads
to a contractionary policy one period after the shock. This pattern is similar (though not
fully identical) to commitment policies under full information. In both cases, a credible
promise to undo expansionary shocks in the future, lowers inflation expectations.53 This is
the disciplinary channel emphasized amongst others by Walsh (2000), Faust and Svensson
(2001) and Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006).
The other lever of policy is the mixing ratio which is higher compared to the full
information case.54 Under hidden information, policy becomes less bold in its pursuit of
persistent output targets. This increases the endogenous noise variance σ¯2 defined in (3.15)
for the public’s signal extraction problem.
Policy trade-offs are dramatically affected by two parameters: The preference weight
αx and the variance of transitory target shocks, σε, (keeping fixed the variance of shocks to
τt). Changing the slope of the Phillips Curve changes trade-offs in ways inversely related
to αx.
55 Figure 3.6 documents the sensitivity of the mixing ratio and Fτ when varying
51As before the baseline calibration uses the values from Table 3.1 and an equal weighting of policy
preferences αx.
52Fτ is the negative “impact” coefficient of the policy response to this experiment.
53A direct comparison of both policies is shown in Figure C.3.
54For the baseline calibration, the mixing ratio is 1.2340 under symmetric information and 1.2866 under
hidden information.
55Defining “normalized inflation” for κ = 1 as π¯t =
∑∞
j=0 β
jxt+j|t the loss function can be written as
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the calibration along these two dimensions. When increasing the preference for meeting
the output targets, the mixing ratio drops, since policies become less concerned about the
inflationary costs. Interestingly, when varying σε the mixing ratio reaches a maximum
around σε > 1 and then decreases in both direction. For increasing innovation variances it
decreases only mildly, and the effective noise variance σ¯2 increases almost linearly.56 (The
corresponding picture for σ¯2 is shown in Figure C.5 of Appendix C.6.) With decreasing σε,
the relative probability of a transitory shock decreases strongly, which makes the mixing
ratio decline as well.
The reaction to prior beliefs, Fτ changes smoothly and mostly monotonic when changing
αx and σǫ. It is always negative, and the more so if inflation carries a stronger weight in
policymakers preferences (αx small) and shocks are mostly transitory (σε large) such that
beliefs τt|t−1 are more likely to be erroneous.
Going back to the baseline calibration, the publicly perceived persistence of the policy
process is reduced both by the higher mixing and the negative reaction to prior beliefs. It
is instructive to compare the publicly expected response paths to an innovation in optimal
policy to those analyzed in Section 3.1 when using the coefficients from the symmetric
information case. This is shown in Figure 3.5. The reduced persistence of policy now leads
to sufficiently transitory belief about policy, that the interest rate responds negatively to a
policy innovation. This negative reaction stands in contrast to the positive reaction shown
in Figure 3.3 in case of a policy, which simply implements the policy function that were
optimal under full information.
The expected loss of the policymaker is clearly reduced by optimal policy under hidden
information. The key reason is that policies explicitly account for private sector expec-
tations – whilst retaining time-consistency. The gains from reduced inflation even offset
Lt = κ
2π¯2t + αx(xt − x¯t)2.
56For σε very large the response to persistent target shocks becomes very bold, i.e. fτ close to one, since
it is swamped by the higher frequency with which same-sized transitory shocks occur.
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the scaled back ambitions to pursue the output goals. This is illustrated by computing ex-
pected loss, E(Vt),
57 for various policies. First, there is the optimal policy under symmetric
information with a loss of 835.63, using this policy in the hidden information setting (the
experiment analyzed in Figure 3.3) leads already to sufficient uncertainty for the public
that losses drop to 739.30. The next experiment is to reduce the mixing ratio to the opti-
mal value, whilst neglecting prior beliefs (Fτ = 0). This scales back the relative boldness of
persistent policies. The expected loss drops further to 444.61. The optimal policy finally
reacts also to prior beliefs and the optimized loss is 346.98. Impulse response for these
policies are compared in Figure 3.7.58 The gains stem from reduced inflation due to less
expansionary policies, such that this ranking also carries over to the notion of representa-
tive welfare discussed in Section 3.1. In this case, losses are evaluated as deviations from
zero targets for inflation and output gap.
57Expected loss is an average measure of the policymaker’s value function across states of nature. The
averaging occurs with the unconditional probabilities of the states in equilibrium. (See Appendix C.5 for
computational details.) Optimal policy is of course defined on a state-by-state bass.
58Outcomes under these policy rules can be computed, because of the existence of a private sector
equilibrium in this simple model. See Section 3.2.
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Figure 3.4: Optimal Policy under Hidden Information: Structural Shocks
Note: Impulse responses (straight lines) to unit standard deviation shocks τt and εt. The column labeled τt|t−1 shows responses to initial
conditions τt = 0, εt = 0, τt|t−1 = 1. Dashed lines are prior beliefs zt|t−1 for any corresponding variable, zt. The variables are: output gap (xt),
inflation (πt), nominal rate (it) and spread between eight and one-period nominal rate (i
8
t − it). Public beliefs τt|t and εt|t.
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Figure 3.5: Optimal Policy under Hidden Information: Innovation Responses
Note: Impulse responses under different information sets. Straight line shows public expectations formed at time zero, after a unit innovation
in policy (x˜t) at time zero. Dashed lines are true impulses under the full information measure to structural shocks τt (starred) respectively
εt. Structural responses are scaled to yield a unit innovation in output. Corresponds to Figure 3.3 but uses optimal policy. The variables are:
output gap (xt), inflation (πt), nominal rate (it) and spread between eight and one-period nominal rate (i
8
t − it). Public beliefs τt|t and εt|t.
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Figure 3.6: Sensitivity of Policy Function
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(b) Belief Reaction Fτ
Note: Variations in αx and σε, keeping other parameters at their baseline values (Table 3.1). In order to provide the best perspective on each
surface, the axes in both plots have been rotated differently. See Figure C.5 in Appendix C.6 for sensitivity of σ¯2 = (fε/fτ )
2 σε.
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Figure 3.7: Optimal Policy and Arbitrary Rules
Note: Impulse responses of output and inflation under hidden information with different policies: Straight lines show optimal policy. Dash-
dotted lines use the optimal coefficients fε and fτ but neglect prior beliefs (Fτ = 0). Dashed lines correspond to using the symmetric
information policy when there is hidden information. Expected losses are 346.98, 444.61 and 739.30 respectively. Calibrated to baseline values
from Table 3.1.
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3.4 Belief Shocks and Disinflation
The simple New Keynesian model analyzed so far has only one communication channel
between policymaker and public: Policy actions themselves. Since policy is driven by more
shocks than there are communication channels, the public cannot perfectly infer the drivers
of policy, not even in equilibrium. In reality, there are however other communication
channels than the policy instrument itself. If these channels are informative, they can
alleviate the credibility problems in the previous section.
This section studies how outcomes change when the scope for credibility problems is
reduced. By doing so, we can verify a conjecture of Sargent (1993) and Bordo et al. (2007),
that disinflations should be pursued more vigorously when credibility is at stake. Their
advice stands in contrast to another view, advocated for example by Ireland (1995, 1997),
that disinflations should be more cautious when inflation persistence is large. In the simple
hidden information model, inflation persistence is largely governed by beliefs and thus by
the credibility of policy. To account for Ireland’s view, the model is later augmented with
a backward looking component in the Phillips curve to generate persistence exogenously.
In addition to observing policy, the public is now assumed to receive a noisy signal
about the persistent output target. The public’s measurement vector is
Zt =
 xt
τt + bt
 bt ∼ N(0, σ2b )
where bt are iid noise shocks contaminating the target signal. They will be called “belief
shocks” since they operate solely via public’s beliefs.
The scope for hidden information increases with the volatility of belief shocks. For
σb = 0, the model is identical to the full information model, since τt is perfectly observable
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and the other target component can be perfectly observed from policy.59 The opposite
occurs when σb is very large. In this case, the signal becomes useless and the model
converges to the previous setting where policy is the only observable.
Belief shocks play no role under symmetric information. But they matter under asym-
metric information because of their influence on inflation via the forward looking Phillips
Curve (3.1). In general, it cannot be optimal for policy to ignore them. Similarly to prior
beliefs about the output target, they are inflationary and optimal policy contracts output
to fight their effects. The corresponding impulse responses are shown in Figure 3.8. A
negative reaction to belief shocks is sensible in two ways: First it directly lowers inflation
via (3.1). Second, it signals that the target τt has in fact not gone up and thus reduces
expected inflation. In the baseline calibration, it takes again about four periods (one year)
to fight these erroneous beliefs.
How does policy change with the volatility of belief shocks? To answer this question,
Figure 3.9 shows how the policy coefficients change when σb is varied between zero and
infinity. As discussed above, the limit points in this experiment are the symmetric in-
formation model, respectively the model when only policy is observed. Policy coefficients
change smoothly and (with one exception) monotonically. As σb increases, the target signal
becomes useless and credibility must be more and more obtained via policy actions. Ac-
cordingly, policies become less bold (fτ and fε decrease). In reaction to prior beliefs, τt|t−1,
policy contracts more and more strongly. The policy reaction to belief shocks is always
negative and goes to zero when σb increase. This is intuitive since the public pays less
and less attention to the target signals when the become useless. Intriguingly, the policy
reaction becomes slightly less negative as σb becomes close to zero
60. As information gets
almost perfectly revealed, the trade-offs between reacting to a non-fundamental shock and
affecting almost fully-informed inflation beliefs are changing.61
59The exception would be if policy were to ignore εt such that the measurement vector becomes collinear.
But this would make εt irrelevant for the model, except for the policymaker’s welfare (and clearly subop-
timal for him, too).
60And apparently, this is not a convergence problem of the algorithm.
61Furthermore, policy coefficients represent impact responses to a unit-size shock, not a unit-standard
deviation shock. In this case, the probability of a bt = 1 is shrinking against zero.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses with Belief Shocks
Note: Impulse responses (straight lines) to structural shocks in the simple NK model augmented with belief shocks. Dashed lines are prior
beliefs zt|t−1 for any corresponding variable, zt. The column labeled τt|t−1 shows responses to initial conditions τt = 0, εt = 0, bt = 0, τt|t−1 = 1.
Baseline calibration values, see Table 3.1, where all innovation variances are equal to unity.
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Note: Change in policy coefficients of the simple model, augmented by belief shocks, as the volatility of belief shocks, σb is varied along the
x-axis.
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The key statistic to study optimal disinflations is here the response to prior beliefs τt|t−1.
When credibility issues are larger, the policymaker seeks to disinflate more vigilantly and
Fτ is more negative. This confirms the conjectures of Sargent (1993) and Bordo et al.
(2007) in an explicitly optimizing, yet simple, framework.
In this model, the cost of disinflation is largely under the policymaker’s influence, since
it depends a mostly on his credibility to keep policy persistence low. To see how policy
changes in the presence of exogenous persistence, the Phillips Curve is augmented with a
backward looking term, representing price indexation at the rate γ.62
(1 + βγ)πt = γπt−1 + βπt+1|t + κxt
Figure 3.10 compares the impulse response to a belief shock bt when varying the indexation
rate γ and for a constant volatility of the belief shocks, σb = 1, identical to the other shock
variances, see also Table 3.1. The figure looks at the different calibrations of γ at values
of 0, 1, and 0.5 respectively. For γ = 0 the model is identical to what has been studied
earlier in this section. In each case, shocks have been scaled to yield a unit innovation in
inflation. Surprisingly, optimal policy induces an even stronger contraction of the economy
when there is exogenous persistence. Despite the stronger policy response, the inflationary
effects of a belief shock are more prolonged when γ = 1.
Policy becomes thus relatively more vigilant to fight inflationary beliefs when there is
exogenous persistence, for a given inflation response. There are also interesting general
equilibrium effects of introducing price indexation in the model. These become apparent
62As in Woodford (2003) or Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) this can be derived from the
optimizing behavior of Firms under Calvo pricing. Firms who do not optimize their prices are supposed
to change prices at the rate Πγt−1 where Πt−1 is last period’s level (not log) of inflation. As shown by
Woodford (2003), this changes also welfare functions such as (3.4) to be concerned with quasi-differenced
inflation πt − γπt−1 instead of inflation. The point of the experiment is here is however to consider how
exogenous persistence changes policies whilst keeping the objective function constant. The policymaker’s
loss function is thus kept unchanged.
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when comparing the absolute responses to a same-sized belief shock. This requires scaling
back the responses in Figure 3.10 to correspond each to a unit-standard deviation shock
in beliefs (not shown in the figure). Under this perspective, a belief shock has a smaller
impact on inflation when γ is larger. Accordingly, the optimal policy is to contract output
only to a lesser degree. But in relation to the inflation response, the contraction is stronger,
than when compared with lower rates of price indexation. (The results are similar when
looking at responses to an initial condition τt|t−1 = 1 instead of a belief shock.)
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Figure 3.10: Fighting Belief Shocks Under Exogenous Persistence
Note: Impulse response of output and inflation to a belief shock with and without price indexation in the Phillips Curve. γ =0 (straight lines)
corresponds to the standard Phillips Curve (3.1). Dashed lines show the case with full indexation, γ = 1. Dash-dotted lines for a 50% rate of
indexation (γ = 0.5). Other parameters calibrated as in Table 3.1.
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3.5 Discussion
This section discusses related literature, companion work on commitment policies as well
as estimation strategies.
Related Literature
Since asymmetric information is such a pertinent issue in policymaking, it is no wonder,
that there is a wide body of related literature. General surveys can be found in Rogoff
(1989), Walsh (2003, Chapter 8) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 15). The diver-
sity of related topics is reflected by the various angles from which research has proceeded.
Basically, the literature can be classified by answering the following question: Who learns
about what and how? Moreover, an important aspect is whether policy is optimized or
represented by a fixed rule.63
In this paper, the public faces hidden information and policy is optimal. The tractabil-
ity of the solution stems from the unobservable states following smooth, Gaussian processes
as opposed to discrete regime switches. The latter are attractive to model central bank
“types” like weak/soft or commitment/discretion as in Backus and Driffill (1985b), Cukier-
man and Liviatan (1991), Ball (1995), Walsh (2000) and King, Lu, and Pasten (2007) in
more restrictive environments.64 But the public’s learning problem under regime switching
imposes on the policy problem a constraint with important non-linearities. This makes it
hard to solve in a general dynamic setting as those used for policy analysis. Svensson and
Williams (2006) discuss the resulting difficulties in more detail.
Learning about regime-switches does not pose such problem when it is the central bank
who learns about economic conditions as in Sargent (1999). This is because of the strategic
63Another influential strand of the literature studies how the central bank influences coordination prob-
lems in the private-sector when there is heterogenous information, see Morris and Shin (2002), Shin and
Amato (2003) and Svensson (2006).
64Most papers must resort to very small state spaces and/or finite horizon problems.
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behavior of the policymaker when facing agents learning about, respectively from, him as
opposed to the non-strategic behavior of atomistic private agents. Svensson and Woodford
(2003a, 2004), Aoki (2006) study optimal policy in such settings in linear quadratic settings
similar to mine.
Another simplifying feature of my approach is that the “learning” problem of the public
is technically just an inference problem with time-invariant regression coefficients, and not
the kind of evolutionary belief system studied in the learning literature represented for
example by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Adaptive learning leads to interesting dynamics
where past data drives changes in regression coefficients, but is so far hard to capture in
optimal policy problem. For fixed policy rules, the issue is analyzed by Orphanides and
Williams (2005, 2006). An exception is the work of Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006)
discussed below.
As discussed in the introduction, the papers closest to my work are Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986) and Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002). This paper shares with them not
only the linear framework and the Kalman filtering of the public, but also the broad
specification of unobserved policy goals. New is the general framework capable of handling
various models with endogenous state variables. A substantive difference with Cukierman
and Meltzer is that their policies do not react to prior beliefs. Faust and Svensson focus on
the welfare effects of credibility. Within a slightly different economic structure (forward-
looking Phillips Curve instead of Lucas-supply curve), their results are confirmed here:
Welfare is is improved when output targets are unobservable. The underlying reason is
that under hidden information Markov-perfect policies become explicitly responsible for
public beliefs. This disciplines policy in a time-consistent fashion. This is also recognized
by Walsh (2000). A similar, but less explicit mechanism operates also under the adaptive
learning scheme of Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006).
None of the above considers the optimal commitment policy when there is hidden
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information about dynamic state variables. This is the subject of ongoing companion work
to this paper, which is briefly discussed below.
Turning to the evidence for proprietary information held by central banks, Romer
and Romer (2000) find improved forecastability of inflation and output using the Fed’s
proprietary Greenbook forecasts (which are released only with a five-year lag). Their
results are corroborated by Sims (2002) using an extended data set. Faust, Swanson, and
Wright (2004) cast doubts on this view based on estimated responses to policy surprises,
but they also find evidence of superior information about future activity – related to
the Fed’s construction of the industrial production index. The empirical results of Peek,
Rosengren, and Tootell (2003) also point the Fed’s role in banking supervision as a source
of informational advantage.
Commitment
Ongoing work on a companion paper looks at the optimal commitment policy under hid-
den information. The solution is complicated since the state-contingent commitment policy
must consider the effects of policy innovations into the indefinite future. However a recur-
sive representation can be found using Lagrange multipliers as state variables analogously
to Kydland and Prescott (1980). A neat feature of policy under commitment is that it can
be decomposed in two steps: First, the projection of policy onto the public information set
follows the same policy function as under symmetric information. It has the form:
Ut|t = FxXt|t + Fλλt−1|t−1
where λt−1 is the marginal value attached by the policymaker to adhering to his forward
looking constraints in last period’s optimization problem.65 Second, the policymaker de-
65Applying a result from Svensson and Woodford (2003b), it is straightforward to derive that Fx and
Fλ are the certainty equivalent coefficients from the corresponding full information policy.
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termines the optimal innovation policy U˜t and thus determines which combination of state
variables Xt and continuation values λt is observable to the public or not. Using the re-
cursive structure of the Kalman Filter, an infinite regress problem can be avoided. This
structure of the commitment policy leads to interesting questions about observability and
commitment.
Estimation and Observational Equivalence
The model presented here is build around the idea that the private sector cannot correctly
infer structural shocks from observed data on outcomes (Zt, Yt). So how could an econo-
metrician do any better? In most cases, an econometrician will at best only observe the
same data as the private sector, (Zt, Yt), maybe even less.
66 Formally, he faces a hidden
components model of the form
X t+1 = AX t +Dwt+1
Zˆt ≡H
Zt
Yt
 = CX t (3.35)
where Zˆt contains the observables of the econometrician and the matrices A, D and C
depend on the parameters of the model, which are supposed to be stacked in a vector θ.67
Let Zˆt denote the econometricians data set and call projections of a variable zt on
this data set zˆt|t. Given Zˆt he cannot construct better estimates than Xt|t but he can
use later data to improve estimates beyond what contemporaneous decision makers in the
66The exception would be if she would have ex-post access to proprietary information of the central
bank, for example Greenbook data released by the U.S. Fed with a five year lag as in the study of Romer
and Romer (2000).
67H selects the subset of Zt which is observed by the econometrician. The econometrician would also
have to consider that there is a stochastic singularity between the public’s measurements Zt and decision
variables Yt in the model. If she were to observe the same variables as the model agents, she would then
either have to prune some variables or to consider measurement error in her data, see for example Hansen
and Sargent (2005) or Ireland (2004).
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private sector could. Formally, the Kalman smoother can be used to construct estimates
Xˆt|T based on time T data, see for example Hamilton (1994, Chapter 13). To estimate
the structural parameters θ of the model, its likelihood is computed from the sequence of
innovations
Z∗t = Zˆt − E(Zˆt|Zˆt−1)
which are constructed from Kalman filtering the data with the model (3.35).68 The likeli-
hood function is then
L = −1
2
T∑
t=1
NZˆ log (2π) |VarZ∗t |−1 (Z∗t )′ (VarZ∗t )−1 Z∗t
where VarZ∗t is computed from the Kalman filter using computations analgously to those
used by the private sector agents in the model of Section 3.2.
Moreover, Section 3.1 pointed to an observational equivalence between a hidden com-
ponents model of policy and a symmetric information version where the policy process has
more lags. By construction, such a model will have identical likelihood than its hidden
information counterpart in any data. But this is not a drawback. The value typically lies
in offering a deeper interpretation of policy dynamics which would otherwise have to be
taken as exogenous. In general, unobserved component models have a successful tradition
in applied work to represent macroeconomic data in intuitive ways, see for example Wat-
son (1986) and the references cited in Kim and Nelson (1999). A most recent example is
the trend-cycle decomposition of Stock and Watson (2007) to illustrate changes in ARMA
coefficients of the inflation process.
68In principle this could be done using a steady state Kalman filter as used in Appendix C.3, see also
Anderson et al. (1995). Or one could use the exact likelihood function for finite sample data, see for
example Hamilton (1994).
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper fits a gap between commonplace concerns about credibility and asymmetric in-
formation in monetary policy, usually analyzed in stylized and often static models, and the
kind of dynamic general equilibrium models widely used for policy analysis. By relying on
linear quadratic approximations, the optimal policy problem is still intricate but tractable.
Whilst the results for the simple New Keynesian model are illustrative at best, a few
features are certainly here to stay: First, the dependence of Markov-perfect policies on prior
beliefs leads (indirectly) to history dependent policies. Intuitively, this allows policy to fight
inflationary beliefs created by past policies – not dissimilar to commitment strategies under
full information. Second, rational expectations impose restrictions on average outcomes69:
Every scenario of a disinflation where public inflation forecasts are persistently too low
must be matched by an opposite scenario of persistent inflationary surprises. Equilibrium
beliefs must be consistent with policy plans, and optimal policy must balance outcomes
under one kind of scenario with those under the other. In the context of the simple model
implemented here, this leads to scaling back the pursuit of persistent output targets because
of the inflationary beliefs it creates even when a transitory target shock occurs.
Moreover, a caveat is at order about generalizing the results on the value of trans-
parency. Literally, the model says that intransparency about policy goals is a good thing.
Faust and Svensson (2001) find the same. But this must be appreciated in the specific
context of the model where there is asymmetric information about output targets. Due to
the Barro-Gordon bias, the persistent pursuit of output targets is a futile exercise. Under
asymmetric information, the policymker must account for the public’s beliefs about the
targets and this makes him recognize the cost of inflationary expectations even when policy
is restricted to be time-consistent. The welfare effects need not be the same when there is
an unobservable inflation target – which should be easiest to attain under full transparency
69Also known as the innovations representation of policy.
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– or when the bank has proprietary information about fundamentals.
Appealing for future applications is the scalability of the method. Questions which can
now be studied are: The merits of explicit versus implicit inflation targeting (Bernanke
2007; Blinder 2007). In particular, how important the differences are once policy optimally
reacts to erroneous target beliefs. In the open economy context, there is the case of han-
dling exchange rate regimes with managed floating and unofficial targets for exchange and
inflation rates. Finally, the method can be augmented to allow for central bank forecasts
to enter the set of publicly observables to assess the effects of forecast publication.70 This
is not only interesting when there hidden information about policy preferences but also in
settings where the central bank has proprietary information about fundamentals, such as
potential output.
As discussed in Section 3.5, the solution of the optimal commitment policy is a subject
of my ongoing research with promising features. The ultimate extension of this work is
to endow both central bank and public with asymmetric information which would lead to
two interrelated signal extraction problems.
70Rudebusch and Williams (2006) analyze this topic from the perspective of a fixed, not necessarily
optimal policy rule.
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Appendix A
Supplement to Chapter 1
This appendix contains details of the VAR lag-length selection (A.1), identification of
“inflation persistence” shocks (A.2), tests for long run effects of monetary policy on output
(A.3) and further arguments for conditioning on permanent shocks to output instead of
labor productivity (A.4).
A.1 Lag-Length Selection
Specification of the VAR’s lag-length is based on various criteria. As whiteness of the resid-
uals is key for the auto-covariances, I focus in particular on Portmanteau tests.1 Another
aspect is how well the unconditional, filtered covariances of the data are matched by their
VAR analogues. This is an indirect measure for how well the VAR estimates the relevant
frequency bands of the data’s spectrum.
For the benchmark VAR with four variables, equation (1.2) of Section 1.1, the portman-
teau tests require a lag-length of at least p = 12 (one year) as reported in Table A.1 which
coincides with the AIC’s recommendation but is much higher than the one lag, advocated
by SIC or HQIC. With 30 years of monthly data, 12 lags leave sufficiently many degrees
of freedom to the VAR. Figure A.1 shows how well this fits the sample bc-moments of the
1Since their large sample distribution tends to over-reject dramatically, I follow Altig et al. (2004) and
bootstrap critical values.
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data.
Based on these results, a lag-length of p = 12 is used. The estimated VAR coefficients
are reported in Table A.2. Figure A.2 plots the autocorrelations of the forecast errors,
which are practically zero. Figure A.3 shows the VAR’s autocovariance function and the
associated confidence intervals.
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Table A.1: Lag-Length Selection Criteria for Benchmark VAR
VAR Information Criteria Portmanteau Tests for lags . . .
lag T-K llf/T max root AIC HQIC SIC 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
2 360 −6.57 0.9476 13.34 13.49† 13.72† 164.24∗∗ 334.49∗∗ 485.91∗∗ 666.38∗∗ 800.16∗∗ 889.77∗∗ 966.41∗∗ 1064.05∗∗
4 350 −6.46 0.9694 13.29 13.58 14.02 94.49∗∗ 255.53∗∗ 401.01∗∗ 575.64∗∗ 692.93∗∗ 792.73∗∗ 870.91∗∗ 971.15∗∗
8 330 −6.25 0.9699 13.22 13.78 14.64 14.34 113.25∗∗ 246.75∗∗ 388.50∗∗ 497.03∗∗ 604.31∗∗ 693.28∗∗ 794.26∗∗
12 310 −6.06 0.9791 13.20† 14.05 15.32 7.61 45.08 147.11∗ 285.34∗∗ 398.19∗∗ 502.88∗∗ 594.58∗∗ 699.18∗∗
16 290 −5.91 0.9700 13.28 14.41 16.12 11.84 42.35 91.90 232.30∗∗ 354.46∗∗ 459.14∗∗ 544.54∗∗ 653.89∗∗
20 270 −5.73 0.9789 13.31 14.73 16.88 14.53 35.51 71.75 168.84 277.90∗ 379.70∗ 461.27∗ 569.22∗
24 250 −5.55 0.9810 13.34 15.05 17.64 11.03 30.40 55.66 95.09 202.42 298.39 390.02 488.03
28 230 −5.44 0.9775 13.51 15.53 18.57 7.78 29.07 54.29 94.45 176.68 271.92 360.46 447.48
32 210 −5.29 0.9857 13.62 15.94 19.44 7.78 32.57 64.93 111.47 168.02 258.64 331.28 424.14
36 190 −5.13 0.9871 13.72 16.35 20.32 11.85 39.17 73.54 122.62 180.65 242.06 326.94 418.02
40 170 −4.91 0.9902 13.70 16.65 21.10 17.07 45.96 90.50 141.43 206.22 276.69 345.87 434.35
44 150 −4.67 0.9946 13.67 16.95 21.88 18.11 51.29 107.69 156.79 226.16 302.90 371.64 461.89
48 130 −4.42 0.9963 13.62 17.23 22.65 28.98 75.47 147.63 206.80 263.06 343.11 420.65 510.77
Note: Model chosen with lag-length 12. † denotes minimum IC. Q-statistics for Portmanteau test. ∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the
5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ at the 1% level of bootstrapped distribution (2000 draws).
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Figure A.1: BC-Moments: Filtered VAR versus Filtered Data
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Note: Bandpass-filtered moments, EY˜tY˜
′
t−k for benchmark VAR. The thick lines plot unconditional correlations computed from filtering VAR-
Spectrum (see Section 1.1). The thin lines are their analogues computed from filtering the data first and then taking sample correlations. Data
for the ex-ante real rate is constructed from fitted values of the VAR for expected inflation. The exact bandpass was used for the VAR-based
correlations, and the Baxter-King approximation for the data (Baxter and King (1999) recommend a lag truncation of 12 in quarterly data,
with monthly data, 12× 4 = 48 is used here). (The thin lines plot mostly underneath the thick ones). Correlations on upper diagonal.
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Figure A.2: Autocorrelation Function of Forecast Errors
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Note: Autocorrelation of forecast errors for benchmark VAR (see Section 1.1)
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Table A.2: Estimated VAR Coefficients
VAR Equation for
Variable ∆y π i m
∆yt−1 0.1863
∗∗∗ 0.0127 0.0097∗∗∗ −0.0010
πt−1 0.1194 0.2468
∗∗∗ 0.0011 −0.0000
it−1 2.5517
∗∗ 0.6748∗ 1.2228∗∗∗ 0.0932∗
mt−1 0.6108 −0.2873 0.3825
∗∗∗ 0.0039
∆yt−2 0.0611 −0.0323
∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0021
πt−2 −0.1126 0.1053
∗ −0.0120 0.0003
it−2 −0.3144 0.0618 −0.6004
∗∗∗ −0.2039∗∗∗
mt−2 −2.3311 −0.2213 0.1672
∗∗ 0.0151
∆yt−3 0.0863 0.0332
∗∗ −0.0010 −0.0003
πt−3 −0.2554 0.0428 0.0088 −0.0029
it−3 −1.5820 −0.1213 0.4643
∗∗∗ 0.1988∗∗∗
mt−3 −2.8398
∗ 0.7229 −0.0211 −0.0647
∆yt−4 0.0819 0.0137 −0.0012 0.0006
πt−4 −0.2152 0.0271 −0.0196
∗∗ −0.0180∗∗∗
it−4 −2.5844 0.2581 −0.3229
∗∗∗ −0.1333∗
mt−4 −0.7082 −1.2555
∗∗ 0.1530∗ 0.0294
∆yt−5 −0.1286
∗∗ −0.0145 0.0063∗∗ 0.0018
πt−5 0.0577 0.0625 0.0363
∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗
it−5 3.2792
∗ 0.1689 0.5012∗∗∗ 0.0433
mt−5 −2.3493 −0.7171 −0.2111
∗∗∗ −0.1477∗∗
∆yt−6 0.0053 0.0053 −0.0018 −0.0016
πt−6 −0.1400 0.0670 −0.0090 0.0008
it−6 −0.9947 −1.3757
∗∗ −0.6228∗∗∗ −0.1268
mt−6 −0.9146 −0.2910 0.0260 0.0562
∆yt−7 −0.0971
∗ −0.0483∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0007
πt−7 0.0138 0.0807 0.0328
∗∗∗ 0.0022
it−7 1.3623 0.9634 0.2419
∗∗ 0.1321∗
mt−7 −1.5928 −0.0915 0.1287 0.0376
∆yt−8 0.0136 0.0004 −0.0001 0.0023
πt−8 0.1097 −0.0396 −0.0055 −0.0077
it−8 −1.6328 −0.5389 0.0447 0.0187
mt−8 −3.0411
∗ 0.9633∗ 0.1150 0.0770
∆yt−9 0.1075
∗ −0.0140 0.0061∗∗ 0.0041∗
πt−9 −0.1457 0.2052
∗∗∗ 0.0113 0.0069
it−9 4.0078
∗∗ 0.7068 0.1857∗∗ 0.0758
mt−9 −3.6653
∗∗ −0.9485∗ 0.0012 −0.1754∗∗∗
∆yt−10 0.0090 0.0102 −0.0004 −0.0024
πt−10 −0.3008
∗ −0.0079 −0.0199∗∗ −0.0075
it−10 −5.4376
∗∗∗ −0.3331 −0.2232∗∗ −0.0293
mt−10 −5.1382
∗∗∗ −0.9265∗ −0.2128∗∗∗ −0.0855
∆yt−11 −0.0102 0.0139 0.0019 −0.0037
∗
πt−11 0.0491 0.0668 0.0171
∗ −0.0034
it−11 0.8793 0.1212 0.1904
∗∗ −0.0479
mt−11 −0.8658 −1.1959
∗∗ −0.0440 −0.0462
∆yt−12 −0.1066
∗∗ 0.0063 −0.0006 0.0004
πt−12 −0.0731 −0.0884
∗ 0.0025 0.0092
it−12 0.5625 −0.5413 −0.1164
∗∗ −0.0112
mt−12 −0.7876 −0.6832 −0.3017
∗∗∗ −0.0704
const 4.9607∗∗∗ 0.9551∗∗ −0.0330 −0.0422
System Statistics
lags: 12
obs: 359
det(Ω): 2.1396
llf: −2174.1274
AIC: 13.2041
SIC: 15.3242
HQIC: 14.0471
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% respectively 10% level. Ω is the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR’s forecast errors.
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Figure A.3: Autocorrelation Function of Yt with Confidence Intervals
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Note: Bandpass-filtered moments computed from VAR described in Section 1.1. Bootstrapped standard-errors bands with Kilian (1998)’s small
sample adjustment (1000 draws in first round, 2000 draws in second). Percentiles are shaded: 95% (light), 90% (middle), 68% (dark) and 38%
(very dark). White line is median of bootstraps. Black line is point estimate of VAR.
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A.2 Identification of Persistence Shocks
This section describes the identification of the inflation persistence shocks. These are con-
structed as the single disturbance which maximizes the forecast error variance of inflation
between the 2 to 20 year horizon and which is orthogonal to the previously identified shocks
to technology and monetary policy. I extend the method of Uhlig (2004b) to accommodate
this orthogonality constraint.
For this method it is convenient to express the identification in terms of an orthonormal
matrix Q˜ and not in terms of the matrix of impact coefficients Q defined in equation (1.3)
above. These two are related via the Cholesky decomposition2 of the VAR’s forecast error
variance, Σ = Eete
′
t:
Ψ ≡ chol (Σ)
Q˜ ≡ Ψ−1Q
By construction we have Q˜Q˜′ = I.
We seek the third column of Q˜, associated with the inflation persistence shocks, given
the first two columns of Q containing the impact coefficients of technology and monetary
shocks. This third column of Q˜ solves the following variance maximization problem
max
q˜
h′π
(
240∑
k=24
CkΨq˜ q˜
′Ψ′C ′k
)
hπ (A.1)
= q˜′
(
240∑
k=24
C ′kΨ
′h′π hπΨCk
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡S
q˜ (A.2)
2The Cholesky decomposition is the unique triangular factorization of a positive definite matrix. Ψ is
lower triangular and we have Σ = ΨΨ′ = QQ′.
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subject to
q˜′q˜ = 1 (A.3)
(Ψ−1Q12)′ q˜ = 0 (A.4)
where Ck are the coefficients of the VAR’s vector moving average representation
C(L) =
∞∑
k=0
CkL
k = A(L)−1
Q12 contains the previously identified columns of Q and hπ selects inflation from the VAR
defined in (1.2):
hπ =
[
0 1 0 0
]′
Uhlig (2004b) solves the above problem without the orthogonality constraint (A.4). In
this case the problem reduces to finding the largest eigenvector of the positive definite
matrix S defined in (A.2) with q˜ being its normalized eigenvector.
I extend his computations to handle the orthogonality constraint (A.4) as follows. Let
B be an orthonormal basis for the nullspace of Ψ−1Q12. Such a matrix is easily com-
puted using algorithms based on the singular value decomposition3 of Ψ−1Q12. The set of
permissible vectors q˜ is then
{q˜ : q˜ = Bz ∀ z ∈ Rn}
where n is the dimension of the nullspace (here: two, since there are two remaining columns
in Q).
Reparametrized in terms of z, the problem reduces to set z equal to the normalized
3See for instance the command null in Matlab.
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eigenvector of of B′SB associated with its largest eigenvalue, denoted z∗. All the necessary
computation are part of standard libraries for linear algebra and pose no particular burden
for the Bootstrap simulations.
The sign of z∗ (and thus the sign of the shock) is determined by making it raise inflation
on impact. Let Q3 denote the third column of Q. The sign of z
∗ is then set such that the
second element of Q3 (the one associated with inflation) is positive. Q3 is computed from
Q3 = ΨBz
∗
A.3 No Long Run Effects of Monetary Policy
This section describes the tests for zero long run effects of the Romer series on real output.
This is an overidentifying restriction on the Romer coefficients in the VAR’s first equation
for output growth.
Long-run restrictions are most conveniently combined with overidentifying restrictions
using the analysis of Shapiro and Watson (1988).4 They showed how to cast long-run
restrictions into coefficient restrictions on an instrumental variables regression. Without
overidentifying restrictions, this is numerically equivalent to the matrix method of Blan-
chard and Quah (1989) used in the main text.
Without the overidentifying restriction, the long-run restriction can be implemented as
follows: The structural equation for output growth is
a(L)∆yt =W (L)
πt
it
+ k(l)mt + σzεzt (A.5)
4Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003) do not use overidentifying restrictions, but they get
also mileage out of the instrumental variables setup by recognizing nonstationary hours as a problem of
weak instruments.
A.3. NO LONG RUN EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY 143
where 1/σz
[
a(L) −W (L) −k(l)
]
corresponds to the first row ofQ−1A(L) in the notation
of equation (1.3).
Because of the correlation between the technology shock εzt and it as well as πt and mt,
equation (A.5) cannot be estimated with OLS. But an instrumental variables regression
works where it, πt and mt are instrumented for by their own lagged values. The restriction,
that only εzt has a long-run impact on yt imposes W (1) = 0 and k(1) = 0 (this eliminates
long-run effects of any other shocks than εzt operating through it, πt andmt). The restricted
IV regression is estimated by replacing it, πt and mt with their differences using W (L) =
(1−L)W˜ (L) and k(l) = (1−L)k˜(l), which holds for some W˜ (L)5 and some k˜(l) whenever
W (1) = 0. This is nicely illustrated by Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Francis, Owyang,
and Theodorou (2003, Appendix A).
A zero effect of the Romer measure on permanent output means that k(1) = 0 without
the need to impose it. I estimate (A.5) imposing only W (1) = 0 but not k(1) = 0. The
Wald test for k(1) = 0 is insignificant with a p-value of 70%. Alternatively, technology
shocks can be estimated by dropping k(l) mt from (A.5) as in a three-variable VAR. mt
can then be added as an instrument. Hansen (1982)’s J statistic for the estimation with
efficient GMM cannot reject the overidentifying restriction. Using only mt as additional
instrument, the p-value is 33%. Using mt and 12 of its lags, the p-value is 48%.
5W˜ (L) has one lag less than W (L) see for instance Hayashi (2000, p. 564).
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A.4 Discussion of “Technology Shocks”
Permanent shocks to output are labeled here as “technology shocks”. Conditional on these
shocks, the real rate is estimated to be pro-cyclical and a positive leading indicator of
output. This is in line with predictions of standard RBC and New Keynesian models for
technology shocks. (A common feature of these models is that they have a time-separable,
iso-elastic utility of consumption.)
The kind of labor augmenting technology shocks specified in these models is the sole
driver of permanent output if hours are stationary, otherwise they have to be identified
from the permanent component of labor productivity (Gali 1999).6 Given the physical
constraints of time, models sensibly assume hours to be stationary. Whether the post-war
sample of U.S. hours data is better approximated by a stationary or a unit root process
has generated an intense debate with good arguments on both sides.78
What matters for the message of this paper, is whether the transmission mechanisms
of simple RBC or New-Keynesian models predict the same comovements in output and
interest rates for whatever shocks drive the stochastic trend in output.9 Non-technology
sources of stochastic growth in output are for instance permanent changes in government
6This is easily seen from the (typically assumed) Cobb-Douglas function for aggregate production.
In logs: yt = at + α(kt − lt) + lt
where yt is real output, at the technology shock, α the income share of capital, kt capital and lt are hours
(as throughout the paper, all quantities are per-capita). Stationarity of the capital-labor ratio is a key
restriction of balanced growth (which is a maintained hypothesis). Stochastic trends in output must thus
be coming either from technology and/or from hours.
7See for instance Gali and Rabanal (2004), Francis and Ramey (2005a) and Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Vigfusson (2003).
8Using quarterly hours data over my sample, unit root tests favor the stationary specification, mostly
because the sample excludes the run-up in hours worked during the second half of the 1990’s. This was
reported in the previous Working Paper version of this chapter.
9Regardless of whether they are identified from labor productivity or output, my “technology shocks”
are based on estimating a stochastic trend. Against this practice, a deeper critique has been levied by
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005) who are concerned with the large uncertainty and possibly misleading
results arising from estimates of long-run shocks and responses from VARs with limited lag lengths. My
paper implements its VAR with a limited lag length (8 lags) as well. It relies on obtaining good estimates
from this specification.
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spending or secular changes in workforce participation. These will now be discussed in
more detail.
Generally, the following mechanisms will be at work: In standard models the real
rate is proportional to expected consumption growth.10 All it takes for a pro-cyclical and
positively leading real-rate is that consumption is expected to be growing after a permanent
increase in output. This rising profile will then be reflected in a higher interest rate – both
in conjunction with the current increase in output and in anticipation of persistently higher
levels of output in the future.11 This applies both to the standard RBC as well as simple
New-Keynesian models. Of course, different utility functions, or frictions in the decisions
to consume/invest/work can change this prediction. My point is that the data is actually
consistent with the simple model’s predictions of a pro-cyclical and positively leading real
rate in response to permanent shocks to output.
Permanent shocks in government spending and their effects on output and interest rates
are analyzed Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992) within a neoclassical model.
Both output and real rate react positively.12 The same result can be found for the simple
New-Keynesian model, see for example Gali (2003).13
Francis and Ramey (2005b) argue that the potentially permanent movements in hours
per-capita are related to some secular changes in workforce participation: Increased school
10I have in mind models with standard preferences which are time-separable and iso-elastic. To a
first order, they imply rt = const + σEt∆ct+1 where rt and ct are the logs of the real rate respectively
consumption, and σ is the relative risk aversion.
11An obvious example would be permanent income effects from an increase in output. But note the subtle
language above: It is important that consumption is expected to be growing after the impact, on impact
disposable income may fall and thus can consumption. So the expected consumption growth may occur
from an initially lower level compared to before the impact. See Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum
(1992) for the case of a permanent increase in government spending, which reduces disposable income.
In response to preference shocks to demand, Baxter and King (1991) also find a pro-cyclical, positively
leading real interest rate.
12The effects work out as follows: The permanent increase in spending leads to a drop in consumer’s
permanent income and thus in consumption. But the spending increase is also initially buffered by lower
investment and the thus increased marginal productivity of capital leads to higher interest rates and a
slowly increasing consumption profile. Together with higher work effort, output rises, too.
13Gali (2003) specifies only a temporary shocks in government spending, but it is straightforwardly
extended to a unit root process.
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years, longevity of retirees (but unchanged retirement age) as well as increased government
employment. Their suggestion is to prune the conventional per-capita units from these
effects. Instead of dividing quantities by the entire civilian population of age 16 and older,
this would account only for the population available for production in the private sector.
Implicitly, this does not only redefine hours per-capita but also output per-capita. For a
business-cycle model, such secular workforce effects are indeed best viewed as exogenous
shifts in effective labor supply.
My estimated correlations pertain to conventionally measured per-capita output. To
introduce some notation, Yt, Ct, Kt and Nt are conventionally measured per-capita output,
consumption, capital and hours. N¯t = Nt/Xt is Francis and Ramey’s measure for hours,
where Xt reflects the exogenous and permanent workforce changes.
14 In a neo-classical
production function we have Yt = F (Kt, AtXtN¯t) where At are conventional technology
shocks. But also the workforce changes, Xt, influence conventional per-capita output very
much like labor-augmenting technology shocks. Together with At, they make up for a
permanent component in Yt.
For the standard RBC model, King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988b, 1988a, “KPR”) trace
out how the effects of permanent technology shocks induce a concurrent rise in real rate and
output (forecasting future high levels of output as well).15 Business cycle models typically
abstract from population growth so that their quantities are best understood as matching
per-capita aggregates. The question is now which per-capita units to use? A direct mapping
of the present setting to the KPR model presumes that the representative household has
preferences over Ct and N¯t, not Nt. In response to an increase in his workforce participation
14To be precise: Xt reflects a difference in population measures. It is the ratios of Francis and Ramey
(2005b, p. 10)’s “population available to carry out productive activity in the private sector” or “available
workforce” over the conventional measure of the civilian population over age 16.
15Partly, this results also from the choice of preferences and parameters of KPR. A permanent technology
shocks initially reduces capital stock (in technology adjusted units) and would thus reduce the incentive
to work because of a lower real wage. For standard preferences, this is however outweighed by positive
incentives arising from the high incentives to invest and thus raise future productive capacity and wealth.
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Xt, he benefits from the additional production without an increased disutility of labor.
16
But also a model where the representative agent’s quantity decisions are measured in the
new per-capita units of Francis and Ramey would yield similar results. To a first order,
deflating all quantities by Xt corresponds to the transformations used by King, Plosser,
and Rebelo (1988a) to obtain a stationary economy in the presence of a stochastic trend.17
Its prediction for the correlation between real rate and (untransformed) output are the
same as above see King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988a).
16In the spirit of Francis and Ramey (2005b), this could be palatable when Xt involves a change between
occupations with different productivity at least in terms of private sector output (e.g. time spent in school
or – no offense – government employment).
17This holds when the accuracy of the solution is limited to the first order, such that certainty equivalence
can be posited. The analysis then mirrors closely the case of a deterministic trend, see King, Plosser, and
Rebelo (1988a) for details.
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Appendix B
Supplement to Chapter 2
B.1 Spectral Factorization Method
The following theorem is a lengthier version of Theorem 1 and is adapted from Hannan
(1970, p. 66). A similar version is also stated by Li (2005). It assures us of the existence
and uniqueness of an MA(q) polynomial D(L), based on an autocovariance function with q
elements. Thereafter I describe how the factorization can be implement to construct D(L)
based on q autocovariances (or equivalently: based on a spectral density).
Theorem (Spectral Factorization). Suppose Γk for k = −q . . . 0 . . . q is a sequence of m×m
matrices which satisfy Γk = Γ
′
−k. The sequence defines a complex valued function
Γ(z) ≡
q∑
k=−q
Γkz
k
where z is complex number. Equivalently, it is represented by its Fourier transformation
Sv(ω) ≡ Γ(eiω)
=
q∑
k=−q
Γke
−ikω ∀ ω ∈ [−π, π]
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If |Sv(ω)| 6= 0 ∀ω, then there is a unique factorization of Sv(ω), respectively Γ(z) into
Sv(ω) = D(e
−ikω) ΩeD(e−ikω)T
Γ(z) = D(z)ΩeD(z)
T
(The transpose is complex conjugate). This factorization is unique and Ωe is a positive
definite n× n matrix and D(z) is a q’th order polynomial
D(z) = I +
q∑
k=1
Dkz
k
which has all its roots on or outside the unit circle.
The result is known as the “(canonical) spectral factorization” and has a long tradition
for instance in linear quadratic control, robust estimation and control, see for example
Whittle (1996). For a reference in the context of economics see Hansen and Sargent (2007,
2005).
Invertibility of the MA(q) follows immediately when excluding the case of zero power
of the spectral density at zero-frequency:
Corollary. Suppose that S(0) 6= 0. Since Ω is positive definite, it follows that D(1) 6= 0.
All roots of D(z) are thus outside the unit circle and D(L) is an invertible MA(q).
In the context of this paper, Sv(ω) will be the spectral density of v
OLS
t = D(L)et
where Eete
′
t = Ω = A0A
′
0. We will be using non-parametric estimates of Sv(ω) based on
weighted sums of the sample autocovariance function as described in Section 2.1.2. The
sample autocovariances are however not to be confused with the Γ(z) above. In the above
theorem Γ(z) is the inverse Fourier transform of the spectral density, and thus a smoothed
version of the sample autocovariance.
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Theorem 1 requires Sv(ω) to be non-singular. This can be understood as requiring
that the autocovariances need to decay sufficiently fast in relation to the number of MA
lags. For example, in the scalar case and with q = 1, the first-order autocorrelation to be
matched with a MA(1) cannot be larger than 0.5 in absolute value.1
Algorithms for implementing the factorization have also a long tradition, see for example
Whittle (1963) or Sayed and Kailath (2001) for a recent survey. I use the implementation of
Li (2005) which is based on a state space representation of vt and performs very reliably in
my simulations. The algorithm of Li (2005) is described in the remainder of this appendix.
Suppose vt follows an MA(q) as above. To represent it in a state space system, define
the state vector
xt = E
{[
vt vt+1 . . . vt+q−1
]′ ∣∣∣∣vt−1} (B.1)
where vt−1 is the entire history of realizations of the vt process up to time t − 1. Li then
constructs the following state space system
xt+1 = Axt +Bet (B.2)
vt = Cxt + et (B.3)
1Given a covariance γ0 and first-order autocovariance γ1, the spectrum equals s(ω) = γ0·(1+2γ1 cos (ω)).
And |s(ω)| 6= 0 requires |γ1/γ0| < 0.5.
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whose system matrices are equal to
A =

0m Im 0m . . . 0m
0m 0m Im 0m . . . 0m
...
. . .
...
0m . . . 0m Im
0m . . . 0m 0m

(B.4)
C =
[
Im 0m . . . 0m
]
(B.5)
D =

D1
D2
...
Dq

(B.6)
where Im and 0m are the m×m identity matrix, respectively the n× n zero matrix.
We need a mapping from autocovariances Γk to the state space objects. Our objects of
interest are the matrix D containing the stacked MA coefficients Di as well as the variance
Ωe of the innovations process. For this mapping, stack the autocovariances into the matrix
M =

Γ1
Γ2
...
Γq

Li (2005, Theorem 2) shows that variance matrix of the states
Ψ ≡ Extx′t
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solves the following Riccati equation
Ψ = AΨA′ + (M − AΨC ′)(Γ0 − CΨC ′)−1(M − AΨC ′)′ (B.7)
which allows the following mapping to our MA(q) coefficients:
Ωe = Γ0 − CΨC ′
D = (M −AΨC ′)(Γ0 − CΨC ′)−1
This yields coefficients D such that D(L) has all roots outside or on the unit circle.
The above Riccati equation can be solved using standard routines. Li shows that it can
also be solved recursively starting from Ψ(0) = 0 and iterating over
Ψ(n+1) = AΨ(n)A′ + (M −AΨ(n)C ′)(Γ0 − CΨ(n)C ′)−1(M −AΨ(n)C ′)′
where Ψ(n+1) ≥ Ψ(n) and Ψ = limn→∞Ψ(n).2
At the end of each factorization, I check that the factorization produces an invertible
MA(q) polynomial and that it matches the original spectral density. In all simulations,
this holds up to machine accuracy.
The paper of Li also shows how to reduce the number of iterations by stacking the
MA(q) into first order form, however this comes at the cost of iterating over inverting
larger matrices in the Riccati iterations which I found to yield numerically less stable
solutions.
2Alternatively, a standard Riccati solver such as Matlab’s dare could be used. I found both routines
to operate numerically equally well. The relative performance of the alternatives routines can differ
substantially but it also depends on the size of the problem and the underlying operating system. A
clearly superior choice did not emerge.
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B.2 VAR’s Implied by Lab Economy
This section outlines how to derive the following:
1. The true values of A0, A(1), B(1), and the autocovariances of Xt in the lab economy
2. Population coefficients of finite-order VAR’s implied by the lab economy
For this specific two-shock economy, details of these derivations can be found in McGrattan
(2005). For general state space models details can be found in Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-
Ramirez, and Sargent (2005). To simplify the VAR notation, Xt has been demeaned prior
to the analysis.
The linearized solution to the lab economy described in Section 2.2 yields a state space
model for labor productivity growth and hours
Xt =
∆yt −∆lt
lt
 (B.8)
= CZt
= CAZt−1 + CBεt
Zt = AZt−1 + Bεt (B.9)
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State vector and shock vector are:
Zt =

kˆt
εzt
τ zl,t
kˆt−1
εzt−1
τ zl,t−1

εt =
εzt
εlt
 (B.10)
where kˆt is the log-deviation of detrended capital from its stead state state, τl,t and ε
z
t are
the labor wedge and the growth rate in technology. (Zt includes also lagged variables due
to the presence of labor productivity growth in Xt.)
The computation of the matrices A, B and C is straightforward, please see CKM for a
detailed presentation.
True VAR objects
The decomposition in section 2.3 uses the following objects of the true process: A0, A(1),
B(1) as well as the autocovariances of Xt. Their computation from the state space is
straightforward. True impulse responses and spectrum of Xt are given by
A(L) = C (I −AL)−1 B
SX(ω) = A(e
−iω)A(e−iω)T
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From (B.9), it is apparent how the structural shocks are linearly related to the forecast
errors of Xt:
CBεt = et
⇒ CB = A0
In order to map forecast errors into structural shocks, A0 must obviously be square and
invertible. Furthermore, Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Sargent (2005) show
that invertibility requires the eigenvalues of A−B(CB)−1CA to be strictly less than one
in modulus, which is satisfied for all calibrations considered here.
Recall from equation (2.4) that this also ties down the covariance matrix of the forecast
errors Ω = CBBCT . Applying (2.6), the non-structural moving average representation is
then simply
Xt = A(L)A
−1
0 et
= C(L)et
⇒ B(1) = I − C(1)−1
The autocovariances EXtX
T
t−k can be directly computed from the state space model,
see for instance the textbook of Sargent and Ljungqvist (2004). The covariance matrix of
the states EZtZ
T
t ≡ Ω is obtained as the solution to a discrete Lyapunov equation:
Ω = AΩ AT + BBT
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The autocovariances of Xt are then
EXtX
T
t−k = CAkΩ CT
VAR(p) coefficients in population
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005, Proposition 1) show that the VAR representation
of Xt in the model is of infinite order. Still, finite-order VAR(p) can be computed as
projections of Xt on a finite number of its past values, Xt−1 . . .Xt−p. Their residuals
will however not be martingales. In line with the notation of the main text, population
coefficients of a VAR(p) are denoted with a superscript “OLS”.
Xt = B(L)
OLSXt−1 + vOLSt
The coefficients of the lag polynomial B(L)OLS =
∑p−1
i=0 B
OLS
i L
i solve the OLS normal
equations
E
(
Xt −
p−1∑
i=0
BOLSi Xt−1−i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=vOLSt
XTt−j = 0 ∀ j = 1 . . . p
which are evaluated using the autocovariance matrices of Xt whose computations are de-
scribed in the preceding paragraph. For instance if p = 1, BOLS1 =
(
EXtX
T
t−1
) (
EXtX
T
t
)−1
.
(Detailed formulas for higher VAR’s can be found in Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez,
and Sargent (2005).)
Notice that by construction, the projection residuals vOLSt are orthogonal to Xt−1, . . . ,
Xt−p, but they are not orthogonal to the entire history ofXt, because of the truncation bias
in the VAR(p). Their moving average representation vOLSt = D(L)et is easily constructed
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using
D(L) =
(
I − B(L)OLS ) (I − B(L))−1 (B.11)
Variance equation
Even though the VAR(p) residuals vOLSt are not iid, the usual variance equation is still
applicable. For notational convenience, take p = 1: Xt = B
OLS
1 Xt−1 + v
OLS
t . The normal
equations imply
VarXt = B
OLS
1 (VarXt) (B
OLS
1 )
T + ΩOLSv (B.12)
=
∞∑
k=0
(BOLS1 )
k ΩOLSv ((B
OLS
1 )
k)T
=
∞∑
k=0
COLSk Ω
OLS
v (C
OLS
k )
T
To see that the last line holds for general VAR(p), rewrite the VAR in companion form
and derive its variance analogously to (B.12).
B.3 Additional Results
This appendix shows some supplementary results. A complete set of results for a model
with lower persistence (ρ = 0.5) can be found at http://www.elmarmertens.ch/thesis.
Figure B.1 demonstrates that there can be in fact a wider spread in impact error com-
puted from CEV than from OLS, depending on the true process. In this case, the lab
economy was simulated using a lower persistence of the labor shocks, ρl. Likewise, Fig-
ure B.2 shows that the OLS error in variance decompositions is vastly reduced in this case
and distributed more tightly than under the high persistence scenario shown in Figure 2.7
of the main text.
B.3. ADDITIONAL RESULTS 159
Figure B.3 is the analogue for the case where ρl = 0.5 to Figure 2.3 of the main text.
Panel a) documents that spectral estimates with high-bandwidth are actually worse than
OLS. Spectral estimates with optimal bandwidth selection are at best only marginally bet-
ter than OLS, see Panel b). The only exception being the spectrum of labor-productivity,
which is better estimated by Newey-West when the importance of technology shocks is
comparably low.
Figure B.4 is the analogue for the Newey-West estimator to the bias decomposition of
Figure 2.6 in the main text. The two are broadly similar. These figures distinguish small
sample bias from truncation (or misspecification) bias. A more detailed decomposition is
given by Figure B.5 which also distinguishes biases in the computation of B(1)OLS from
the biases in estimates of A(1) – recall that the spectral estimates affect only the latter.
For example, the bias in an estimate of ACEV0 can be decomposed as
Â0
CEV − A0 =
[
I − B̂(1)OLS
] [
Â(1)
NW − A(1)NW
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
NW A(1) small sample
(B.13)
+
[
I − B̂(1)OLS
] [
A(1)NW −A(1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
NW A(1) truncation
+
{
B(1)OLS − B̂(1)OLS
}
A(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(1) small sample
+
{
B(1)−B(1)OLS
}
A(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(1) truncation
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The corresponding decomposition for AOLS0 is
Â0
OLS − A0 =
[
I − B̂(1)OLS
] [
Â(1)
OLS − A(1)OLS
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
OLS A(1) small sample
(B.14)
+
[
I − B̂(1)OLS
] [
A(1)OLS −A(1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
OLS A(1) truncation
+
{
B(1)OLS − B̂(1)OLS
}
A(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(1) small sample
+
{
B(1)− B(1)OLS
}
A(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(1) truncation
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Figure B.1: Low persistence: Distribution of Impact Errors
(a) OLS (b) CEV w/AM and b = 150
Note: Distribution of percentage errors in the impact response of hours to a technology shock, a21, over 10,000 simulations with ρl = 0.5. CEV
computed from Andrews-Monahan spectral estimate with bandwidth b = 150. Percentiles are shaded: 95% (light), 68% (middle) and 38%
(very dark). Black line is median of bootstraps.
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Figure B.2: Variance Decompositions: Low Persistence
Note: Share of innovation variance in hours explained by technology shocks a221/(a
2
21 + a
2
22). Simulated estimates using 10,000 draws and
ρl = 0.5. Spectral estimates computed with bandwidth b = 150. Percentiles are shaded: 95% (light), 68% (middle) and 38% (very dark). Black
line is median of bootstraps. Yellow dotted line is population value (computed from applying estimation procedures to true autocovariances of
model) and yellow dashed line is true value.
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Figure B.3: Median Errors in Spectral Estimates (Low Persistence)
(a) b automatically selected (b) b = 150
Note: Median percentage errors of spectral estimates over 10,000 simulations with ρl = 0.5. Automatic bandwidth selection in Panel a) uses
scheme of Newey and West (1994).
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Figure B.4: Decomposed Bias of Hours Impact with Newey-West Spectrum
Note: Small sample and truncation bias in the median percentage errors of the hours impact to technology, a21. Small sample bias computed
from (ÂOLS0 −AOLS0 )/A0 and truncation bias is (AOLS0 −A0)/A0, where ÂOLS0 is the median of the OLS estimates over 10,000 simulation with
ρl = 0.986 and A
OLS
0 is the associated population value. CEV computed with Newey-West spectral estimate with bandwidth b = 150.
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Figure B.5: Detailed Decomposition of Biases with Newey-West Spectrum
Note: The biases are computed according to equations (B.13) and (B.14). Sample values are medians over 10,000 simulation with ρl = 0.986.
Middle panel shows results for A(1)NW , denoted “NWB”, estimated with bandwidth b = 150.
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Appendix C
Supplement to Chapter 3
C.1 LQ Representation for the Simple Model
The model of Section 3.1 can be represented in the framework of Section 3.2 as follows:
The output gap equals the policy control, Ut = gt and is also identical to the measurement
vector Zt = Ut such that Cu = 1 and Cx = 0.
The backward looking variables are
Xt+1 =
τt+1
εt+1
 =
ρ 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Axx
Xt +
ση 0
0 σε

︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
wt+1
with Axy = 0 and Bx = 0.
Inflation is the only forward looking variable of the private sector, Yt = πt, and the
Phillips Curve corresponds to the associated constraint with A1yy = β, Ayy = 1, Ayx = 0,
and By = −κ. As discussed in Section 3.1, nominal interest rate and IS curve have been
dropped from the model since they are redundant for determining equilibrium.
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C.2 Innovation Representation in the Simple Model
This section derives the ARMA(1,1) innovations process (3.19) for policy in the simple
model of Section 3.1. First, policy can be separated into innovation and public expectations
xt = fτ τ˜t + fεε˜t︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜t
+ (fτ + Fτ )τt|t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
xt|t−1
(C.1)
Using τt+1|t = ρτt|t and the Kalman filter, prior beliefs evolve as
xt|t−1 = (1− ρL)−1 ρKτ Lx˜t
where L is the lag operator. Together with (C.1), this yields the ARMA(1,1)
xt = (1− ρL)−1 [1 + ρ(Kτ (fτ + Fτ )− 1)L] x˜t (C.2)
which is identical to (3.19).
C.3 Kalman Filter
For the policy given in (3.26), the private sector’s Kalman filter combines (3.26) with (3.21)
and (3.22) to obtain the state and measurement equations
Xt+1 = (Axx +BxF
0
1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
Xt + AxyYt|t +BxF
0
2Xt|t−1 +Gwt+1 (C.3)
Zt = (Cx +BxF
0
1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C
Xt +BxF
0
2Xt|t−1 (C.4)
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and beliefs evolve as
Xt|t = Xt|t−1 +K
0(Zt − Zt|t−1) (C.5)
with Kalman Gain K
K ≡ Cov (Xt, Zt − Zt|t−1) Var (Zt − Zt|t−1)−1 (C.6)
Notice that the Kalman Gain is identical to the coefficients of a least squares projection of
Xt on Zt−Zt|t−1. The presence of private sector controls Yt|t and predetermined variables
Xt|t−1 does not affect the standard solution of the Kalman filter which yields
K0 = ΣC ′ (C ΣC ′)−1 (C.7)
where Σ solves the Riccati equation
Σ = AΣA′ +DD′ −AC ′ (CΣC ′)−1CA′ (C.8)
Notice that the Kalman filter depends only on the policy coefficients F 01 , via which policy
reacts to Xt, and that it is independent of the reaction coefficients associated with the
predetermined state variable Xt|t−1.
The above assumes that the Nz×Nx matrix C has full row rank.1 In principle (and also
in practice) it can happen that C is collinear for some F 01 . Numerically it is already critical
if C is nearly collinear. This corresponds to situations when there are multiple observables2
which are (almost) perfectly correlated such that Var Z˜t = CΣC
′ is ill-conditioned. Eco-
1Recall that Nz < Nw ≤ Nw.
2This is the case in the model with belief shocks in Section 3.4, but not in the simple model of Section 3.1.
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nomically, this means that a candidate policy F 0 tries to mimic other signals in Zt with
information content of policy. I have never observed such mimicking strategies in equi-
librium, but depending on initial conditions it can occur along the path of the policy
improvement algorithm. In these cases, the Kalman filter is implemented by pruning the
redundancies in the set of observable variables via a singular value decomposition of C. To
obtain numerically stable solution, this is done for singular values of C smaller than 10−8.
C.4 Private Sector Equilibrium
This section proofs proposition 3. Optimal choices of the private sector solve the forward-
looking constraint (3.23) given the policy (3.26) and private sector beliefs about Xt. Based
on the Kalman filter, (3.23) and (3.21), this can be written as a system of expectational
difference equations driven by the exogenous iid disturbance Z˜t:
Xt+1|t = (Axx +BxFˆ
0)Xt|t−1 + AxyYt|t + (Axx +BxF
0
1 )K
0 Z˜t
A1yyYt+1|t = (Ayx +ByFˆ
0)Xt|t−1 + AyyYt|t + (Ayx +ByF
0
1 )K
0 Z˜t
where Fˆ 0 ≡ F 01 + F 02 . The matrices
A¯ =
I 0
0 A1yy
 and B¯ =
(Axx +BxFˆ 0) Axy
(Ayx +ByFˆ
0) Ayy

collect the coefficients on the endogenous variables.
This is the kind of linear systems studied by King and Watson (1998) and Klein (2000),
where A1yy is allowed to be singular. Applying their methods yields the counting rule in
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the proposition and the solution has the form
Yt|t = G¯Xt|t−1 +HyZ˜t
Xt+1|t = A¯Xt|t−1 +HxZ˜t
Notice that for given policies, F 01 and F
0
2 , the Kalman gain enters only in connection
with the exogenous disturbances and thus does neither affect the existence condition nor
the decision coefficients G¯ and A¯. (The latter follows from the certainty equivalence of the
solution to a linear difference system.)
C.5 Regulator for Discretion Problem
This section shows how to derive the regulator problem (3.31) with state transition (3.32)
from Section 3.2. For convenience, the regulator is reproduced here
X ′tV
∗X t + v
∗ = min
Ut
{
X ′tQ
0X t + 2X
′
tN
0Ut + U
′
tR
0Ut + βEtX
′
t+1V
0X t+1 + v
0
}
(3.31)
s.t. X t+1 = A
0X t +B
0Ut +Dwt+1 (3.32)
X t ≡
 Xt
Xt|t−1

Public beliefs about current and future policies are taken as given. They are represented
by F 0 = [F 01 F
0
2 ] and G
0 as in (3.26) and (3.29). As will be seen regulator matrices with
superscript “0” depend on F 0 and G0. Future policies of the policymaker are also taken
as given and represented by the value function V 0t+1. Since the problem is linear quadratic,
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the value function can be taken to be linear quadratic, too, (Bertsekas 2005):
V 0t+1 =X
′
t+1V
0X t+1 + v
0 (C.9)
The definition of the discretion problem in Section 3.2, takes the matrix V 0 and the scalar
v0 as given. For the policy improvement algorithm, they are however calculated to be
consistent with continuing the policy F 0 and the beliefs G0 forever. This is shown at the
end of this section.
The derivation proceeds by using the temporary equilibrium (3.30) and the Kalman
filter (3.27) to substitute Yt|t out of the loss function (3.25) and transition equation (3.21)
for Xt. The Kalman filter also yields the transition equation for Xt|t−1. The Kalman filter
also depends on a prior belief about observables Zt|t−1 = CxXt|t−1+CuUt|t−1 and thus on a
prior belief on policy. To simplify the regulator, it is assumed that this belief is consistent
with F 0 (as it will be in equilibrium), such that
Zt|t−1 = (Cx + Cu(F 01 + F
0
2 ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cˆ
Xt|t−1
The Kalman update can then be written as
Xt|t = KCxXt + (I −KCˆ)Xt|t−1 +KCuUt
Together with the temporary equilibrium (3.30) this yields
Yt|t = G
0
xXt + Gˆ
0
xXt|t−1 +G
0
uUt
with G0x = (Gx +GuF
0
1 )KCx
Gˆ0x = (Gx +GuF
0
1 )(I −KCˆ) +GuF 02
G0u = (Gx +GuF
0
1 )KCu
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Loss Function
The loss function (3.25) can then be rewritten in terms of the regulator’s states and control
using

Xt
Yt|t
Ut
 =
 I 0 0
G0x Gˆ
0
x G
0
u

︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
0

Xt
Xt|t−1
Ut

such that
Lt =

Xt
Yt
Ut

′
Q

Xt
Yt
Ut
 =
X t
Ut

′
H0
′
QH0
X t
Ut

=X ′tQ
0X t + 2X
′
tN
0Ut + U
′
tR
0Ut
where Q0, N0 and R0 conformably partition the above quadratic form as:
H0
′
QH0 =
Q0 N0
N0
′
R0

State Transition
Likewise, the state transitions for Xt and Xt|t−1 can be derived as
Xt+1 = (Axx + AxyG
0
x)Xt + AxyGˆ
0
xXt|t−1 + (AxyG
0
u +Bx)Ut +Dwt+1
Xt+1|t = AxxKCxXt +
(
Axx(I −KCˆ) + (AxyGu +By)F 02
)
Xt|t−1 +AxxKCuUt
where Axx = AxxAxy(Gx +GuF
0
1 ) +ByF
0
1
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The matrices A0, B0 and D in (3.32) are thus given by:
A0 =
(Axx + AxyG0x) AxyGˆ0x
AxxKCx
(
Axx(I −KCˆ) + (AxyGu +By)F 02
)

B0 =
AxyG0u +Bx
AxxKCu
 and D0 =
D
0

Value Function consistent with F 0 and G0
The policy improvement algorithm described at the end of Section 3.2 uses a continuation
value consistent with carrying out the policy F 0 forever. The continuation value is linear
quadratic in X t as in (C.9). It is computed from the closed loop representation of the
regulator obtained by plugging the policy F 0 into (3.31) and (3.32). V 0 then solves the
Lyapunov equation
V 0 =
{
Q0 +N0F 0 + F ∗′R0F 0
}
+ β(A0 +B0F 0)′V 0(A0 +B0F 0)
The equation has a unique solution if the matrix in curly braces is positive definite and if
the closed loop transition matrix (A0 +B0F 0) has all eigenvalues inside the unit circle.
The former is assured by the form of the original loss function3 and the latter holds if a
stationary equilibrium exists.4
The scalar v0 can be computed from:
v0 =
β
1− β tr (V
0DD′)
where tr is the trace operator. Notice that optimal policies are certainty equivalent (for
3Please recall that Q in (3.25) is assumed to be positive definite.
4Efficient methods for solving Lyapunov equations are available for example via the LAPACK routines
encoded in MATLAB or by using the doubling algorithms of Anderson et al. (1995).
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given F 0) and do not depend on v0. Details behind these derivations can be found in
Sargent and Ljungqvist (2004) or Svenssson (2007). Unconditionally expected losses are
computed as
E(V 0t ) = tr (V
0EX tX
′
t) + v
0
where EX tX
′
t solves another Lyapunov equation:
EX tX
′
t = (A
0 +B0F 0) (EX tX
′
t) (A
0 +B0F 0)′ +DD′
C.6 Additional Results
This appendix contains supplementary results: Figure C.1 compares impulse responses
under hidden and symmetric information for the simple NK model, this collects results
from Figure 3.1 and 3.4 on one figure. Figure C.2 compares impulse responses under full
information measure with time-zero public expectations for same model. A comparison
with the commitment policy under full information is given in Figure C.3.
Figure C.4 documents the dependence of the policymaker’s value function on the extent
of credibility problems, measured by σb. Figure C.5 supplements the sensitivity analysis
of Figure 3.6 for fε/fτ with the corresponding picture for σ¯
2 = (fε/fτ )
2 σε.
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Figure C.1: Hidden Information versus Symmetric Information
Note: Impulse responses to structural shocks in the simple NK model. Straight lines show optimal policy
under hidden information and are identical to those in Figure 3.4. Dashed lines show optimal policy under
symmetric information and are identical to those in Figure 3.1.
Figure C.2: Public Beliefs versus Actual Policies
Note: Impulse responses in simple NK model with optimal policy. Straight lines show structural responses
under full information measure. (Identical to those in Figure 3.4.) Dashed lines show publicly expected
response paths as of time zero.
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Figure C.3: Discretion with Hidden Information versus Commitment under Symmetric
Information
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x
τ
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
ε
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
pi
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
 
 
commitment
hidden info discretion
Note: Impulse responses in simple NK model with optimal policy. Straight lines show responses under
discretion policy with hidden information, identical to those in Figure 3.4.) Dashed lines show commitment
outcomes under symmetric information.
Figure C.4: Transparency and Welfare
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Note: Unconditionally expected value function of policymaker E(Vt) of model with belief shocks (Sec-
tion 3.4) when varying the volatility of belief shocks, σb. Other parameters at baseline values of Table 3.1.
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Figure C.5: Sensitivity of Effective Noise σ¯2
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Note: Sensitivity of σ¯2 = (fε/fτ )
2 σε to changes in αx and σε, keeping other parameters at their baseline values (Table 3.1).
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